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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This case involves an appeal from a final order, dated October 8, 2005. See 
Ruling and Order, dated October 8, 2005 (R. at 1420). Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to 
Art. VIII, Section 5, of the Utah Constitution, Sections 78-2-2(3)0) and 78-2a-3(2)(j) of 
the Utah Code, and Rules 3(a) and 4(a) of Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
ISSUES, PRESERVATION AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue #1: Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment on Plaintiffs' 
nuisance claims and ruling that no disputes of material fact exist and that the permits and 
ordinances1 govern or otherwise bar those claims? Plaintiffs preserved this issue for 
appellate review in their Memoranda in Opposition to Summary Judgment. (R. at 638, 
643, 695-99.) Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment is a question 
of law reviewed "for correctness/' while granting "no deference" to trial court's 
conclusions. Ault v. Holden, 2002 UT 33, U 15, 44 P.3d 781 (emphasis added); see also 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
Issue #2: Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment on Plaintiffs' 
nuisance claims and ruling that the permits and Outdoor Music Ordinance "govern" and 
thereby supercede state law governing those claims? Plaintiffs preserved this issue for 
appellate review in their Memoranda in Opposition to Summary Judgment. (R. at 636-
1
 The ordinances are collectively referred to herein as "the Outdoor Music 
Ordinance" or "the Ordinance." 
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38.) Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment is a question of law 
reviewed "for correctness/' while granting "no deference" to trial court's conclusions. 
Auk, 2002 UT 33 at TI15 (emphasis added); see also Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
Issue #3: Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment and ruling that 
Plaintiffs' common law and statutory nuisance claims are barred under U.C.A. §§ 10-8-
60 and 10-8-76? Plaintiffs preserved this issue in their Memoranda in Opposition to 
Summary Judgment, Petition for Permission to Appeal, and Memorandum in Opposition 
to Defendants' Combined Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. at 638, 763-67, 1411-13.) 
Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment is a question of law 
reviewed "for correctness." while granting "no deference" to trial court's conclusions. 
Auk, 2002 UT 33 at f 15 (emphasis added); see also Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Similarly, 
"[t]he correct interpretation of a statute is a question of law and is reviewed for 
correctness." State v. Larsen. 865 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Utah 1993) (emphasis added). 
Thus, whether the trial court erred in dismissing Plaintiffs' nuisance claims under 
Sections 10-8-60 and 10-8-76 is a question of law, which this Court reviews for 
correctness. See id. 
Issue #4: Did the trial court err in not striking the Outdoor Music Ordinance void 
and unconstitutional? Plaintiffs preserved this issue in their Memoranda in Opposition to 
Summary Judgment and Motions for Reconsideration. (R. at 647-48, 810-19, 886-87, 
1413-14 n.4.) Whether the trial court erred in ruling that the Outdoor Music Ordinance 
2 
is constitutional, involves a question of law, which this Court reviews "for correctness, 
giving no deference to the trial court." Salt Lake Citv v. Wood. 1999 UT App. 323, f 4, 
991 P.2d 595 (emphasis added). 
Issue #5: Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment on Plaintiffs' 
takings claim and ruling that Plaintiffs "failed to exhaust.. . administrative remedies" 
under Section 15-1-18 of the Park City Land Management Code? Plaintiffs preserved 
this issue in their Memoranda in Opposition to Summary Judgment and Motions for 
Reconsideration. (R. at 648-51, 812 n.4.) Whether the trial court erred in granting 
summary judgment is a question of law reviewed "for correctness." while granting "no 
deference" to trial court's conclusions. Ault, 2002 UT 33 at f 15 (emphasis added); see 
also Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Similarly, "[t]he correct interpretation of a statute is a 
question of law and is reviewed for correctness." Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1357 (emphasis 
added). Thus, whether the trial court erred in dismissing Plaintiffs' takings claim under 
Section 15-1-18 is a question of law, which this Court reviews for correctness. See id. 
Issue #6: Did the trial court err in denying Plaintiffs' Motions for Reconsideration 
because the court's earlier ruling was "final"? Plaintiffs preserved this issue in their 
Motions for Reconsideration. (R. at 851-52, 883.) Whether a trial court's ruling is 
"final," is a question of law reviewed for correction. See generally Bradbury v. Valencia, 
2000 UT 50, 5 P.3d 649. 
Issue #7: Did the trial court err in denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration 
3 
because their constitutional claims against the Outdoor Music Ordinance were not 
adequately briefed when first considered by the court? Plaintiffs preserved this issue in 
their Motion for Reconsideration. (R. at 886-88.) Whether the trial court erred in 
denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 
See Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies. 884 P.2d 1306, 1312 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
Issue #8: Did the trial court err in ruling on Defendants' Motions for Summary 
Judgment before answers were filed and/or discovery could be initiated or completed. 
Plaintiffs preserved this issue in their Memoranda in Opposition to Summary Judgment. 
(R. at 731; 976.) "This court reviews the denial ot the Rule 56(f) motion for an abuse of 
discretion." Aspenwood L.L.C. v. C.A.T.. L.L.C.. 2003 UT App. 28,116, 73 P.3d 947, 
cert, denied, 72 P.3d 685 (Utah 2003). However, when a trial court does not rule on a 
Rule 56(f) motion, thereby failing to exercise its discretion, "'the issue of whether or not 
it should have presents a legal question which is subject to de novo review.'" Crossland 
Sav. v. Haten, 877 P.2d 1241, 1243 n.4 (Utah 1994) (quoting Garrett v. City & County 
of San Francisco, 818 F.2d 1515 n.3 ( 9th Cir. 1987)). 
Issue #9: Did the trial court err in denying Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Defendant 
Barton's Supplemental Affidavit? Plaintiffs preserved this issue in their Motion to Strike 
Defendant Barton's Supplemental Affidavit. (R. at 1123-28.) "A motion to strike . . . is 
reviewed for under an abuse of discretion standard." Rivera v. State Farm Mut. Auto 
Ins. Co.. 2000 UT 36, t 7. 
4 
Issue #10: Should the trial court's finding that Defendant Barton did not 
contribute to the nuisance complained of by Plaintiffs during 1999 be set aside? 
Plaintiffs preserved this issue throughout their case. (See, e.g., Mem in Siipp. of Prelim. 
Injun. R. at 38, 48; Reif Aff. R. at 78-81, 99; Amended ( omplaint R. at 665, 669, 674-
75, 682-87; Mem. in Opp. to Barton's Motion for Sum. J. R. at 696-99; 959-66, 1017-
18.) This Court reviews the trial court's findings under a "clearly erroneous" standard. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) (emphasis added). Alternatively, when findings are based solely on 
written documents and not on direct testimony, this Couri may "examine the evidence de 
novo and determine the facts." In re Infant Anonymous, 760 P.2d 916, 918 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988) (emphasis added). 
Issue #11: Should costs on appeal be granted to Plaintiffs/Appellants? hu Mian I In 
Rule 34 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiffs/Appellants respectfully request 
that costs be granted to them. 
5 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves a noise dispute, which began in 1998, over loud amplified 
outdoor concerts which were held within close proximity to Plaintiffs' home.2 (Amended 
Complaint at 664.) Park City Municipal Corporation authorized the concerts by issuing 
permits to restaurants in 1999 and by passing an ordinance ("the Outdoor Music 
Ordinance") in 2000 and which, as amended, remains in effect today. (Amended 
Complaint at 665, If 26; 671, f 88.) In 1999, Randy Barton, d/b/a Wooden Dog, operated 
as the concert promoter, scheduler of bands and sound controller for at least one of the 
permitted restaurants. (Aff. of Barton at 665, % 25; 619, f 6.) In 2000, Park City Arts 
Council operated as the sole licensee under the Outdoor Music Ordinance, and Barton, 
d/b/a Mountain Town Stages, served as Park City Arts Council's program manager and 
sound technician. (Aff. of Barton at 621, fflf 21-23; Aff. of Charnes at 626,19; 627, f 13 
Amended Complaint at 682, ffl[ 175-76.) Beginning in 2001, Randy Barton, d/b/a 
Mountain Town Stages, operated as the sole licensee under the Ordinance. (R. at 236-45; 
Aff. of Barton at 622, ^ 26; Aff. of Charnes at 627, If 15.) 
As a result of Defendants' failure to abate the noise level despite Plaintiffs' 
repeated complaints, Plaintiffs had no choice but to seek legal redress for their claims, 
which they sought by filing a lawsuit in 2001. (Amended Complaint at 662.) Plaintiffs' 
lawsuit alleges common law nuisance, statutory nuisance, and continuing, threatened or 
2
 Plaintiffs do not appeal the trial court's decision on their 1998 nuisance claim. 
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anticipatory nuisance. (Amended Compla in t at 682-84.) Plaintiffs ' lawsuit also alleges 
local noise ordinance violations, permit violations, invalidation and unconsti tut ionali ty of 
the Outdoor Mus ic Ordinance, and takings. (R. at 684-86) . 
After Plaintiffs filed suit in 2 0 0 1 , Defendants i i IC >\ ed foi sin nmary judgment on all 
of Plaintiffs' claims before any answers were filed or any discovery could be initiated or 
completed. (R. at 143, 503, 611.) On August 7,2002, with the exception of Plaintiffs' 
fourth cause of action for common law nuisance claim for continuing, threatened or 
anticipatory nuisance, the trial court dismissed Plaintiffs' common law and statutory 
nuisance claims against all Defendants, ruling that those claims were governed by the 
permits and Outdoor Music Ordinance authorizing the concerts and that Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 10-8-60 and 10-8-76 further governed those claims, as a matter of law. (R i ilii ig and 
Order at 754-55, attached hereto as Exhibit A.) The trial court also dismissed Plaintiffs' 
constitutional challenge and takings claim against the Outdoor Music Ordinance, ruling 
that Plaintiffs had failed to establish that the Ordinance is unconstitutional and had failed 
to exhaust administrative remedies available under § 15-1-18 of the Park City Land 
Management Code. (Ruling and Order at 757.) The trial court, however, specifically 
denied Barton's motion as to Plaintiffs' claim for violations of the 1999 permits. (Ruling 
and Order at 756-57.) Plaintiffs sought interlocutory appeal but the Utah Supreme Court 
denied Plaintiffs' petition. (Ruling and Order at 759, 799.) 
Plaintiffs then filed a Motion for Clarification and/or Reconsideration. (R. at 805.) 
7 
Plaintiffs argued, in part, that reconsideration was appropriate because the Outdoor Music 
Ordinance: (1) violates the Supremacy Clause, (2) violates the Fifth Amendment Takings 
Clause, (3) violates the Separation of Powers provision, (4) violates the Due Process 
Clauses, (5) constitutes special legislation, (6) delegates a core governmental function, (7) 
fails to meet minimal scrutiny, (8) is overinclusive and unreasonable, and (9) is repugnant 
to law. (R. at 810-19.) On March 31, 2003, the trial court denied Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Reconsideration as to the constitutionality of the Ordinance, stating that its earlier ruling 
constituted "a final, formal judgment" and that Plaintiffs' arguments were "not 
specifically briefed" when first considered by the court during summary judgment 
proceedings. (Ruling and Order at 877-78, attached hereto as Exhibit B.) 
Plaintiffs then filed a second Motion for Reconsideration or, in the alternative, 
Certification. (R. at 880.) Plaintiffs argued in part that reconsideration was appropriate 
because the trial court erred as a matter of law in denying Plaintiffs' earlier Motion for 
Reconsideration on the basis that the August 7, 2002 Ruling and Order was "final" and 
that Plaintiffs' arguments were "not specifically briefed" during summary judgment 
proceedings. (R. at 883-89.) In the meantime, Barton filed a second motion for summary 
judgment on Plaintiffs' claim for violations of the permits. (R. at 896.)3 
In a Minute Entry and Order, dated July 5, 2003, the trial court acknowledged that 
3
 Barton attached an affidavit to his reply brief in support of his motion (R. at 
1082), which Plaintiffs moved to strike. (R. at 1119.) Barton's reply brief was untimely 
and was filed after the Notice to Submit for Decision was filed. (R. at 1122, fflj 4-7.) 
8 
its earlier ruling was not "technically a final judgment," but nevertheless denied Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Reconsideration because "most o f their arguments "were not adequately 
briefed" when initially considered by the court. (Minute Entry aiv i >• dor at 1130, 
attached hereto as Exhibit C.) ' I lie trial coi n t fi n tl ler asserted that its March j i, 2003 .-\ 
ruling was intended to advance the "policy of furthering certainty and discouraging 
piecemeal briefing." (Minute Entry and Order at 1130.) The trial court also "denied 
without prejudice" Plaintiffs' Motion for Certification pending resolution U» liu ton\ 
second summary judgment motion. (Minute Entry and Order at 1130). 
On July 14, 2003, the trial court held a hearing on Barton's second motion for 
summary judgment and ruled from the bench to grant that motion. (R. at 1139, 
1305:32:17-18.) The trial court also instructed Barton's counsel to prepare an order 
consistent with the trial court's decision to grant Barton's motion. (R. at 1139, 
1305:32:19, 25.) Barton's counsel failed to timely submit an order and failed to request 
or receive a stipulated extension of time from Plaintiffs' counsel or the trial court. (R. at 
1234-35.) On September 16, 2003, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Vacate and Reconsider 
Summary Judgment Decision and to Renew Plaintiffs' Motion for Certification and 
supporting memorandum, arguing that summary judgment should be reconsidered and 
additional time for discovery should be granted because Plaintiffs' counsel 1lad located a 
witness whose testimony directly contradicts Barton's testimony set forth in his affidavit 
filed with his reply memo for summary judgment. (R. at 1151-76.) On October 16, 2003, 
9 
Plaintiffs filed a Notice to Submit in connection with their Motion to Vacate. (R. at 
1226.) In the interim, Barton filed a proposed order and second proposed order, and 
Plaintiffs timely objected to the form of those orders. (R. at 1177, 1229.) On October 18, 
2003, the trial court signed a Minute Entry, stating that it had "signed" Barton's second 
proposed order without addressing Plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate, which the trial court 
mistakenly believed had not been submitted for decision. (R. at 1256.) 
On January 19, 2004, the trial court denied Plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate and 
Reconsider Summary Judgment but did not explicitly resolve Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion 
for Certification. (Minute Entry and Order at 1267-68, attached hereto as Exhibit D.) 
Instead, with respect to that motion, the court acknowledged that "it was not clear whether 
the court previously ruled on plaintiffs' Fourth Cause of Action" but again suggested that 
the court's prior rulings were "final"; thus, providing no clear resolution as to the finality 
of Plaintiffs' case while suggesting that the court's order might suffice as a certification 
order if one is needed. (Minute Entry and Order at 1267-68.) Plaintiffs then filed a 
proposed order to certify the case for appeal. (R. at 1289.) On March 29, 2004, the trial 
court declined to sign Plaintiffs' proposed order, stating that "[t]he court believes its 
[January 19, 2004] Minute Entry and Order will suffice as certification, if one is needed . . 
and the court now determines that it will sign no further orders unless the appellate court 
to which this matter is assigned remands the matter as to the Fourth Cause of Action for 
any reason." (Minute Entry and Order at 1295, attached hereto as Exhibit E.) Plaintiffs 
10 
thereafter filed a timely notice of appeal. (R. at 1297.) 
On appeal, Plaintiffs moved for summary disposition for lack of jurisdiction and 
requested a remand because the trial court had not issued a final appealable order or 
judgmen at 1306.) On Septeml r lu, z004, tlle I Jtah Court i - : oals dismissed 
the case for lack of jurisdiction and remanded for clarification by the trial court as to the 
status of Plaintiffs' fourth cause of action. (Memorandum Decision at 1306-07.) 
Plaintiffs then filed a Renewed Motion for Certification I ^1.) 
On December 15, 2004, while Plaintiffs5 Renewed Motion for Certification was 
pending, the trial court ruled that it "never clearly dismissed" Plaintiffs' fourth cause of 
action and directed the parties to agree to dismissal of that action, without prejudice, or to 
submit a proposed order certifying the matter for appeal. I t 1329.) Defendants then 
filed for summary judgment on Plaintiffs' fourth cause of action (R. at 1331, 1371, 1377), 
and the trial court ordered the case stayed pending a resolution attempt. (Minute Entry at 
1340.) Plaintiffs then filed a combined motion to vacate the stay, enter an order of 
certification, and stay Defendants' motion for summary judgment. (R. at 1342.) 
On June 5, 2005, the trial court issued a Minute Entry again noting that "it has 
never clearly dismissed plaintiffs' Fourth Cause of Action" and further instructing 
Plaintiffs to respond to Defendants' motion for summary judgment, and denying 
Plaintiffs' motion to stay Defendants' motion for summary judgment. (R. at 1400.) On 
June 27, 2005, Plaintiffs timely filed their memorandum in opposition to Defendants' 
11 
motion for summary judgment. (R. at 1403-16.) Defendants filed no reply memoranda 
(R. at 1417), and on June 12, 2005 Plaintiffs submitted the motion for decision. (R. at 
1417). 
On October 8, 2005, the trial court entered an order acknowledging that 
"[Plaintiffs] may well be right" in arguing that "the law does not bar the Fourth Cause of 
Action, and [that] the court's August 2002 ruling was in error that must be reversed, so 
[that] it should not justify dismissal of the remaining claim." (Ruling and Order at 1420 
(emphasis added), attached hereto as Exhibit F.) Nevertheless, without further 
explanation, the court concluded to "hold to its view" set forth in its August 7, 2002 
ruling and granted Defendant Barton's motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs' 
fourth cause of action. (Ruling and Order at 1420.) Plaintiffs timely appealed. (R. at 
1422.) 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Plaintiffs are longtime residents and owners of property located in the Old 
Town district of Park City, Utah. (Amended Complaint at 663, ffif 8-12.) 
2. Plaintiffs support the arts and enjoy music. (Aff. of Reif - o5, fflf 3-4.) 
3. Plamtiff Reif is a classically trained flutist and she also teaches flute lessons. 
(Aff. of Reif at 65, f 3.) 
4. Plaintiffs' property parallels lower Main Street, which includes recently 
devel . • •• private property (i.e., 1 azas) on both sides of tl le street that are occi lpied • 
by (or have been occupied by) restaurants and other businesses. (Aff. of Whaley at 87, f 
10; Amended Complaint at 663-64, t l 13-14.) 
5. The Plazas are known as the Town Lift and Summit Watch plazas. 
(Amended Compia^ oo4,)] 14.) 
6. Lower Main Street and the Plazas did not exist and were not contemplated 
when Plaintiff Whaley purchased Plaintiffs' property over three decades ago. (Amended 
Complaint at 663, ]f 12.) 
7. Plaintiffs are the closest, permanent, year-round residents to the Plazas. 
(Amended Complaint at 664, ^  17.) Plaintiffs' property is located less than 150 feet from 
the Town Lift plaza and less than 380 feet from the Summit Watch plaza. (Amended 
Complaint 664, T| 18.) 
8. Main Street and Plaintiffs' property are located at the bottom of a steep 
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mountain canyon (Aff. of Whaley at 87, ^  11), and the Plazas are higher in elevation than 
Plaintiffs' property. (Aff. of Whaley at 88, ^ 17.) 
9. Before 1998, amplified outdoor music did not exist and was not allowed in 
the lower Main Street area. (Amended Complaint at 664, ^  19.) 
10. Beginning in the summer of 1998, Park City Municipal Corporation allowed 
amplified outdoor music at the Plazas (Amended Complaint at 664, % 19), and Plaintiffs 
complained to the City that the excessive volume created by those concerts was unduly 
disturbing, but the City did nothing to resolve Plaintiffs' concerns. (Amended Complaint 
at 664, fflf 21-23.) 
11. In 1999, Park City Municipal Corporation continued to allow amplified 
outdoor music at the Plazas. (Amended Complaint at 664, % 26.) The City accomplished 
this by issuing permits to three (3) restaurants in the lower Main Street area. (Amended 
Complaint at 665, t 26.) 
12. Defendant Barton, d/b/a the Wooden Dog, scheduled, arranged, booked 
and/or produced bands for the 1999 outdoor concerts. (Amended Complaint at 665, ^  25; 
Barton's Admission (Letter to the Editor) at 1026.) Defendant Barton has specifically 
admitted to arranging for musicians, providing the sound amplification, operating under 
the authority granted by the City through the permits, knowing of complaints from nearby 
residents and, due to those complaints, having the permits revoked by the City. (Barton's 
Admission (Letter to the Editor) at 1026.) 
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13. Defendant Barton's involvement as producer of the bands for the 1999 
concert was well documented in the media. (R. at 962, <f 5; Barton's Admission (Letter to 
the Editor) at 1026.) 
14. Defendant Barton acted as promoter for the 1999 concert series and 
personally advertised the concerts in the media as "the Wooden Dog concert series." (R. 
at 962, Tf 6; R. at 1168, 1170, 1173.) Defendant Barton also promoted the concerts on his 
website. (R. at 962, f 7; R. at 1158-59.) 
15. As a result of the 1999 permits that were issued by the City, Plaintiffs were 
unduly disturbed by the outdoor music allowed at the Plazas. (Amended Complaint at 
665-664128-41.) 
16. Such intrusions occurred nearly every day and every night. (Amended 
Complaint at 665,129.) 
17. Plaintiffs were subjected to ten (10) hours of excessive noise on Sundays, 
three (3) hours on Tuesdays, four (4) hours on Fridays, and six (6) hours on Saturdays. 
(Amended Complaint at 665-66, Yl 31-34.) 
18. With respect to the Sunday hours in particular, the City's Police Chief, 
Lloyd D. Evans stated in a memorandum dated July 1, 1999: "I believe that the number of 
hours requested [by the 1999 outdoor music permit applicants] is extreme and not in the 
best interest of the business and residential neighbors of these establishments." 
(Amended Complaint at 667, ^ 55.) 
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19. The City extended the hours of operation over the Chiefs objections. 
(Amended Complaint at 667, ffl[ 56.) As a result, the Sunday concerts were allowed 
between 11:00 a.m. and 9:00 p.m., but they frequently exceeded that limitation. 
(Amended Complaint at 665, U 31; R. at 964-65, ffl[ 16-17.) 
20. Plaintiffs' ability to sleep, rest, relax, work, study, read, or do anything that 
required concentration was impossible as a result of the loud intrusive noise. (Amended 
Complaint at 666, ffif 35-39.) 
21. Plaintiffs could not engage in normal conversation or enjoy a meal together 
because the music was so loud. (Amended Complaint at 666, Tj 38.) 
22. Plaintiff Reif even resorted to using earplugs, but to no avail. (Amended 
Complaint at 666, Tf 36.) 
23. Plaintiffs' only relief resulted when they left their home and returned after 
the music ceased. (Amended Complaint at 666, |^ 40.) 
24. It was enormously stressful and inconvenient for Plaintiffs to be forced from 
their home. (Amended Complaint at 666, If 41.) 
25. Defendant Barton contributed to the nuisance complained of by Plaintiffs. 
(R. at 965, If 19.) 
26. Plaintiffs called the City and complained repeatedly. (Amended Complaint 
at 666-67, fflf 43- 49.) 
27. Plaintiffs' voices became so familiar to police dispatchers that they would 
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call Plaintiffs by their first names before Plaintiffs identified themselves. (Amended 
Complaint at 667, % 49.) 
28. On at least one occasion, the police agreed with Plaintiffs that the music was 
too loud but said they could do nothing about it because a "permit" had been issued to 
allow it. (Amended Complaint at 667, f 47.) One officer also told Plaintiffs that filing a 
lawsuit was their only recourse. (Amended Complaint at 667, ^ f 47.) 
29. Defendant Barton knew or had reason to know of Plaintiffs' complaints, but 
he did nothing to amend his behavior as sound manager and/or music producer for the 
restaurants. (R. at 963-64, fflf 10-12.) 
30. No relief resulted despite Plaintiffs' incessant complaints to the City. 
(Amended Complaint at 667, f^ 50.) 
31. The 1999 concerts did not abide by the volume and time limitations set forth 
in the permits. (Amended Complaint at 667, f 52.) 
32. The music played at the Plazas in 1999 violated at least three conditions of 
the permits: (1) "[s]ound levels on all amplified sound will remain at a reasonable level 
[so] as not to unduly disturb the surrounding neighborhood," (2) "[t]he applicants will 
confine the event activity to those areas indicated in the site plan," and (3) "[t]he 
applicants will confine the hours of th[e] event[s] to the time frame indicated on the 
application." (Amended Complaint at 667, ^ J 52.) 
33. As sound manager and/or music producer for the 1999 concert series, 
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Defendant Barton's conduct was governed by all three of the permit conditions noted 
above, and he failed to comply therewith. (R. at 964-65, ^  16-17.) 
34. The 1999 concerts violated at least three Park City noise ordinances; 
specifically, Park City Municipal Code §§ 6-3-7, 6-3-8(J)(2), and 6-3-9(A). (Amended 
Complaint at 667,^51.) 
35. The City issued at least two citations for noise violations resulting from the 
1999 concert series. (R. at 964, If 13.) 
36. The City eventually "revoked the permits" at the end of the 1999 summer 
season. (R. at 1005, ^ f 3.) This was due in part to Defendant Barton's failure to comply 
with the conditions of the permits. (R. at 1005, f 3.) 
37. At the close of the 1999 summer season, Barton authored and published a 
"Letter to the Editor" in the Park Record newspaper in which he admitted his involvement 
in the 1999 concerts and his involvement in and knowledge of the revocation of at least 
one of the permits. (R. at 1026.) 
38. Plaintiffs were not aware of Barton's "Letter to the Editor" until 2003 when 
they found it while preparing to defend a second motion for summary judgment in which 
Barton claimed he was not involved in the 1999 concerts after he had already admitted his 
involvement in the 1999 concerts during an earlier summary judgment proceeding. (R. at 
1017.) 
39. After the 1999 summer season ended, the City again started to consider the 
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issue of outdoor music concerts in the lower Main Street area. (Amended Complaint at 
670, H 79.) 
40. Plaintiffs voiced their objections to the City after learning that amplified 
outdoor music might again be allowed within close proximity to their home. (Amended 
Complaint at 670, f 80.) 
41. On April 13, 2000, Plaintiffs delivered a notice of claim to the City. 
(Amended Complaint at 674, U 103.) 
42. On June 1, 2000, the City passed a special ordinance, Ordinance 00-36 
(codified at Park City, Utah, Code § 4-8A (2000)), governing outdoor music (heretofore 
referred to as the "Outdoor Music Ordinance" or the "Ordinance"). (R. at 826-33, 
attached hereto as Exhibit G.) 
43. The Outdoor Music Ordinance was limited to the same privately owned 
Plazas as Plaintiffs had complained about the year prior; namely, the Town Lift and 
Summit Watch plazas. (R. at 829.) 
44. The Outdoor Music Ordinance authorized amplified music at a much higher 
volume level and for a longer period of time than, and for just as many days per week, as 
the year prior. (Amended Complaint at 671-72, ^ 89-90.) 
45. The permitted volume alone was increased to 90 decibels, which resulted in 
a 25 decibel increase over the year prior. (Amended Complaint at 671-72, }^ 89.) 
46. The increase in volume was authorized based on a flawed noise study, 
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which was conducted by person(s) who were not certified in the area of expertise in which 
they purported to give advice to the City. (Aff. of Sola at 105, ^  7; 106-09, Tflj 14-19.) 
47. Park City Arts Council (the "Arts Council") was the sole licensee under the 
Outdoor Music Ordinance passed in 2000. (Amended Complaint at 682, If 175.) 
48. In 2001, when this litigation began, the Arts Council had been a dissolved 
non-profit corporation for over ten years, and was unlicenced as a business before, during 
and after enactment of the Outdoor Music Ordinance. (Amended Complaint at 673, fflf 
94-95; R. at 136.) Thus, the Ordinance purports to vest authority in a non-existent entity 
that is not properly licensed to do business in the city. (Amended Complaint at 673, fflf 
94-95; R. at 136.) 
49. The Outdoor Music Ordinance required the Arts Council to "hire" a 
program manager and sound technician. (R. at 831.) 
50. Barton, d/b/a Mountain Town Stages, served as the Arts Council's program 
manager and sound technician. (Amended Complaint at 673, ^  93; id at 674-75, If 111-
12; idL at 682,1f 176.) 
51. Mountain Town Stages was not a recognized non-profit corporation during 
the summer of 2000. (Aff. of Barton at 622, f 25.) 
52. Park City Arts Council financed all activities conducted under the Outdoor 
Music Ordinance passed in 2000. (Aff of Charnes at 626, ffl[ 9-10.) 
53. The Outdoor Music Ordinance passed in 2000 authorizes the Arts Council 
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to sponsor the concerts and Barton to act as the Arts Council's manager and regulator of 
those events. (Amended Complaint at 673, ^ | 93.) 
54. The Ordinance delegates the City's power to regulate noise and nuisance 
activities to a private individual and a private entity; namely Barton and the Arts Council. 
(Amended Complaint at 672, f 91.) 
55. In furtherance of the City's delegation of power to regulate noise and 
nuisance activities, the City bought, purchased and/or acquired a decibel meter reader, 
which the City gave or lent to Defendants Barton and the Arts Council to use in their 
respective roles as regulators of the noise they created. (Amended Complaint at 672, f^ 
91.) 
56. During the summer and fall of 2000, as a result of the noise created by 
outdoor concerts near Plaintiffs' home, Plaintiffs were again regularly and unreasonably 
disrupted. (Amended Complaint at 675-76, fflf 113-32.) 
57. The loud and continuous noise that emanated from the Plazas made 
Plaintiffs' basic life activities impossible or unenjoyable. (Amended Complaint at 675, j^ 
115.) 
58. Plaintiffs were unable to carry on conversation, enjoy meals together, watch 
television, read, work, sleep or rest while the music was playing. (Amended Complaint at 
675, t l 120-25.) 
59. Plaintiffs closed their windows and doors, but doing so made no appreciable 
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difference. (Amended Complaint at 676, f 124.) 
60. Plaintiffs were also prevented from enjoying their own selection of music, 
and Plaintiff Reif was prevented from practicing her flute. (Amended Complaint at 676, 
11 126-27.) 
61. The noises created by amplified outdoor music concerts made impossible 
Plaintiffs' ability to use and enjoy their property. (Amended Complaint at 675-76, ff 
113-32.) 
62. Plaintiffs' were only able to seek relief by leaving their home and returning 
after the music ceased. (Amended Complaint at 676, f 132.) 
63. This experience has been exasperating and enormously inconvenient for 
Plaintiffs. (Amended Complaint at 677, fflf 133-34.) 
64. Plaintiffs were forced to endure the concerts almost every day and/or night 
of the summer and fall seasons. (Amended Complaint at 675, Iff 113-14, 116-19). 
65. Plaintiffs' property value has decreased as a result of the noise. (Amended 
Complaint at 680, f 165) 
66. Plaintiffs complained numerous times to Barton and the City, but no volume 
adjustment was made. (Amended Complaint at 677, ffl[ 136-40.) 
67. Plaintiffs complained for three years, but Defendants ignored Plaintiffs' 
concerns and objections. (Amended Complaint at 666-70, fflj 43-50; 668, fflf 58-66; 669, If 
72; 680,1fl[ 80, 82-83; 672, f 97; 674, fflf 103-104; 677,1ft 136-40; 678,f150; 680; 1ft 
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166-68; 6814 173.) 
68. Despite Plaintiffs' continuous complaints, Defendants did nothing to abate 
the noise level. (Amended Complaint at 668-669, fflf 64, 67; 667, fflf 136-37, 140.) 
69. Plaintiffs have been exasperated and enormously stressed by Defendants' 
continuous disregard for their concerns. (Amended Complaint at 666, ^ f 41; 677, ffl[ 133-
35.) 
70. The City passed amended Outdoor Music Ordinances in 2001,4 2002, and 
2003.5 
71. Plaintiffs' continuing nuisance claim continues to present day (Amended 
Complaint at 684,1186.) 
72. Barton, d/b/a Mountain Town Stages, was the licensee under the 
ordinances passed after the Outdoor Music Ordinance enacted in 2000. (R. at 243; 
Amended Complaint at 682,1177; 684,1 186.) 
73. There are real and substantial harms associated with loud, continuous noise. 
(R. at 655.) Such harms include: risk of cancer, stress, sleeping disorder, pregnancy 
complications, hearing loss, and premature death. (R. at 655.) 
74. Plaintiffs have had to continue to suffer emotional and physical harm as a 
result of Defendants' tortious conduct. (R. at 655.) 
4
 See Ordinance 01-16 (codified at Park City, Utah, Code § 4-8A (2001). (R. at 
236-45). A copy of this ordinance is attached hereto as Exhibit H. 
5
 This ordinance remains in effect today. 
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75. On May 1, 2001 and June 22,2001, respectively, Plaintiffs filed a 
Complaint and an Amended Complaint against Defendants. (R. at 1, 662.) 
76. Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint alleges common law nuisance (claim one), 
statutory private nuisance (claim two), statutory public nuisance (claim three), continuing, 
threatened or anticipatory nuisance (claim four), violation of local noise ordinances (claim 
five), violation of permits (claim six), unconstitutionality of the Outdoor Music Ordinance 
(claim seven), and taking of property (claim eight). (R. at 682-86.) 
77. In May and June 2001, Defendants filed separate motions for summary 
judgment, and Plaintiffs timely responded, arguing that issues of material fact existed and 
that Defendants were not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (R. at 634; 638; 695-99; 
731.) Plaintiffs also objected because no answers had been filed and Plaintiffs had not an 
opportunity to conduct discovery. (R. at 731.) 
78. On June 3, 2002, after considerable delay,6 the trial court held a hearing on 
the summary judgment motions, and Plaintiffs' and Defendants' counsel submitted the 
motions on the briefs. (R. at 1304.)7 
6
 The trial court scheduled a hearing on the summary judgment motions for 
October 2, 2001, but Barton's counsel requested a delay one day before the scheduled 
hearing. The trial court then rescheduled the hearing; however, Barton's counsel again 
objected. The trial court then rescheduled the hearing for April 18, 2002, but a 
scheduling conflict with the trial court's schedule prevented the hearing from going 
forth. 
7
 As noted in Plaintiffs' earlier pleading before the appellate court, several days 
later the trial court forwarded the "complete" record to an out-of-state law school intern 
for assistance in drafting a research "memo" which would presumably act as a guiding 
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79. In a Ruling and Order, dated August 7, 2002, the trial court dismissed 
Plaintiffs5 first, second, third, fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth causes of action against 
Park City Municipal Corporation, and dismissed Plaintiffs' first, second, third, fifth, and 
seventh causes of action against Barton and Park City Arts Council. (R. at 753-57.) Over 
Plaintiffs' objections, the trial court's Order was issued before discovery was conducted 
or answers were filed in the case. (R. at 731-32.) 
80. The trail court's ruling did not address Plaintiffs' fourth cause of action for 
continuing, threatened or anticipatory nuisance but specifically denied Barton summary 
judgment on Plaintiffs' sixth cause of action for violations of the permits. (R. at 753-57.) 
81. On August 26, 2002, Plaintiffs timely filed a Petition for Interlocutory 
Appeal. (R. at 759.) 
82. On October 23, 2002, the Utah Supreme Court denied Plaintiffs' Petition 
aid or otherwise influence the trial court's decision to grant or deny summary judgment 
in this case. See Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs/Appellants' Motion for Summary 
Disposition, filed previously herein, at 13-14. Lincoln Nehring, the son of then Presiding 
Judge (now Justice) Ronald E. Nehring, assisted the trial court at this phase of the case. 
See id. For the reasons outlined in Plaintiffs' earlier pleading, this was inappropriate, 
and Judge Hilder should have voluntarily recused himself from the case due to these 
circumstances. Cf. Parker v. Conners Steel Co.. 855 F.2d 1510, 1525 (11th Cir. 1988) 
("A law clerk, as well as a judge, should stay informed of circumstances that may raise 
the appearance of impartiality or impropriety. And when such circumstances are present 
appropriate actions should be taken.") 
Plaintiffs further note that after they brought this issue to the attention of the 
appellate court, the court docket in this case was altered or otherwise revised to remove 
any reference that the case was handled in the manner noted. 
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for Permission to Appeal. (R. at 799.) 
83. On December 23, 2002, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Clarification and/or 
Reconsideration. (R. at 805.) 
84. Plaintiffs argued, in part, that reconsideration was appropriate because the 
Outdoor Music Ordinance: (1) violates the Supremacy Clause, (2) violates the Fifth 
Amendment Takings Clause, (3) violates the Separation of Powers provision, (4) violates 
the Due Process Clauses, (5) constitutes special legislation, (6) delegates a core 
governmental, and (7) is repugnant to law. (R. at 810-19.) 
85. Defendants did not raise any substantive arguments against the 
constitutional arguments raised in Plaintiffs' Motion for Clarification and/or 
Reconsideration. (See R. at 836-39.) 
86. In a Ruling and Order, dated March 31, 2003, the trial court granted 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Clarification but denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration, 
stating that its earlier ruling was "final" and that Plaintiffs' arguments were "not 
specifically briefed" when initially considered by the court. (R. at 877-78.) 
87. On April 15, 2003, Plaintiffs filed a second Motion for Reconsideration (or, 
in the alternative, Certification). (R. at 880.) 
88. On May 9, 2003, Barton filed a second motion for summary judgment on 
Plaintiffs' sixth cause of action for violations of the permits, arguing that he could not be 
held liable because he merely "rented sound equipment" and he "never operated the 
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equipment, or booked the bands." (R. at 901, ^ 4-5.) Barton's affidavit was attached to 
this motion, which states, in pertinent part: ". . .1 began booking and promoting concerts 
in the Park City area in November 1997. . . .In the Summer of 1999,1 was approached by 
Park City Brewing Company & Smokehouse and [was] asked to provide sound and to 
book musicians for the restaurant. . . .In late August 1999, Park City Brewing Company 
& Smokehouse's permit was revoked by Park City." (R. at 913, fflf 3, 6-7 (emphasis 
added).) 
89. On May 27, 2003, Plaintiffs timely filed a Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendant Barton's Motion for Summary Judgment, attaching thereto a variety of sources 
acknowledging the extent of Barton's involvement in the 1999 summer concerts, 
including Barton's own affidavit and memorandum in support of his first motion for 
summary judgment. (R. at 959-1016.) 
90. On May 29, 2003, Plaintiffs filed a Supplemental Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendant Barton's Motion for Summary Judgment, attaching thereto a 
"Letter to the Editor" authored by Barton and published in the Park Record on September 
1, 1999. (R. at 1917.) In that letter, Barton makes the following admission: 
This summer I have arranged for musicians and provided the 
sound amplification for Park City Brewing and Smokehouse 
and the Town Lift Plaza. We were operating under a special 
outdoor music permit provided by the city. Last week that 
permit was rescinded due to complaints received from 
residents (one individual in particular living near the plazaf)]. 
We were invited to a meeting at City Hall to discuss the 
complaints and the future of outdoor amplified music. We 
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were given a reprieve by the city and allowed to continue 
under new restrictions . . . . 
(R. at 1920-21; 1026 (emphasis added).) 
91. On June 16, 2003 Barton untimely filed a reply memorandum in support of 
summary judgment and attached thereto Barton's supplemental affidavit asserting that he 
"never . . . operated the sound equipment... [or] booked any performers . . . during the 
summer of 1999." (R. at 1060; 1083, ff 3-4.) 
92. On June 23, 2003, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Strike Defendant Barton's 
Supplemental Affidavit. (R. at 1119.) Plaintiffs argued that the supplemental affidavit 
should be stricken because it: (1) is not permitted under Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration and Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; (2) was 
untimely filed under Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration; and (3) 
contradicts Defendant Barton's prior statements and is riddled with untruths. (R. at 1123-
28.) 
93. In a Minute Entry and Order, dated July 5, 2003, the trial court denied 
Plaintiffs' second Motion for Reconsideration and denied "without prejudice" Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Certification, pending a ruling on Defendant Barton's motion for summary 
judgment. (R. at 1130.) 
94. Barton filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike 
Barton's Supplemental Affidavit on July 10, 2003; however, Plaintiffs did not receive a 
copy of that memorandum until the eve of the hearing scheduled for July 14, 2003. (R. at 
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1133; 1177; 1230.) 
95. On July 14,2003, the trial court held a hearing on Barton's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Defendant Barton's Supplemental 
Affidavit. (R. at 1139.) That hearing was specially scheduled to accommodate Barton's 
counsel's impending birth. At the hearing, the trial court ruled from the bench to deny 
Plaintiffs' motion and to grant Barton's motion. (R. at 1305:32:17-18.) The trial court 
also instructed Barton's counsel to prepare an order consistent with the court's decisions 
in the case. (R. at 1305:32-33:25, 1.) Barton's counsel made no request for an extension 
of time in which to file the order. (R. at 1305:33:2.) At the close of the hearing, the trial 
court instructed Plaintiffs to take their case to a different judge if the case is remanded 
after appeal. (R. at 1305:32:22-23.) 
96. Barton's counsel failed to timely prepare the order as instructed by the trial 
court and, thereafter, Plaintiffs' counsel prepared the order and presented it to trial court. 
(R. at 1177; 1179; 1154.) 
97. On September 16, 2003, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Vacate and Reconsider 
Summary Judgment Decision and to Renew Plaintiffs' Motion for Certification and 
supporting memorandum, arguing that summary judgment should be reconsidered and 
additional time for discovery should be granted because Plaintiffs' counsel had located a 
witness whose testimony directly contradicts Barton's testimony set forth in his affidavit 
for summary judgment. (R. at 1153.) 
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98. On October 16, 2003, Plaintiffs filed a Notice to Submit in connection with 
their Motion to Vacate. (R. at 1226.) 
99. In the interim, Barton filed a proposed order and second proposed order, 
and Plaintiffs timely objected to the form of those orders. (R. at 1177; 1229.) 
100. On October 18, 2003, the trial court signed Barton's second proposed order 
without addressing Plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate, which the trial court mistakenly believed 
had not been submitted for decision. (R. at 1255; Minute Entry at 1256 ("The court 
awaits a Notice to Submit regarding the subsequent motion that has apparently been 
filed.")) 
101. On December 5, 2003, Plaintiffs' counsel sent a letter to the trial court and 
opposing counsel, clarifying that a Notice to Submit on Plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate had 
been filed before the trial court's October 18, 2003 Minute Entry, and requested a 
decision on that motion "at [the trial court's] earliest convenience." 
102. On December 31, 2003, the trial court clerk called Plaintiffs' counsel to 
request "courtesy copies" of all pleadings relevant to Plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate, and 
Plaintiffs' counsel delivered those copies to the trial court on January 5, 2004. 
103. On January 19, 2004, the trial court denied Plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate but 
did not explicitly resolve Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Certification. (R. at 1267.) The 
court's ruling stated that "it was not clear whether the court previously ruled on plaintiffs 
Fourth Cause of Action." (R. at 1267.) The court concluded by inviting Plaintiffs to file 
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an order to certify the case for appeal if they did not believe that the court's order would 
serve as such an order. (R. at 1268.) 
104. Plaintiffs thereafter filed a proposed order to certify the case for appeal. (R. 
at 1279; 1289.) 
105. On March 29, 2004, the trial court declined to sign Plaintiffs' proposed 
order, stating that "[t]he court believes its [January 19, 2004] Minute Entry and Order will 
suffice as certification, if one is needed . . . and the court now determines that it will sign 
no further orders unless the appellate court to which this matter is assigned remands the 
matter as to the Fourth Cause of Action for any reason." (R. at 1295.) Plaintiffs 
thereafter filed a timely notice of appeal. (R. at 1297.) 
106. On appeal, Plaintiffs moved for summary disposition for lack of 
jurisdiction and requested a remand because the trial court had not issued a final 
appealable order or judgment. (R. at 1304.) On September 10, 2004, the appellate court 
dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction and remanded for clarification by the trial court 
as to the status of Plaintiffs' fourth cause of action. (R. at 1307.) Plaintiffs then filed a 
Renewed Motion for Certification. (R. at 1313.) 
107. On December 15, 2004, while Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Certification 
was pending, the trial court ruled that it "never clearly dismissed" Plaintiffs' fourth cause 
of action and directed the parties to agree to dismissal of that action, without prejudice, or 
to submit a proposed order certifying the matter for appeal. (R. at 1329.) Defendants 
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then filed a motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs5 fourth cause of action (R. at 
1331; 1368; 1374), and the trial court ordered the case stayed pending a resolution 
attempt. (R. at 1340.) Plaintiffs then filed a combined motion to vacate the stay, enter an 
order of certification, and stay Defendants' motion for summary judgment. (R. at 1355; 
1350.) 
108. On June 5, 2005, the trial court issued a Minute Entry again noting that "it 
has never clearly dismissed plaintiffs' Fourth Cause of Action" and further instructing 
Plaintiffs to respond to Defendants' motion for summary judgment, and denying 
Plaintiffs' motion to stay Defendant Barton's motion. (R. at 1400.) On June 27, 2005, 
Plaintiffs timely filed their memorandum in opposition to Defendants' motion. (R. at 
1403.) Defendants filed no reply memoranda (R. at 1417), and on June 12, 2005 
Plaintiffs submitted the motion for decision. (R. at 1417.) 
109. On October 8, 2005, the trial court entered an order acknowledging that 
"[Plaintiffs] may well be right" that uthe law does not bar the Fourth Cause of Action, and 
[that] the court's August 2002 ruling was in error that must be reversed, so [that] it should 
not justify dismissal of the remaining claim." (R. at 1420 (emphasis added).) 
Nevertheless, without further explanation, the court concluded to "hold to its view" set 
forth in its August 7, 2002 ruling and granted Defendant Barton's motion for summary 
judgment as to Plaintiffs' fourth cause of action. (R. at 1420.) Plaintiffs appealed. (R. at 
1422.) 
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110. Plaintiffs now appeal the trial court's rulings as they pertain to Plaintiffs' 
claims from 1999 forward. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court's grant of summary judgment should be reversed because issues of 
material fact exist and, as a matter of law, the permits and Outdoor Music Ordinance do 
not govern Plaintiffs' nuisance claims, the permits and Outdoor Music Ordinance do not 
(and cannot) supercede state law governing Plaintiffs' claims, U.C.A. §§ 10-8-60 and 10-
8-76 do not (and cannot) govern Plaintiffs' nuisance claims, the Outdoor Music 
Ordinance is void and unconstitutional, no exhaustion of administrative remedies is 
required for a per se takings claim and § 15-1-18 of the Park City Land Management 
Code is inapplicable to this case. 
The trial court's denial of Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration should be 
reversed because the trial court committed clear error when declaring that its earlier ruling 
was "final" and abused its discretion when denying Plaintiffs' motion because they had 
inadequately briefed their constitutional arguments against the Outdoor Music Ordinance 
when first considered by the trial court during summary judgment proceedings. Similarly, 
the trial court's decision not to grant Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration on their 
constitutional claims against the Ordinance should be reversed because the trial court 
abused its discretion when declining not to consider Plaintiffs arguments because they had 
not been briefed during an earlier summary judgment proceeding. 
The trial court grant of summary judgment should be reversed because the answers 
had not been filed and/or discovery had not been completed. Alternatively, summary 
34 
judgment should be reversed because the trial court failed to address Plaintiffs' Rule 56(f) 
objection on the issue of discovery when the trial court issued its first ruling granting 
summary judgment. 
The trial court's denial of Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Defendant Barton's 
Supplemental Affidavit filed with his reply brief in support of summary judgment should 
be reversed, and the trial court's findings that Barton did not contribute to the nuisance 
complained of by Plaintiffs during 1999 should be set aside. 
Plaintiffs/Appellants should be granted costs on appeal, pursuant to Rule 34 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
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ARGUMENTS 
I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE ISSUES 
OF MATERIAL FACT EXIST AND, AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE 
PERMITS AND OUTDOOR MUSIC ORDINANCE DO NOT GOVERN OR 
OTHERWISE BAR PLAINTIFFS' NUISANCE CLAIMS 
The trial court's ruling should be reversed and Plaintiffs' nuisance claims should 
be reinstated because issues of material fact exist and the permits and Outdoor Music 
Ordinance do not govern or otherwise bar Plaintiffs' nuisance claims as a matter of law. 
Summary judgment is appropriate only when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment 
as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). A party seeking summary judgment bears the 
burden of establishing that no material fact remains for trial. See Gerbich v. Numed, Inc., 
1999 UT 37, f 12, 977 P.2d 1205. The evidence of the nonmoving party should be taken 
as true, and all justifiable inferences should be drawn in its favor. £ee K&T, Inc. v. 
Koroulis, 888 P.2d 623, 629 (Utah 1994). If, upon examination of the record, the court 
finds that any material issue remains in dispute, the motion for summary judgment must 
be denied. See id. 
A. Issues of Material Facts Preclude Summary Judgment 
Plaintiffs allege in their affidavits that outdoor music that is held within close 
proximity to their home constitutes a nuisance resulting in an inability to enjoy normal 
daily activities such as conversing, eating, resting, relaxing, reading and working. See 
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Aff. of Whaley at 84, ffl[ 27-41, 71-88,102; see also Aff. of Reif at 64, ffl[ 27-41, 72-89. 
The affidavit of Plaintiffs' noise expert further supports their claim of nuisance and 
suggests that their complaints are in fact reasonable under the circumstances. See Aff. of 
Sola at 104, ffif 20-24. Defendants failed to file any affidavits challenging these affidavits. 
Accordingly, an issue of material fact should have precluded the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment.8 (See Ruling and Order at 754 ("the facts are not in dispute"). 
B. As a Matter of Law. Plaintiffs' 1999 Nuisance Claims Should be 
Reinstated 
As a matter of law, Plaintiffs' nuisance claims (arising in the summer of 1999) 
should be reinstated because the permits do not govern or otherwise bar Plaintiffs' claims. 
A permit constitutes a mere privilege to perform a certain act. A permit does not (and in 
fact cannot) license the creation of a private nuisance. See 58 Am. Jur. 2d Nuisances § 
454 (2002) ("[A] city cannot legally authorize anyone to create a private nuisance."). 
Further, a permit "does not carry with it immunity for private injuries which may result 
directly from the exercise of the powers and privileges conferred [thereunder]." IdL § 453. 
Thus, even if the permit conditions are not violated, "no one can justify the commission of 
a nuisance under . . . a license." Id. § 455. 
8
 The trial court also erred in granting summary judgment because no answers had 
been filed at the time of the court's ruling. "When a trial court has for consideration a . . 
. motion for summary judgment before the [answer] . . . has [been filed], the summary 
judgment should not be granted unless it is clear that an issue of material fact can not be 
presented." Beacher Higher Power Corp. v. Granados, 717 So.2d 563, 565 (Fla. Ct. 
App. 1998); see also Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
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A permit does not insulate wrongdoers from suit for private nuisance, particularly 
in this circumstance, where the alleged conduct unreasonably "interferes with a person's 
[or persons'] [use or] enjoyment of property." Black's Law Dictionary 1094 (7th ed. 
1999).9 Likewise, a permit does not insulate wrongdoers from suit for public nuisance 
"when the private plaintiff has suffered damages different from those of society at large" 
and the alleged conduct is "unreasonable." Van Erickson v. Sorensen. 877 P.2d 144, 149 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994), cert, denied, 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994). Defendants have 
unreasonably interfered with Plaintiffs' use and enjoyment of their property (Amended 
Complaint at 665-667, Tffi 28-50), Plaintiffs have also suffered damages different from 
those of society at large (Amended Complaint at 683, ^  184), and Defendants' conduct is 
unreasonable insofar as it is "intentional, negligent, reckless, or ultrahazardous." Van 
Erickson, 877 P.2d at 149; see also Amended Complaint at 684, ^ 184. Therefore, the 
trial court erred as a matter of law in granting Defendants summary judgment on the basis 
9 
It can scarcely be argued that any habitual noise whether 
produced by skilled musicians . . . [or otherwise], which is so 
loud, continuous, insistent, and not inherent to the character 
of the neighborhood, and unusual therein, that normal men, 
women, and children, when occupying their own homes, 
however distant, are seriously incommoded that they cannot 
sleep, study, read, converse, or concentrate until it stops, is 
not an unreasonable, unlawful, invasion of their rights. 
Anne Arundel County Fish & Game Conservation Ass'n v. Carlucci, 573 A.2d 847, 852-
53 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990) (internal quotations & citation omitted), cert, denied. Fish 
& Game Ass?n v. Carlucci, 580 A.2d 218 (Md. 1990). 
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that the "permits govern" Plaintiffs' nuisance claims. (Ruling and Order at 755.) 
Accordingly, Plaintiffs' 1999 nuisance claims should be reinstated. 
C. As a Matter of Law, Plaintiffs9 2000 et seqq. Nuisance Claims Should be 
Reinstated 
As a matter of law, Plaintiffs' nuisance claims (arising in the summer of 2000 and 
thereafter) should be reinstated because the Outdoor Music Ordinance does not govern or 
otherwise bar Plaintiffs' claims. A municipal license does not (and in fact cannot) justify 
the creation or maintenance of a private nuisance. See supra. Thus, the fact that a 
municipality authorized certain acts does not insulate the actors from suit for private 
nuisance. See 66 C.J.S. Nuisances § 24(c) (1998); see also 58 Am. Jur. 2d Nuisances § 
112(2002). 
Similarly, an ordinance does not insulate wrongdoers from suit for private 
nuisance, particularly in this circumstance, where the alleged conduct unreasonably 
"interferes with a person's [or persons'] [use or] enjoyment of property." Black's Law 
Dictionary 1094 (7th ed. 1999); see also infra n.9; accord Van Erickson. 877 P.2d at 149. 
Defendants have unreasonably interfered with Plaintiffs' use and enjoyment of their 
property. (Amended Complaint at 675-77, ffl[ 113-140.) Plaintiffs have also suffered 
damages different from those of society at large (Amended Complaint at 683, f 184), and 
Defendants' conduct is unreasonable insofar as it is "intentional, negligent, reckless, or 
ultrahazardous." Van Erickson, 877 P.2d at 149; see also Amended Complaint at 684, f 
184. Therefore, the trial court erred as a matter of law in granting Defendants summary 
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judgment on the basis that the Outdoor Music Ordinance "govern[s]" Plaintiffs' nuisance 
claims. (Ruling and Order at 755.) Accordingly, Plaintiffs' 2000 et seqq. nuisance 
claims should be reinstated. Cf. Hobbs v. Smith, 493 P.2d 1352, 1354-55 (Colo. 1972) 
(rejecting claim that "when legislative authorities, by zoning ordinances, permit an act or 
a particular use of land, a court has no authority to enjoin [or grant damages to an 
aggrieved party as a result of] a public or private nuisance"); see also Davis v. J.C. 
Nichols Co. & Harwood Operating Co., 761 S.W.2d 735, 742 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) 
(holding that "noise pollution [and other effects of land use] may give rise to a common 
law nuisance quite apart from any . . . ordinance - if the use which engenders them is 
unreasonable"). 
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE 
TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN RULING THAT THE 
PERMITS AND OUTDOOR MUSIC ORDINANCE SUPERCEDE STATE 
LAW GOVERNING PLAINTIFFS' NUISANCE CLAIMS 
As a matter of law, the trial court's ruling should be reversed and Plaintiffs' 
nuisance claims should be reinstated because the permits and Outdoor Music Ordinance 
do not (and in fact cannot) supercede state law governing Plaintiffs' nuisance claims. 
State law always preempts or abrogates conflicting local law. See City of Fort Worth v. 
McDonald, 293 S.W.2d 256, 258 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) (holding that no city ordinance 
could supercede state law). In this case, Plaintiffs' nuisance claims are recognized by 
state statute and common law. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-38-1 (2002) (setting forth cause 
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of action for private nuisance)10; Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-803 (Supp. 2003) (setting forth 
cause of action for public nuisance)11; see also Brough v. Ute Stampede Ass'n. 105 Utah 
446, 142 P.2d 670, 673 (1943) (recognizing cause of action for continuing or anticipatory 
nuisance). 
The permits and Outdoor Music Ordinance, insofar as they are intended to directly 
or indirectly bar Plaintiffs' nuisance claims, conflict with state statute and common law 
governing Plaintiffs' nuisance claims, and therefore they are void. See Citvof Fort 
Worth. 293 S.W.2d at 258: see also Allgood v. Larson. 545 P.2d 530, 532 (Utah 1976) 
("The . . . ordinance . . . cannot exceed . . . state law."). Thus, the trial court's ruling that 
the permits and Outdoor Music "rule" and Sections 78-38-1 and 76-10-80312 "do not 
apply" is clear error and Plaintiffs' nuisance claims should be reinstated. (Ruling and 
Order at 755.)13 
10
 Section 78-38-1 provides: "an action [for private nuisance] maybe brought by 
any person whose property is injuriously affected, or whose personal enjoyment is 
lessened by the nuisance." Utah Code Ann. § 78-38-1(6) (2002). 
11
 Section 76-10-803 provides a cause of action for "[a] public nuisance . . . 
which act or omission . . . annoys, injures, or endangers the comfort, repose, health, or 
safety of three or more persons . . . or . . . in any way renders three or more persons 
insecure in life or use of property." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-803(l)(a), (e) (2003). 
12
 The trial court's ruling refers to § 78-10-803; however, the correct section is 
§ 76-10-803. 
13
 In sum, as one court recognized: "The antagonism between the ordinance and 
the law is as emphatic as that between life and death. . . .The law of the state must 
prevail." City of Fort Worth. 293 S.W.2d at 259 (internal quotations omitted). The same 
holds true for the permits. Cf. kL Therefore, Plaintiffs' nuisance claims should be 
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III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE 
TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN RULING THAT 
PLAINTIFFS' COMMON LAW AND STATUTORY NUISANCE CLAIMS 
ARE BARRED UNDER U.C.A. §§ 10-8-60 AND 10-8-76 
The trial court's ruling that Plaintiffs' common law and statutory nuisance claims 
are barred under Sections 10-8-60 and 10-8-76 of the Utah Code should be reversed 
because the trial court misinterpreted those statutes and incorrectly dismissed Plaintiffs' 
nuisance claims. "The correct interpretation of a statute is a question of law and is 
reviewed for correctness." Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1357 (emphasis added). Thus, whether 
the trial court erred in barring Plaintiffs' nuisance claims under Sections 10-8-60 and 10-
8-76 is a question of law, which this Court reviews for correctness. See id. 
Plaintiffs' right to sue for nuisance is recognized by state statute, and the City has 
no authority to circumvent this right which is protected by the state and federal 
constitutions. Specifically, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-38-1 and 76-10-803 set forth the 
statutory basis for a nuisance claim and Utah law recognizes that these statutes apply to a 
continuing or threatened nuisance. See Brough, 142 P.2d at 673. The Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments of the Utah and United States Constitutions protect and preserve 
the statutory right to sue for nuisance, which simply cannot be stripped from Plaintiffs by 
a mere utterance by the City that the complained of activity does not constitute a nuisance, 
whether per se or otherwise. This rule of law was recognized many decades ago in 
reinstated as a matter of law. 
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Eastern Oil Refining Co. v. Court of Burgesses ofWallingford, 11 Conn. Supp. 285 
(Conn. Super 1942), 1942 WL 901, *6, affd 36 A.2d 586 (Conn. 1944), where the court 
therein held that "what is not a nuisance cannot be conclusively declared [by a municipal 
corporation] as such because it is a question of fact." A leading municipal law treatise 
supports the same conclusion, stating that "[w]hether something is in law a nuisance is a 
judicial question and it cannot be foreclosed by any determination of local governing 
body or board." 2 Antieau on Local Gov't Law § 29.07[2], at 29-70. 
Further, nothing relied upon in the trial court's prior ruling; in particular, neither 
section 10-8-60 nor section 10-8-76 of the Utah Code changes this. Indeed those sections 
are entirely inapplicable to this case, and the trial court's prior reliance on those sections 
to dismiss Plaintiffs' nuisance claims was error. Sections 10-8-60 and 10-8-76 provide no 
legal basis whatsoever for granting Defendants' motions for summary judgment, and as a 
matter of law those decisions should be reversed. 
A. Section 10-8-60 Does Not Apply 
Title 10 of the Utah Code Ann. grants limited authority to cities, and any authority 
not expressly granted thereunder is expressly reserved to the state. Pursuant to the powers 
granted under Title 10, cities have the authority to declare and abate nuisances. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 10-8-60 (2003). The plain and unambiguous language of Section 10-8-60 
allows for nothing more: "[Cities] may declare what shall be a nuisance, and abate the 
same, and impose fines upon persons who may create, continue or suffer nuisances to 
43 
exist." Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-60 (2003). The City in this case did not "declare" a 
nuisance; nor did it "abate" a nuisance so declared. Rather, the City merely asserted that a 
particular activity, i.e., outdoor music, is not a nuisance.14 
Section 10-8-60 does not grant authority to a city to declare that something is not a 
nuisance, or, worse, cut off a claimant's statutorily recognized claim for nuisance as the 
City asserts in this case. Indeed these principals are well recognized in the law. See 6A 
McQuillin on Municipal Corporations § 24.67, at 198 (3d ed. 1997) ("A municipal 
corporation cannot legalize as not a nuisance that which is a nuisance per se or at common 
law, per accidens or in fact, or under state statute."). See also Weber v. Springville City, 
725 P.2d 1360, 1367 (Utah 1986) (holding that city ordinance, enacted under Section 10-
8-60, cannot prevent civil nuisance actions); accord Rantapaa v. Black Hills Chair Lift 
Co., 2001 SD 111, Tf1f 23, 25, 633 N.W.2d 196 (supporting same). Simply stated, section 
10-8-60 provides no support for summary judgment; its application is limited to 
circumstances not presented by this case; and well established law requires that Plaintiffs' 
nuisance claims survive Defendants' motions for summary judgment. 
14
 For clarification, the City actually stated that outdoor music "is not a nuisance 
per se" However, for brevity and clarity, Plaintiffs do not focus on the City's "per se" 
qualification because that is entirely irrelevant because Plaintiffs' nuisance claims are not 
per se claims. 
A separate reason for reversal is that the trial court erred in focusing on nuisance 
per se, because Plaintiffs claims are based on nuisance in fact. See Bielecki v. City of 
Port Arthur, 12 S.W.2d 976, 977-78 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1929) (limiting city's authority 
to declare what is a nuisance per se, not what is a nuisance in fact). 
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B. Section 10-8-76 Does Not Apply 
Section 10-8-76 has no application to this case because it too pertains only to 
abatement and does not grant authority to cities to circumvent a plaintiffs right to sue for 
nuisance by declaring that a particular act is not a nuisance. See Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-
76 (2003). Section 10-8-76 merely states: "[Cities] may prevent the ringing of bells, 
blowing of horns and bugles, crying of goods by auctioneers and others, and the making 
of other noises, for the purposes of business, amusement or otherwise, and prevent all 
performances and devices tending to the collection of persons on the streets or sidewalks 
of the city." Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-76 (2003). The City did not abate or even "prevent" 
any of the things that are specifically limited to city streets or sidewalks in Section 10-8-
76. Rather, the City merely asserted that a particular activity, i.e., outdoor music that is 
played on "private" and not on public property, is not a nuisance. 
Section 10-8-76 does not grant authority to cities to abate nuisances on private 
property. See Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-76 (2003). Neither does it allow cities to abate 
private nuisances. See Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-76 (2003). See also 2 Antieau on Local 
Gov't Law § 29.07[1], at 29-67 (stating that u[a] private nuisance . . . is not subject to 
governmental abatement"). Further, even if it allowed these things, it does not grant 
authority to cities to declare that something is not a nuisance and thereby extinguish a 
claimant's statutorily recognized claim for nuisance. Simply stated, Section 10-8-76 
provides no support for the City's actions herein, and its application is limited to 
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circumstances not presented by this case. Plaintiffs' nuisance claims survive Defendants' 
motions for summary judgment as a matter of well settled law, and the trial court erred in 
ruling to the contrary. 
IV. SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE 
OUTDOOR MUSIC ORDINANCE IS VOID AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
As a matter of law, the Outdoor Music Ordinance should be stricken as void and 
unconstitutional and Plaintiffs' nuisance claims should be reinstated. Whether the trial 
court erred in ruling that the Outdoor Music Ordinance is constitutional, involves a 
question of law, which this Court reviews "for correctness, giving no deference to the trial 
court." Wood, 1999 UT App. 323, % 4. As explained herein, the Outdoor Music 
Ordinance is void and unconstitutional because it: (A) violates the Supremacy Clause and 
constitutes a per se taking in violation of the Takings Clause; (B) violates the Separation 
of Powers provision; (C) violates the Due Process Clauses; (D) constitutes special 
legislation; (E) delegates a core municipal function; and (F) is repugnant to law. 
Accordingly, Plaintiffs respectfully ask this Court to reverse the trial court by declaring 
the Outdoor Music Ordinance void and unconstitutional and reinstating Plaintiffs' 
nuisance claims. 
A. The Outdoor Music Ordinance Violates the Supremacy Clause and 
Constitutes a per se Taking in Violation of the Fifth Amendment Takings 
Clause 
The Outdoor Music Ordinance is unconstitutional because it violates the 
Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution and its parallel under the Utah Constitution. 
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The Supremacy Clause states that federal law "shall be the supreme Law of the Land." 
U.S. Const, art. VI, cl. 2; see also Utah Const, art. I, § 3 (stating same). Plaintiffs5 
property rights are protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Fifth 
Amendment provides, in relevant part, that "[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation." U.S. Const, amend. V. The Fifth Amendment is 
made applicable to states and their political subdivisions through the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which prohibits any state or political subdivision from "depriving] any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." See First English 
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles. 428 U.S. 304, 310 n.4,107 S. 
Ct. 2378, 2383 n.4, 96 L. Ed. 2d 250, 260-61 n.4 (1987); see also Utah Const, art. I, § 7 
("No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."). 
Plaintiffs' rights are "supreme" and therefore are superior to any other rights or interests 
asserted by Defendants in this case. U.S. Const, art. VI; see also McOuade v. Tuscon 
Tiller Apartments. Ltd.. 543 P.2d 150, 152 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975) (holding plaintiffs 
property rights of use and enjoyment outweigh defendants' interest in holding loud 
concerts); accord Hude v. Commonwealth. 423 A.2d 15, 17 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1980) 
(stating that playing of "loud music . . . is not a fundamental right"). Accordingly, it 
would be contrary to the constitutional guarantees afforded Plaintiffs "if through . . . 
ordinance . . . [their] property could be taken, injured, or destroyed . . . for the benefit of 
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[another person or entity]." Mazeika v. American Oil Co.. 118 A.2d 142, 143 (Pa. 1955) 
(internal quotations & citation omitted). 
The Outdoor Music Ordinance violates the Supremacy Clause because, as the City 
has asserted throughout this litigation, the Ordinance -- either directly or indirectly --
forecloses Plaintiffs' ability to sue under state and federal law. Park City Municipal 
Corporation cannot foreclose Plaintiffs' rights to sue under state and federal law. See 
Utah Const, art. I, § 1 ("All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and 
defend their lives and liberties"); Utah Const, art. I, § 11 ("[E]very person, for an injury 
done to . . . [his or her] property . . . , shall have remedy by due course of law"). 
Furthermore, to foreclose Plaintiffs' right to sue under state and federal law constitutes a 
per se taking requiring just compensation under the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment. See U.S. Const, amend. V; U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1; Utah Const, art. I, 
§ 22; Utah Const, art. I, § 7; see also Bormann v. Board of Supervisors, 584 N.W.2d 309, 
321 (Iowa 1998) (holding that ordinance forbidding claim under state law constitutes 
unconstitutional taking of right to bring nuisance action), cert, denied, Girres v. Bormann, 
525 U.S. 1172, 119 S. Ct 1096, 143 L. Ed. 2d 96 (1999). Following the argument 
asserted and defended by the City throughout this litigation, the Outdoor Music Ordinance 
is unconstitutional because it violates the Supremacy Clause of both the U.S. and Utah 
Constitutions and constitutes a per se taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment Takings 
Clause. 
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B. The Ordinance Violates the Separation of Powers Provision 
The Outdoor Music Ordinance constitutes an unconstitutional violation of the 
Separation of Powers provision. Under the Separation of Powers, government is divided 
into three distinct branches: "the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial." Utah 
Const, art. V, § 1. Under this provision, "no person charged with the exercise of powers 
properly belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any function appertaining 
to either of the others." Id. Because Park City Municipal Corporation is a political 
subdivision of the state, see Utah Const, art. XI, § 1 (recognizing local governments), it 
must abide by the constitution's Separation of Powers provision and may not pass 
ordinances that are "repugnant to law." Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-84(1) (2003). 
But Park City Municipal Corporation has followed neither federal nor state law in 
this case. Park City Municipal Corporation has argued throughout this litigation that the 
Outdoor Music Ordinance forecloses Plaintiffs5 ability to sue under state and federal law. 
Park City Municipal Corporation cannot foreclose Plaintiffs' rights to sue under state and 
federal law. See supra Section III. Yet Park City Municipal Corporation has attempted to 
play judge and jury in this case by deceiving the trial court that the City has the authority 
to foreclose Plaintiffs' nuisance claims. Park City Municipal Corporation has no right to 
dictate the viability or validity of Plaintiffs' nuisance claims, because the questions posed 
by Plaintiffs' claims are specifically reserved for the Judiciary through the Separation of 
Powers provision. See Weber. 725 P.2d at 1367; see also Begnaud v. Camel Contractors, 
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Inc., 721 So. 2d 550, 554 (La. Ct. App. 1998) ("The determination of the existence of a 
nuisance is a question of fact" to be determined by the "trier of fact"). Accordingly, the 
Outdoor Music Ordinance should be stricken as an unconstitutional violation of the 
Separation of Powers provision set forth in the Utah Constitution. 
C. The Ordinance Violates the Due Process Clauses 
The Outdoor Music Ordinance constitutes an unconstitutional violation of the Due 
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Due Process Clauses 
guarantee that "No person shal l . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law." The Outdoor Music Ordinance is unconstitutional because it violates the 
Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution and its parallel under the Utah Constitution. 
The Supremacy Clause states that federal law "shall be the supreme Law of the Land." 
U.S. Const, art. VI, cl. 2; see also Utah Const, art. I, § 3 (stating same).; see also U.S. 
Const, amend. XIV; see also Utah Const, art. I, § 7. Park City Municipal Corporation 
provided no notice that it intended to restrict Plaintiffs' constitutionally protected rights to 
sue under state and common law. In addition, Park City Municipal Corporation provided 
no opportunity to be heard regarding its intention to restrict Plaintiffs' constitutionally 
protected rights to sue under state and common law. Accordingly, the Outdoor Music 
Ordinance violates Plaintiffs' guarantees afforded by the Due Process Clauses and should 
be stricken as unconstitutional. 
D. The Ordinance Constitutes Special Legislation 
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The Outdoor Music Ordinance constitutes unconstitutional special legislation. The 
Utah Constitution states: "No private or special law shall be enacted where a general law 
can be applicable." Utah Const. Art. VI, § 26. "[SJpecial legislation relates either to 
particular persons, places, or things or to persons, places or things which, though not 
particularized, are separated by any method of selection from the whole class to which the 
law might, but for such legislation, be applied." Colman v. State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 
636 (Utah 1990) (citation omitted). 
The Outdoor Music Ordinance is not a general law because it does not "appl[y] to 
and operate[] uniformly upon all members of a[] class of persons, places, or things." Id. 
Rather, it specifically authorizes and attempts to insulate Barton, the "program manager" 
and "sound technician," from creating and maintaining a nuisance at two venues near 
Plaintiffs' home. (See R. at 224 (identifying "program manager" and "sound 
technician"); see also R. at 223 (identifying two venues).) The Outdoor Music Ordinance 
also specifically recognizes Park City Arts Council15 as the "licensee of the events." (R. at 
832.) The Outdoor Music Ordinance does not "appl[y] equally to all persons embraced in 
15
 At the time this lawsuit began, Park City Arts Council was a dissolved non-
profit corporation for over ten years, and was unlicensed before, during and after 
enactment of the Outdoor Music Ordinance. (R. at 52; 136.) To be sure, Park City Arts 
Council was a corporation that was involuntarily dissolved on 12-31-1985. See 
www.utah.gov/serv/bes (R. at 136.) Later, that name was registered as a DBA to JoAnna 
Charnes. However, Charnes's DBA expired on 3-9-1999. Then, after this lawsuit was 
filed, Attorney Dwayne Vance registered the name as a DBA. An ordinance authorizing 
such an organization is "merely a scheme to private individuals for pecuniary gain" and 
therefore is void. Brought 142 P.2d at 673. 
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a class founded upon some natural, intrinsic, or constitutional distinction" but "confers 
particular privileges or imposes peculiar disabilities, or burdensome conditions in the 
exercise of a common right; upon a class of persons arbitrarily selected, from the general 
body of those who stand in precisely the same relation to the subject of the law." Cohnan, 
795 P.2d at 636. 
Park City Municipal Corporation's classification and designation is unreasonable 
because it allows two specific entities; namely, Barton and Park City Arts Council, to 
operate in a harmful manner not allowed by others in the community. In so doing, the 
City attempts to insulate Barton and Park City Arts Council from suit by specifically 
exempting their conduct from the City's general noise ordinance. See R. at 227. The 
City's classification is also unreasonable because it requires Plaintiffs and others similarly 
situated to contend with and to bear the burdens of Defendants' tortious conduct. This 
form of discrimination (and in this case it is a dual form of discrimination based on who 
the ordinance benefits and who it burdens) is what the special legislation provision was 
intended to prevent. See Coleman 795 P.2d at 636 (discussing standard for reviewing 
special legislation argument). Accordingly, the Outdoor Music Ordinance should be 
stricken as unconstitutional special legislation. 
E. The Ordinance Delegates a Core Municipal Function 
The Outdoor Music Ordinance constitutes an unconstitutional delegation of a core 
function or power to a private person or entity; namely, Barton and Park City Arts 
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Council. The Utah Constitution prohibits municipalities from delegating "any municipal 
function." Utah Const, art. VI, § 28: see also Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 848 
(Utah 1994) ("Core functions or powers of the various branches of government are clearly 
nondelegable under the Utah Constitution."). "[Governmental functions of a municipal 
corporation include the promotion of public peace, health, safety, and morals." 56 Am. 
Jur. 2d Municipal Corporations, Etc. § 183 (2000). Policing noisome activity, enforcing 
noise ordinances, and responding to noise complaints all constitute governmental 
functions. See Decker v. Fish. 126 F. Supp. 2d 342, 346 (D. Vt. 2000) ("[T]here can be 
little question that police work is a quintessential governmental function."). 
Here, the City delegated its governmental function to police noisome activities to 
Barton and Park City Arts Council. The City accomplished its delegation by allowing 
Barton and Park City Arts Council to self-govern their activities under the Ordinance, 
and, in doing so, exempted Defendants' activities from the general noise ordinance, 
thereby effectively and entirely eliminating the City's policing role. (Amended Complaint 
at 672, T| 91.) In furtherance of its delegation, the City bought, purchased and/or 
otherwise acquired a decibel meter reader, which the City gave or lent to Barton and Park 
City Arts Council to use in their respective roles as regulators of the noise which they 
created. (Amended Complaint at 672, U 91.) As further evidence of its delegation, the 
City stopped responding to Plaintiffs' noise complaints and instead directed Barton to 
"mediate" Plaintiffs' concerns. (Amended Complaint at 677-78, Iffi 141-43, 153.) As 
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explained herein, the City's actions constitute an unconstitutional delegation of a core 
governmental function or power in violation of the Utah Constitution. Therefore, the 
Outdoor Music Ordinance should be stricken as unconstitutional. 
F. The Ordinance is Repugnant to Law 
The Outdoor Music Ordinance is repugnant to law. Under our hierarchal system of 
government, Park City Municipal Corporation is a political subdivision of the state. See 
Utah Const, art. XI, § 1 (recognizing local governments). As such, the City must abide by 
the constitution and may not pass ordinances that are "repugnant to law." Utah Code 
Ann. § 10-8-84(1) (2003). Section 10-8-84 of the Utah Code states that cities 
may pass all ordinances and rules, and make all regulations, 
not repugnant to law, necessary for carrying into effect or 
discharging all powers and duties conferred by this chapter, 
and as are necessary and proper to provide for the safety and 
preserve the health, and promote the prosperity, improve the 
morals, peace and good order, comfort, and convenience of 
the city and its inhabitants, and for the protection of property 
in the city. 
Id. (emphasis added). As explained herein, the Outdoor Music Ordinance is "repugnant 
to law" because it: (1) violates the Supremacy Clauses of both the U.S. and Utah 
Constitutions and constitutes a per se taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment Takings 
Clause, (2) violates the Separation of Powers provision set forth in article V, section 1, of 
the Utah Constitution, (3) violates the Due Process Clauses of both the U.S. and Utah 
Constitutions, (4) constitutes special legislation in violation of article VI, section 26, of 
the Utah Constitution, and (5) delegates a core governmental function or power, in 
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violation of article VI, section 28, of the Utah Constitution. In addition, the Outdoor 
Music Ordinance is void because it infringes upon Plaintiffs' fundamental rights to use 
and enjoy their property,16 and it fails to satisfy minimal scrutiny and is overinclusive.17 
Therefore, the Ordinance should be stricken as void.18 
16
 "[W]henever an ordinance infringes on a fundamental right, it must be justified 
by a compelling government interest." 62 CJ.S. Municipal Corporations § 285 (1999); 
see also 56 Am. Jur. 2d Municipal Corporations, Etc. § 315 (2000). The City has no 
compelling interest in allowing loud, amplified music to infringe upon Plaintiffs' 
fundamental rights. Thus, the Outdoor Music Ordinance is void. 
17
 Minimal scrutiny requires that a rational relationship exist between the 
governmental means (i.e., the Ordinance) and the governmental ends sought to be 
achieved (i.e., music in the lower Main Street area). See State v. Powell, 496 So. 2d 
1188 (Fla. 1988). There is no rational relationship between the Outdoor Music 
Ordinance and the governmental ends sought because the Ordinance allows an excessive 
decibel level to substantially and unreasonably impact nearby property owners. In short, 
the Ordinance allows much more noise than is necessary to accomplish its purpose. 
Thus, the Ordinance is overinclusive and void. See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 
38 S.Ct. 16(1917). 
18
 Notwithstanding numerous Constitutional provisions discussed herein, history 
and tradition are replete with support for Plaintiffs' position in this case. See 1 Richard 
R. Powell, Powell on Real Property § 2.02, at 2-3 n.l (Michael Allan Wolf, ed., 2001) 
(the right to use and enjoy property is one of the essential sticks in the bundle of rights); 
8 Thompson on Real Property, Thomas Edition § 67.03, at 92 (David A. Thomas ed., 
1994) (stating that the ancient Latin maxim', "sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas" 
teaches that one should not use one's land so as to injure the property of another); 
McQuade, 543 P.2d at 153 (applying ancient Latin maxim, "sic utere tuo ut alienum non 
laedas" to loud concerts and affirming trial court's decision to enjoin conduct harmful to 
nearby residents); Aesop's Fables 124 (Wordsworth Ed. Ltd., 1994) (teaching lesson, 
through the story of the "The Grasshopper and The Owl," that those who repeatedly 
disregard consideration for others' comforts deserve their just deserts). In short, "[n]o 
man has a right to take from another the enjoyment of the reasonable and essential 
comforts of life, and, consequently, cannot commit acts on . . . premises calculated to 
interfere with the reasonable enjoyment by others of their home." Anderson v. Guerrin 
Sky-Way Amusement Co.. 29 A.2d 682, 684 (Pa. 1943). To the extent that the 
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V. SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE REVERSED AS TO PLAINTIFFS' 
TAKINGS CLAIM BECAUSE THERE IS NO EXHAUSTION OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES REQUIRED FOR A PER SE TAKINGS 
CLAIM AND P.C.L.M.C. § 15-1-18 IS INAPPLICABLE TO THIS CASE 
As a matter of law, the trial court's ruling as to Plaintiffs' eighth cause of action for 
takings should be reversed because Plaintiffs are not required to exhaust administrative 
remedies and Section 15-1-18 of the Park City Land Management Code does not apply to 
this case. As stated above, the Outdoor Music Ordinance constitutes a per se taking of 
Plaintiffs' rights to sue under state and federal law. There is no exhaustion of 
administrative remedies required for a per se takings claim. See generally 
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church. 482 U.S. at 319-21. Accordingly, the trial 
court erred as a matter of law in dismissing Plaintiffs' takings claim. Therefore, 
Plaintiffs' takings claim should be reinstated and, if the Court invalidates the Outdoor 
Music Ordinance, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court also remand this issue to 
the trial court for a determination of damages19 that occurred before the ultimate 
interference is committed under the guise of a permit or ordinance, that so-called 
authorizing instrument is void and unconstitutional and all the actor(s) thereunder are 
accountable for their conduct. 
Defendants herein "set[] in motion the forces which . . . cause[d] the [nuisance]" 
complained of, and they "participate^] in the creation or maintenance of a nuisance." 58 
Am. Jur. 2d Nuisances 112 (2002). In so doing, Defendants contributed to, aided and 
abetted in the commission of a nuisance. 66 C.J.S. Nuisances § 74 (1998). But for 
Defendants' conduct, the nuisance would not have occurred. Accordingly, Defendants 
should be held responsible. 
19 
In this context, the damage constitutes the many years Plaintiffs were prevented from 
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invalidation of the challenged legislation. Id. 
In addition, Section 15-1 -18 of the Park City Land Management Code is 
inapplicable to this case. Section 15-1-18 states that "[a]ny Owner of private Property 
who believes that his/her Property is proposed to be "taken" by an otherwise Final Action 
of the City may Appeal the City's decision to the Takings Appeal Board within thirty (30) 
days after the decision is made." Utah, Park City, Land Management Code § 15-1-18(C) 
(emphasis added), cited in full at R. 649. An "Owner" is defined as "[a]ny [p]erson, or 
group of [p]ersons, having record title to the [p]roperty sought be developed or 
subdivided and [his or her] agent. Id § 15-15-1.132. Plaintiffs (either in whole or in 
part) are not the record owners, and they do not seek to develop or subdivide their 
property through this action. Further, a "Final Action" is defined as "[t]he later of a final 
vote or written decision on a matter." Id § 15-15-1.74. Matters which are covered by 
Section 15-1-18 include applications for amendments to the Land Management Code and 
Zoning Map. See id. § 15-1-7(A). Plaintiffs' case is not premised on an application to 
amend the Land Management Code and Zoning Map. Thus, Section 15-1-18 has no 
bearing in this case. Accordingly, the trial court erred in dismissing Plaintiffs' takings 
claim because they "failed to exhaust all administrative remedies available . . . to them 
enforcing their constitutional rights and the legal fees Plaintiffs incurred in attempting to 
enforce their rights, including those fees incurred on this appeal. Cf First English 
Evangelical Lutheran Church, 482 U.S. at 319-21. 
In addition, damages should also be assessed for the resulting nuisance. 
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under §15-1-18." (Ruling and Order at 757.) 
VI. THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS FOR 
RECONSIDERATION ON THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS 
AGAINST THE ORDINANCE CONSTITUTES CLEAR ERROR 
BECAUSE THE COURT'S EARLIER RULING WAS NOT "FINAL" 
The trial court committed clear error when denying Plaintiffs' Motions for 
Reconsideration. The trial court's denial constitutes clear error because the court 
erroneously ruled that is prior ruling was "a final, formal judgment." (Ruling and Order 
at 878.) A final judgment is "[a] court's last action that settles the rights of the parties and 
disposes of all issues in controversy, except for an award of costs (and, sometimes, 
attorney's fees) and enforcement of judgment." Black's Law Dictionary 847 (7th ed. 
1999). An order that does not "dispose of all parties and claims to an action," including a 
determination of attorney fees, is not a final order." Bradbury, 2000 UT 50, f 10 
(emphasis added). 
The trial court's August 7, 2002 Ruling and Order did not dispose off all parties 
and claims to this action. The trial court's August 7, 2002 Ruling and Order also did not 
"direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or 
parties" pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Utah R. Civ. P. 
54(b) (emphasis added). Accordingly, Plaintiffs' Motions for Reconsideration were a 
reasonable and permissible means of asking the trial court to revise its earlier grant of 
summary judgment. See generally Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178, 1185 (Utah 1983), 
subsequent history omitted. Therefore, the trial court's decision to deny Plaintiffs 
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reconsideration on the basis that the August 7, 2002 Ruling and Order represented a final 
judgment is clear error and should be reversed. See Sears. Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 
351 U.S. 427, 437, 76 S. Ct. 895, 900-01, 100 L. Ed. 1297 (1956) ("The District Court 
cannot, in exercise of it discretion, treat as 'final' that which is not 'final' . . . ."). 
VII. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION ON THEIR 
CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS AGAINST THE OUTDOOR MUSIC 
ORDINANCE 
The standard governing a trial court's decision to grant or deny a Rule 54(b) 
motion for reconsideration is as follows: 
A court can consider several factors in determining the 
propriety of reconsidering a prior ruling. These may include, 
but are not limited to, when (1) the matter is presented in a 
'different light' or under 'different circumstances;' (2) there 
has been a change in the governing law; (3) a party offers new 
evidence; (4) 'manifest injustice' will result if the court does 
not reconsider the prior ruling; (5) a court needs to correct its 
own errors; and (6) an issue was inadequately briefed when 
first contemplated by the court. 
Trembly, 884 P.2d at 1311. This rule serves to ensure that cases are justly and 
expeditiously resolved in the trial court, Timm, 851 P.2d at 1185, because those courts are 
"responsible for carrying [cases] forward as efficiently and expeditiously as possible 
consistent with fairness and thoroughness in administering justice." Hanks v. 
Christensen. 11 Utah 2d 8, 354 P.2d 564, 566 (Utah 1960). 
Plaintiffs' Motions for Reconsideration were properly before the trial court under 
all but the second and third provisions noted above. (R. at 805-33; 882-90). The trial 
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court, nevertheless, denied Plaintiffs reconsideration because they had not adequately 
briefed their constitutional challenges against the Outdoor Music Ordinance when first 
considered by the court during summary judgment. (Minute Entry and Order at 1130.) 
A court that fails to exercise its discretion to address a matter inadequately briefed 
when initially considered, will result in reversal on appeal, so long as the error is not 
harmless. C£ State v. Mead, 2001 UT 58,f33 n.4, 27 P.3d 1115 (stating that an abuse of 
discretion results when the trial court "exceed[s] the range of discretion allowed for [by 
law]"); see also Holladav Duplex Mgmt. Co. v. Howells. 2002 UT App. 125, f 1 n.2, 47 
P.3d 104 (discussing harmless error). Reversible error (or harmful error) is "[a]n error 
that affects a party's substantive rights or the case's outcome." Black's Law Dictionary 
563 (7th ed. 1999). 
The trial court's decision in this case is harmful because it affects Plaintiffs' 
substantive and constitutionally protected rights, and it acts as a further bar to prevent 
Plaintiffs from pursuing their nuisance claims against all Defendants involved herein. 
Because the trial court exceeded the range of discretion allowed for by law, c£ Mead. 
2001 UT 58 at ^ 33 n.4, and thereby committed harmful error, the trial court's denial of 
Plaintiffs' Motions for Reconsideration should be reversed. 
VIII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BEFORE ANSWERS WERE FILED OR 
DISCOVERY COULD BE INITIATED OR COMPLETED 
Summary judgment should generally be denied before the answers are filed and 
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discovery is completed, lest it be shown with absolute certainty that no issue of material 
fact exists. See generally Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). The various affidavits on file by 
Plaintiffs absolutely refute Defendants' assertions that no nuisance existed or was 
otherwise created by Defendants' past and continued conduct. (See Aff. of Whaley at 84-
102; Aff. of Reif at 64-82: see also Aff. of Sola at 104-11; Aff. of Cline at 1164-76.) 
Accordingly, the trial court's rulings should be reversed to the extent they pertain to any 
unanswered claims. Likewise, the trial court's rulings should be reversed as to all claims 
because a material fact exists which should have precluded summary judgment. 
During the first round of summary judgment motions Plaintiffs argued that 
summary judgment was inappropriate, in part, because they had not had an opportunity to 
initiate or complete discovery. (R. at 731.) The trial court's subsequent ruling failed to 
address this issue. (See R. at 753-57.) When a trial court does not rule on a Rule 56(f) 
motion, thereby failing to exercise its discretion, "the issue of whether or not it should 
have presents a question which is subject to de novo review." Crossland Sav., 877 P.2d at 
1243 n.4 (Utah 1994) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Plaintiffs affidavits cited 
above set forth the basis for their nuisance claims, and Plaintiffs should have been given 
an opportunity to develop their case further through discovery documentation and/or 
deposition testimony from Defendants and others because that potentially could produce 
evidence further supporting Plaintiffs' claims or that could lead to evidence suggesting 
that Defendants' rendition of the facts was false. Similarly, Plaintiffs' Rule56(f) Motion 
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should have been granted as it pertained to Defendant Barton's violation of the 1999 
permits. For these reasons, the trial court erred in issuing summary judgment before the 
answers were filed and discovery could be initiated or completed. 
IX. THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISIONS TO DENY PLAINTIFFS' MOTION 
TO STRIKE BARTON'S SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT AND TO GRANT 
BARTON'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFFS' 
CLAIM FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE 1999 PERMIT SHOULD BE 
REVERSED 
The trial court abused its discretion in denying Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike 
Barton's Supplemental Affidavit, and therefore that decision should be reversed. "A 
motion to strike . . . is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard." Rivera. 2000 UT 
36, f^ 7. The trial court's decision should be reversed because (1) Barton's supplemental 
affidavit is not permitted under Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration 
and Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, (2) the supplemental affidavit was 
untimely filed, (3) Defendant Barton filed the supplemental affidavit after the Notice to 
Submit had already been submitted to the trial court, (4) Plaintiffs were unfairly surprised 
since they received Defendant Barton's reply memo in support of his supplemental 
affidavit only one day prior to the hearing on Barton's Motion for Summary Judgment 
and they did not have time to conduct proper discovery to rebut it, (5) Plaintiffs had 
requested additional time to conduct discovery, but the trial court denied them that 
opportunity, (6) Plaintiffs subsequently found a witness whose testimony directly 
contradicts the statements made in Defendant Barton's Supplemental Affidavit, but they 
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were prevented from deposing that person because the trial court denied Plaintiffs' Rule 
56(f) motion, even though Barton's counsel had failed to draft and timely file a proposed 
order for the court to sign after the court had ruled from the bench to grant Defendant 
Barton's motion, (7) the supplemental affidavit contradicts Defendant Barton's prior 
statements and is riddled with untruths, and (8) fairness and justice would not be served 
unless Plaintiffs are allowed an opportunity to overcome the statements made in 
Defendant Barton's supplemental affidavit. 
X. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS THAT BARTON DID NOT 
CONTRIBUTE TO THE NUISANCE COMPLAINED OF BY PLAINTIFFS 
DURING 1999 SHOULD BE SET ASIDE AS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS OR, 
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, UNDER A DE NOVO STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The trial court's findings of fact that Barton did not contribute to the nuisance 
complained of by Plaintiffs during 1999 should be set aside as clearly erroneous. See 
generally Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) (setting forth "clearly erroneous" standard). "A finding is 
clearly erroneous if it is against the great weight of the evidence or if the court is 
otherwise definitely and firmly convinced that a mistake has been made." Bountiful v. 
Riley, 784 P.2d 1174, 1175 (Utah 1989). Further, "a finding is clearly erroneous if it is 
without adequate evidentiary support or is induced by an erroneous view of the law." 
Hoth v. White, 799 P.2d213, 216 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Evidence supporting the trial court's findings 
1. Defendant Barton "rented" his sound equipment to the Park City Brewing 
Company during the summer of 1999. (Supp. Aff. of Barton at 1083, ^  2.) 
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2. Defendant Barton "never actually operated the sound equipment during the 
performances at the Town Lift during the summer of 1999." (Supp. Aff of Barton at 
1083, t 3.) 
3. Defendant Barton "never actually booked any performers for the Brewing 
Company during the summer of 1999." But he did "provide . . . the names of several 
potential performers." (Supp. Aff. of Barton at 1083, f 4.) 
4. Defendant Barton's "only involvement with the 1999 summer concerts was "to 
provide necessary equipment...." (Supp. Aff. of Barton at 1083, f 5.) 
Evidence contradicting the trial court's findings 
1. "In the summer of 1999, [Randy Barton] was approached by Park City Brewing 
[Company] & Smokehouse to provide sound and book musicians for the restaurant." 
(Aff. of Barton at 619, f 6.) 
2. "Randy Barton . . . was hired by Park City Brewing [Company] & Smokehouse 
to provide sound and book musicians for the restaurant." (Mem. in Supp. of Barton's 
Motion for Sum. J. at 532.) Acting in this capacity, Randy Barton served as the "agent" 
or "employee" of the Smokehouse. (Mem. in Supp. of Barton's Motion for Sum. J. at 
532.) 
3. Park City's local newspaper, the Park Record, reported during the summer of 
1999 that "Randy Barton[,] producer for the Wooden Dog concert series,. . . is arranging 
the musicians for the Brewing Company" and that he was "miffed that the city might bend 
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to just a few people who are complaining about the performances." (R. at 1000.) 
4. Defendant Barton published an admission in 1999 as a "Letter to the Editor" in 
which he publically admitted his involvement in the Park City Brewing Company & 
Smokehouse's 1999 concert series, publically admitted being governed by Park City 
Brewing Company & Smokehouse's permit, and publically admitted violating the 
conditions of the permit governing his activities: 
This summer I have arranged for musicians and provided the 
sound amplification for Park City Brewing and Smokehouse 
and the Town Lift Plaza. We were operating under a special 
outdoor music permit provided by the city. Last week that 
permit was rescinded due to complaints received from 
residents (one individual in particular living near the plaza[)]. 
We were invited to a meeting a City Hall to discuss the 
complaints and the future of outdoor amplified music. We 
were given a reprieve by the City and allowed to continue 
under new restrictions . . . . 
(R. at 1026 (emphasis added).) 
5. It was common knowledge that Defendant Barton was actively involved with the 
Park City Brewing Company & Smokehouse's 1999 concert series and that he in fact 
arranged, booked, and/or produced bands and acted as sound manager as Plaintiffs allege 
in their complaint. (R. at 1143.) 
6. Plaintiffs' attorney located an individual whose testimony directly contradicts 
Defendant Barton's testimony set forth in his Supplemental Affidavit. In particular, this 
individual stated that he was booked by Randy Barton during the summer of 1999 and 
that Randy Barton controlled the volume at the 1999 Town Lift plaza performances at 
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which the individual performed. (R. at 1154.) 
7. Defendant Barton booked the bands, controlled the sound equipment, and was 
fully aware of Plaintiffs' complaints. (Aff. of Cline at 1164-65.) This information is 
based on the personal knowledge of one of the musicians who played several times at the 
Town Lift plaza during the 1999 summer season. 
8. Defendant Barton advertised the 1999 Town Lift plaza concerts in the media 
and on his website as the "The Wooden Dog Concert Series." (R. at 960, If 4; 962, ffl[ 6-7; 
1158; 1168; 1170; 1173.) 
9. Defendant Barton failed to comply with the conditions of the permits. (R. at 
965.) 
10. Defendant Barton's failure to comply with the conditions of the permits 
resulted in unreasonably loud and intrusive noise which harmed Plaintiffs. (R. at 965.) 
11. Defendant Barton contributed to the nuisance complained of by Plaintiffs. (R. 
at 965.) 
When viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the trial court's findings 
below, they are legally insufficient to support the trial court's finding that Defendant 
Barton was not an integral part of the nuisance complained of by Plaintiffs. Indeed the 
only evidence supporting this conclusion is a self-serving and untimely affidavit filed by 
Defendant Barton himself, which is completely inconsistent with Defendant's earlier 
statements contained in his published admission and affidavit, and which was 
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subsequently disputed by Plaintiffs' attorney's affidavit. Accordingly, the trial court's 
findings should be set aside as clearly erroneous. See Bountiful, 784 P.2d at 1175; see 
alsoHoth,799P.2dat216. 
In the alternative, the trial court's findings of fact should be set aside under a de 
novo standard of review because those findings were based solely on written documents 
and not on direct testimony from Defendant Barton. The trial court's ruling was not 
based on direct testimony from which the trial court could have made a determination of 
Defendant Barton's credibility. Under these circumstances, "this court is in as good a 
position as the trial court to examine the evidence de novo and determine the facts." In re 
Infant Anonymous. 760 P.2d at 918. 
If the Court chooses to review this issue under a de novo standard of review, the 
Court should find that Defendant Barton was inextricably linked to the 1999 concerts held 
at the Town Lift plaza or, in the alternative, that this issue should be remanded for full 
and proper discovery to determine the extent of Defendant Barton's actual involvement. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiffs respectfully request: 
A. That Plaintiffs' nuisance claims be reinstated against all Defendants; 
B. That the Outdoor Music Ordinance be stricken as void and unconstitutional; 
C. That Plaintiffs' takings claim be reinstated against Defendant Park City 
Municipal Corporation, and that the case be remanded to the district court for a 
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determination of damages, payable by the City to Plaintiffs, to include the time Plaintiffs 
were prevented from enforcing their constitutionally protected rights to be free of 
nuisances and the legal fees they incurred, including those fees incurred on this appeal; 
D. That the trial court's denial of Plaintiffs' Motions for Reconsideration be 
reversed; 
E. That Plaintiffs shall be permitted to conduct discovery after all answers are filed 
by all Defendants; 
F. That Defendant Barton's Supplemental Affidavit shall be stricken; 
G. That the trial court's findings regarding Defendant Barton's involvement in the 
1999 concerts be set aside or, in the alternative, that the Court find that Barton was 
inextricably linked to those events; and 
H. Pursuant to Rule 34 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, costs incurred in 
this appeal. See Utah R. App. P. 34(a) (allowing appellant costs if judgment or order is 
reversed, or if judgment or order is affirmed, reversed in part, or vacated). 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J_l day of September, 2007. 
CRIPPEN & CLINE, L.C. 
/ j 
By_^ 
Russell A. Cline 
Attorney for Appellants 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801)539-1900 
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Exhibit A 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RONALD WHALEY and 
MELANIE A. REIF, RULING AND ORDER 
Plaintiffs, 
PARK CITY MUNICIPAL 
CORPORATION, et al, Civil No. 0106000122 
Defendants. Judge Robert K. Hilder 
The defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment were scheduled for oral argument, but 
after a conflict delayed one of the attorneys, counsel stipulated that the motions could be 
submitted on the memoranda. Now, having fully considered the arguments and the law, the court 
enters the following Ruling and Order: 
I. Statement of Facts 
In this action the Plaintiffs, Ronald R. Whaley and Melanie A. Reif, assert that by 
permitting or by playing outdoor music the defendants, Park City Municipal Corporation, Park 
City Arts Council, and Randy Barton, caused a nuisance under statute and theories of common 
law. Further, the Plaintiffs assert that the city ordinance permitting outdoor music is void. 
In 1999 Park City issued a number administrative permits allowing outdoor music to 
several downtown restaurants including the Park City Brewing Company and Smokehouse, 
Dynamite Dom's, and Jambalaya. Defendant Randy Barton was hired by these restaurants to 
book bands and perform sound control. The plaintiffs assert that the music played as a result of 
these permits caused a nuisance and that Park City failed to enforce the conditions of the permits. 
U J j / u 3 
In June of 2000 Park City passed an "outdoor music ordinance" permitting concerts at the 
Summit Watch plaza and the Town Lift plaza. Defendant Park City Arts Council was in charge 
of issuing permits for the concerts. Defendant Randy Barton received permits to promote several 
concerts on the square. The Plaintiffs assert that the ordinance is void and the music performed 
created a nuisance. 
II. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Presently before the Court are the defendants', Park City Municipal Corporation's, Park 
City Arts Council's, and Randy Barton's Motions for Summary Judgment. As to all material 
issues, the evidence is undisputed. The parties' main dispute is one of what law should rule: the 
Park City Municipal Noise Ordinance or the State of Utah nuisance statute and/or Common Law 
theories of nuisance. In a situation where the facts are not in dispute, as here, the case is well 
suited for Summary Judgment. 
III. Analysis 
A. The Plaintiffs' First, Second, Third, and Seventh causes of action are an improper 
attempt to challenge the validity of Park City's Outdoor Music ordinance and are 
dismissed as a matter of law. 
The Plaintiffs' first, second, third, and seventh causes of action are tied to the argument 
that Park City's Municipal Code and administrative permits are invalid. However, the Utah Code 
has expressly given municipalities like Park City the authority to determine what is and is not a 
nuisance. Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-60 (2001) grants to municipalities the authority to "declare 
what shall be a nuisance, and abate the same." Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-76 (2001) directly 
addresses the issue of noise abatement and states that a city "may" prevent noises. This section 
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implies that noise is not a general and non-curable nuisance. Id. Park City used this power to 
determine what is a nuisance when it passed it passed Title 4, Chapter 8 A of the Municipal Code 
of Park City (MCPC) and permitted outdoor music pursuant to administrative permits. 
The Plaintiffs' argue that Park City's "outdoor music" ordinances conflict with the Utah 
State Code nuisance statutes and under the concept of 'supremacy' the Utah State Code should 
overrule the MCPC. Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-38-178-10-803 (Supp. 2000). However, this 
argument is flawed. A basic tenet of statutory interpretation is that a statute should be read in a 
manner that it makes sense. The power granted to municipalities in Utah Code Ann. Title 10, 
Chapter 8 (e.g.§ 10-8-60, and -76) to regulate nuisance and noise, would be rendered 
meaningless if the Utah Code "Nuisance" statute applied in this situation. Therefore, the court 
holds that Title 4, Chapter 8A MCPC and administrative permits allowing outdoor music rule 
and Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-38-178-10-803 does not apply. 
The Plaintiffs' seventh cause of action, alleging that the outdoor music ordinance is void, 
fails because the Plaintiffs have failed to meet the facial burden required for such an attack. In 
challenging the facial validity of an ordinance the plaintiff must establish that no set of 
circumstances exists under which the statute would be valid. State v. Herrera, 993. P.2d 854, 
857, n.2 (Utah 1999). All presumptions are in favor of the ordinance's validity, 
constitutionality, and reasonableness and the Court maintains a strong reluctance to proclaim a 
legislative action facially unconstitutional. In fact, any reasonable doubts concerning legislation 
must be resolved in favor of constitutionality. Id. at 860. In the present case the plaintiff fails 
to meet this burden. 
Because Title 4, Chapter 8 A of the MCPC and the City issued administrative permits 
govern this circumstance, and Utah Code Ann. § 78-38-1 and § 78-10-803 do not apply, the 
Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment are granted regarding the Plaintiffs' first, second, 
third and seventh Causes of Action. 
B. Plaintiffs' fifth cause of action is dismissed as a matter of law. 
The Plaintiffs argue that the Defendants, Randy Barton and the Park City Art Council, 
violated MCPC §§ 6-3-7, 6-3-8-(J)(2), and 6-3-9(B). The Plaintiffs further argues that the 
Defendant Park City Municipality Corp. failed to enforce these statutes. However, because Park 
City lawfully issued administrative permits allowing outdoor music and later passed Title 4, 
Chapter 8A of the MCPC, MCPC §§ 6-3-7, 6-3-8-(J)(2), and 6-3-9(B) do not apply. Therefore, 
the Defendants Motions for Summary Judgment regarding Plaintiffs' fifth cause of action are 
granted. 
C. Plaintiffs' sixth Cause of Action is dismissed against Defendants Park City Municipal 
Corp. and the Park City Arts Council as a matter of law. Defendant's, Randy Barton, 
Motion for Summary Judgment regarding Plaintiffs' sixth Causes of Action is denied. 
Park City Municipal Corp.'s Motion for Summary Judgment is granted because Park City 
is immune from such claims under the Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-1 
to -38. The failure to suspend or revoke a permit is expressly enumerated as a governmental 
function that is protected by the act. Id § 63-30-10(l)(c)). 
The Park City Art's Council Motion for Summary Judgment is granted because the 
Plaintiffs' fail to claim that the Council had any involvement with the permit issuing process or 
violated any of the permit conditions. 
Randy Barton's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied because there is a dispute of 
material fact of whether his actions violated the conditions of the permit and whether those 
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actions constituted a nuisance. This question is limited to Randy Barton's possible violation of 
the conditions of the permits issued in 1999. 
D. Plaintiffs' eighth Cause of Action, unlawful taking of property under the U.S. 
Constitution and Utah Constitutions, is dismissed for lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction. 
The plaintiffs' have failed to exhaust all the administrative remedies available. The 
Plaintiffs have administrative remedy for alleged takings available to them under § 15-1-18 of the 
MCPC. Therefore, this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Home v. Utah Dep't of Public 
Safety, 962 P.2d 95 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
IV. Summary 
Based upon the foregoing: IT IS ORDERED THAT, Park City Municipal Corporation's 
Motion for Summary Judgment is granted in its entirety. Park City Arts Council's Motion for 
Summary Judgment is granted in its entirety. Randy Barton's Motion for Summary Judgment is 
granted in part, Plaintiffs' first, second, third, fifth, seventh, and eighth Causes of Action are 
dismissed. Randy Barton's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied in regard to the Plaintiffs' 
sixth cause of action. 
DATED this 7th day of August, 2002. 
BY THE COURT: 
#cf> SUMMIT \O\ 
Robert K. Hilder, District Co^pM&^ / "*/ 
tt&\n 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COJJRT- COUPT -VJW.IT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE?(SFtff AH r ° 
RONALD R. WHALEY and 
MELANIE A. REIF, 
RULING AND ORDER 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
PARK CITY MUNICIPAL 
CORPORATION, et ah, Civil No. 010600122 
Defendants. Judge Robert K. Hilder 
Plaintiffs5 Motion for Clarification and/or Reconsideration is before the court for 
decision. Judge Lubeck, the judge presently assigned to Summit County, appropriately referred 
the matter to Judge Hilder, who entered the Ruling at issue. 
The Ruling that plaintiffs wish to revisit is the court's Order granting Summary Judgment 
as to all defendants on all claims, except for defendant Randy Barton as to plaintiffs' Sixth cause 
of action. The Ruling and Order was entered August 7, 2002, and it dismissed all claims except 
the one reserved against Mr. Barton, with prejudice and on the merits. 
As for the clarification portion of the Motion, the court agrees that the Ruling may not be 
unequivocal in addressing alleged violations by Randy Barton in 1998, but in the posture of the 
case, it should be clear that the court has only preserved claims for 1999 or later. The only 
claims preserved against Barton are premised on an alleged violation of permits, and plaintiffs' 
sole claim alleging violation of permits is the Sixth cause of action. That claim is expressly 
premised on permits issued in 1999; therefore, it should be clear, based on plaintiffs' own 
pleading, that 1998 is not at issue. If there was an earlier permit-based claim, it has not been 
plead. 
Everything else plaintiffs seek is a reconsideration, and this court must deny that Motion, 
because it is not proper at this stage of the proceeding. The court understands that the phrase 
"there is no provision in Utah law for a motion to reconsider," or some variant on that phrase, is 
routinely uttered, but as any active litigator or judge knows, it is primarily honored in the breach. 
Courts often revisit rulings. Case law supports the practice in certain circumstances, and it is 
1 
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often in everyone's interest to fix an error before it goes any further, but there is a point where 
the ruling must be final. The court believes that caselaw and the status of this case militate 
against reconsideration. 
One of the cases cited as authority for the proposition that court's may change a ruling is 
Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), but the court finds the 
critical language to be as follows: "a judge is free to change a ruling until a final decision is 
formally rendered." Id. at 1311 (emphasis added). This court concurs. For example, an interim 
evidentiary ruling may be changed, and a ruling denying a motion to dismiss or for summary 
judgment, pending further discovery and or trial, may be changed if new evidence or an 
argument presented in a new light persuades the court to revise its thinking. But, once the ruling 
disposes of the case, either as to one party, or as to all, that is a final decision, on the merits, and 
such a decision can only be changed by an appropriate motion to amend, set aside or alter 
judgment, or perhaps on a motion for new trial and, of course, on appeal. In each case, certain 
time and procedure rules apply. In the case of a final, formal judgment, those rules cannot be 
circumvented by styling the motion as one for reconsideration, or there would be no certainty in 
any rulings. 
In this case, the mere circumstance that one claim against one defendant has not been 
resolved does not change the finality of a dismissal on the merits as to the other defendants. It is 
unfortunate that plaintiffs cannot resolve their disagreement with this court's rulings by 
interlocutory appeal, but the unavailability of that course, and the resulting delay, do not justify 
this court in revisiting and possibly undoing a final judgment. 
In addition, even if reconsideration was available, the court is concerned that the majority 
of plaintiffs' argument as presented now, while it was plead in the briefest terms in the Seventh 
cause of action, by plaintiffs' own admission that theory was not specifically briefed in the 
memorandum opposing summary judgment. Even if the judgment entered was not final as to all 
but Barton (and these newly developed claims do not concern Barton), the court would be very 
reluctant to encourage such a piecemeal approach to briefing. 
For the reasons stated the Motion for Reconsideration be and hereby is DENIED. The 
Motion to Clarify is GRANTED as set forth above. This signed Ruling shall be the ORDER of 
the court and no further Order is required. 
DATED this 31st day of March, 2003. 
By the Cou 
Robert K£ Hilder, DistxitrrCburt'Jiijdge^ 
l^i SUMMIT Vg, 
V&\ COUNTY/^ 
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3RD DISTRICT CT- SILVER SUMMIT COURT 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RONALD R WHALEY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
PARK CITY MUNICIPAL CORPORATIO, 
Defendant. 
MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER 
Case No: 010600122 
Judge: ROBERT K HILDER 
Date: 07/05/2003 
Clerk: rhilder 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration or Certification is before 
the court for decision. As to reconsideration, the court and 
plaintiffs' counsel may be confusing the issue because of differing 
emphases as to the posture of the case. In its March 31, 2003, 
Ruling, the court did not mean to suggest that there is technically 
a final judgment that not only gives a right of appeal, but that 
would start the appeal period running. The court was addressing 
the matter more as a policy of furthering certainty and 
discouraging piecemeal briefing. In this case, as to all but Mr. 
Barton, the court ordered dismissal almost one year ago now. This 
court will not lightly re-visit a dismissal, and that is 
particularly true when most of the reasons advanced for 
reconsideration were not adequately briefed for the initial motion. 
The court believes that reconsideration is discretionary, not 
mandatory, and it is not warranted in this case. On the other 
hand, the court fully understands plaintiffs' desire to obtain 
appellate review. If Mr. Barton's Motion for Summary Judgment was 
not now awaiting decision, the court would grant the request for 
certification, but under the circumstances, the court DENIES the 
Motion to Reconsider, and DENIES the Motion for Certification, but 
the latter Motion is denied without prejudice to renewal after the 
court decides Mr. Barton's Motion. Because that is a dispositive 
Motion, the court believes oral argument would assist decision, and 
the court's clerk will contact counsel to s e t a hearing date as 
soon as possible. This signed Minute E n t ^ ^ P ^ ^ i . be the ORDER of 
the court and no further Order is requij 
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3RD DISTRICT CT- SILVER SUMMIT COURT 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RONALD R WHALEY, : 
Plaintiff, : MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER 
vs. : Case No: 010600122 
PARK CITY MUNICIPAL CORPORATIO, : Judge: ROBERT K HILDER 
Defendant. : Date: 01/19/2004 
Clerk: rhilder 
Plaintiffs' Motion to vacate and Reconsider Summary Judgment 
Decision is before the court for decision. The court does not 
understand plaintiffs' repeated assertion that discovery could not 
be pursued because various (indeed, many) motions were filed 
through the first two-plus years of this case's life. An 
attorney's planning meeting and a discovery schedule were required, 
but why could not that have occurred, concurrently with the 
progress of the many motions? Even if that is a valid concern, by 
the date of argument on Mr. Barton's last Motion for Summary 
Judgment, plaintiffs' had NO admissible evidence on the critical 
issues, and despite repeated colluquy between counsel and the 
court, plaintiffs could not identify what they might find if the 
court treated their discovery concern as a Rule 56 (f) request for 
time to pursue discovery. That hearing occurred July 14, 2003, and 
the court granted Mr. Barton's Motion, because the record contained 
no evidence that would support his personal liability. Then, four 
days later (as is now revealed to the court) plaintiffs' counsel 
apparently found a witness. This event is urged as newly 
discovered evidence, but it meets at most one of the criteria to 
make it such. Like virtually all of the "evidence" presented in 
opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment (and the other 
documents attached at this time, with the possible excepion of the 
affidavit of counsel), what is offerred even now is not evidence in 
an admissible form. In addition, while the evidence, if it was 
admissible evidence, might be material and competent, it manifestly 
would not change the result. For these reasons, the Motion to 
Vacate, etc. is hereby DENIED. Mr. Barton's request for fees is 
hereby DENIED. The court is struggling with the Motion to certify 
for appeal, mainly because it is not clear whether the court 
previously ruled on plaintiffs' Fourth Cause of Action. If the 
claim is deemed dismissed along with the other claims, no 
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Case No: 010600122 
Date: Jan 19, 2004 
certification is needed, but if it is not dismissed, the court 
agrees that this apparently prospective claim does not affect the 
final nature of the court's ruling as to all other claims, and the 
court specifically states the the dismissal orders entered to this 
date are not subject to revision. Plaintiffs may prepare an 
appropriate certification Order if they believe this Minute Entry 
and Order will not suffice. 
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specified 
that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
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PARK CITY UT 84 06 0 
Mail CHRISTINA I MILLER 
ATTORNEY DEF 
PO Box 682800, 2200 N Park 
Ave 
Building D, Suite 200 
PARK CITY UT 84 0 98 
Mail DWAYNE A VANCE 
ATTORNEY DEF 
22 00 NORTH PARK AVENUE 
SUITE D2 00 
PARK CITY UT 84 06 8 
Dated t h i s ££ day o 
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3RD DISTRICT CT- SILVER SUMMIT COURT 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RONALD R WHALEY, : 
Plaintiff, : MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER 
vs. : Case No: 010600122 
PARK CITY MUNICIPAL CORPORATIO, : Judge: ROBERT K HILDER 
Defendant. : Date: 03/29/2004 
Clerk: rhilder 
Pursuant to this court's Minute Entry and Order dated January 19, 
2004, plaintiffs have submitted an Order purportedly certifying all 
issues for appeal under Rule 54(b), URCP. Both Park City and Mr. 
Barton object to the form of the Order. Their objections are 
well-taken. The court's invitation was quite narrow. The court 
believes its Minute Entry and Order will suffice as a 
certification, if one is needed, although the court continues to 
believe that there is no such need. Plaintiffs, however, have 
proposed a much more inclusive Order that greatly enlarges the 
court's ruling, and the court now determines that it will sign no 
further orders unless the appellate court to which this matter is 
assigned remands the matter as to the Fourth Cause of Action for 
any reason. This signed Minute Entry is the ORDER of the court and 
no further Order is required. 
Judg? 
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Mail RUSSELL A CLINE 
ATTORNEY PLA 
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3RD DISTRICT CT- SILVER SUMMIT COURT 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
/?*? 
RONALD R WHALEY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs, 
PARK CITY MUNICIPAL CORPORATIO, 
Defendant. 
RULING AND ORDER 
Case No: 010600122 
Judge: ROBERT K HILDER 
Date: 10/08/2005 
Clerk: rhilder 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment or Motion to Dismiss 
plaintiffs' Fourth Cause of Action is before the court for 
decision. As the court clerk apparently explained to counsel, 
while the Motion was submitted in July, 2005, it sat on a clerk's 
desk in Summit County until the assigned Salt Lake judge personally 
reviewed the docked in late September after growing uneasy that the 
matter was still pending. On being contacted, counsel represented 
that the matter could be submitted on the memoranda. The court has 
reviewed the memoranda and prior rulings carefully. As convoluted 
as this matter has become, it is nevertheless clear that both sides 
recognize that the court's ruling on this Cause of Action depends 
largely on how the court views its 2002 ruling three years later. 
Defendants argue that there can be 
continuing nuisance, or injunctive 
was rejected by this court in 2002. 
agree that the court's prior ruling 
no claim for prospective or 
relief, because the legal basis 
Plaintiffs do not expressly 
bars the Fourth Cause of 
Action, but in the spirit 
that the law does not bar 
of courageous advocacy, counsel argues 
the Fourth Cause of Action, and the 
court's August 2002 ruling was error that must be reversed, so it 
should not justify dismissal of the remaining claim. Counsel may 
well be right, but this court holds to its view, and for the 
reasons stated by defendants, now GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss the 
Fourth Cause of Action. By this action, the entire matter will be 
in the hands of the appellate court where the legal questions may 
be decided with the minimum of additional delay. No jEurtheS^Prder 
is required. A$U^" -v?:^X 
BERT ^ ^ILDER^v^; 
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EXHIBIT B 
ORDINANCE 00-36 
AN ORDINANCE AMENDING TITLE 4, CHAPTER 8 OF THE 
MUNICIPAL CODE OF PARK CITY REGULATING MASTER FESTIVAL 
LICENSING; BY ADDING A NEW SUB-CHAPTER 8A REGULATING PUBLIC 
OUTDOOR MUSIC PLAZAS; AND AMENDING SECTION 6-3-10, OF TITLE 6, 
HEALTH, NUISANCE ABATEMENT, NOISE BY CREATING AN EXEMPTION 
FOR SUCH OUTDOOR MUSIC PLAZAS 
WHEREAS, Utah Code Annotated ("UCA") § 10-8-73 and 10-8-76 give the City 
the power to regulate and prohibit public demonstrations, processions and other street or 
otherwise public performances which may interfere with public order or otherwise create a noise 
nuisance; and 
WHEREAS, UCA § 10-8-84 allows the City to pass all ordinances and rules, and 
make all regulations, not repugnant to law, necessary for carrying into effect or discharging all 
powers and duties conferred by Chapter 8 of UCA Title 10 which are necessary and proper to 
provide for the safety and preserve the health, and promote the prosperity, improve the morals, 
peace and good order, comfort and convenience of the City and its inhabitants, and for the 
protection of property in the city; and 
WHEREAS, UCA § 10-8-60 gives the City the right to declare what constitutes a 
public nuisance, and provide for the abatement of the same, and impose fines upon persons who 
may create, continue or suffer nuisances to exist; and 
WHEREAS, the City Council received a petition supporting outdoor music, but 
also heard from several area residents who objected to amplified music; and 
WHEREAS, the City Council received recommendations based upon the findings 
and experiences of a volunteer citizen committee, and a University of Utah class concerning the 
effects and regulation of noise and the construction of sound mitigating stages, to properly set 
forth reasonable regulations and time limits to substantially mitigate the effects of such music 
upon neighboring residents and businesses; and 
WHEREAS, the Community Development Department recommended the 
restrictions herein based upon the Department's noise measurements around the neighborhood 
and other parts of the City; and 
WHEREAS, the City commissioned an independent noise study by Spectrum 
0Ui,JJ 
Acoustical Engineers along Park Avenue and the study concluded that music performed pursuant 
to the restrictions herein should be compatible with the existing background and traffic noise of 
the neighborhood; and 
WHEREAS, the plazas authorized herein are within the Historic Commercial 
Business ("HCB") zoning district, where noisy commercial operations, businesses and public 
master festivals/parades are common; and 
WHEREAS, the adjoining neighborhood to the west of the Town Lift Plaza is 
primarily residential, however the neighborhood is separated from the plaza by Park Avenue, is 
adjacent to ski runs with permitted but not yet installed snow making with noise levels as high as 
85 decibels, and Park Avenue is along a primary municipal transit route with existing noise 
levels as high as 90 decibels. The snow making decibel limitation was established after 
extensive on-site testing and analysis with the City staff and officials; and 
WHEREAS, licensing and zoning are legitimate and reasonable means of time, 
place and manner regulations to ensure that outdoor music performers comply with reasonable 
regulations and to ensure that performers do not knowingly allow their music to become a 
nuisance to nearby residences and businesses, nor create public disorder; and 
WHEREAS, the City Council received convincing testimony that outdoor music 
performances, because of their very nature, have a positive effect on both the existing businesses 
around them and the community at large, causing enhanced resort atmosphere and business 
patronage; and 
WHEREAS, as a result of these findings and testimony, the City Council finds 
that public outdoor music in the specified plazas is not a nuisance per se, but if performed 
consistently with the regulations contained herein, is reasonably within the standard of comfort 
prevailing in the areas of and adjacent to the plazas defined herein, promotes the arts and cultural 
enhancement in the community, and is consistent with pending Master Festival Licensing section 
4-8-5; and 
WHEREAS, the City Council finds that outdoor music, if unregulated, may have 
serious objectionable operational characteristics particularly when located in close proximity to 
residential neighborhoods, thereby contributing to increased noise, pedestrian traffic and 
downgrading the quality of life in such adjacent residential areas; and 
WHEREAS, the City Council desires to minimize and control these adverse 
effects and thereby preserve the property and character of surrounding neighborhoods, deter 
unreasonably large pedestrian crowds, protect the citizens from increased noise, preserve the 
quality of life, and protect the health, safety and welfare of the citizenry; and 
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WHEREAS, the time, place and manner restrictions of this ordinance are required 
to protect legitimate and important governmental interests and are reasonably related to achieve 
the protection of those interests with the minimum interference necessary to rights protected by 
state and federal constitutional provisions; and 
WHEREAS, implementation of the Ordinance eliminates approximately nine 
potential venues for non-master festival licensed outdoor music; and 
WHEREAS, the City Council finds that barring all amplified events and music 
would be over broad and arbitrary; and 
WHEREAS, the City Council held work sessions with public input on this matter 
as regularly scheduled meetings on November 18, 1999, and February 10, 2000, and public 
hearings on March 2, 2000, March 30, April 13, and May 18, 2000. 
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED BY THE CITY COUNCIL OF PARK CITY, UTAH, 
AS FOLLOWS: 
SECTION 1. FINDINGS. The recitals above are incorporated herein as findings by the City 
Council, the legislative body of Park City. 
SECTION 2. AMENDMENT. The Municipal Code of Park City is hereby amended by 
adding the following Chapter 8a to Title 4: 
CHAPTER 8A - PUBLIC OUTDOOR MUSIC PLAZAS 
4- 8A-1. TITLE FOR CITATION. 
This section shall be known and may be referred to as the Public Outdoor Music Plaza 
Ordinance. 
4- 8A- 2. PURPOSE: REASONABLE LICENSING PROCEDURES. 
It is the purpose and object of this section that the City establish reasonable and uniform 
regulations governing the licensing and manner of operations of Public Outdoor Music Plazas in 
Park City. This section shall be construed to protect the legitimate and important governmental 
interests recognized by this Chapter in a manner consistent with constitutional protections 
provided by the United States and Utah Constitutions. The purpose of these regulations is to 
provide for the regulation and licensing of Public Outdoor Music Plazas within the City in a 
manner which will protect the property values of surrounding businesses and neighborhoods, and 
residents from the potential adverse secondary effects, while providing to those who desire to 
perform in and patronize Public Outdoor Music Plazas the opportunity to do so. The purpose of 
this Chapter is to prevent and control the adverse effects of Public Outdoor Music Plazas and 
Ord. 00-36 3 
u u »*»«* 
thereby to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the citizens and guests of Park City, protect 
the citizens from increased noise, preserve the quality of life, preserve the property values and 
character of the surrounding neighborhoods. 
4- 8A- 3. APPLICATION OF PROVISIONS. 
This section imposes regulatory standards and license requirements on certain activities, which 
are characterized as "Public Outdoor Music Plazas." It is not the intent of this Chapter to 
suppress any speech activities protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution and the Constitution of the State of Utah, but to impose content-neutral 
regulations which address the adverse secondary effects of Public Outdoor Music Plazas. This 
Chapter is intended to supersede any other related ordinances including, but not limited to, Title 
6 Chapter 3, Noise, of the Municipal Code; and Chapter 7 (including pending Municipal Code § 
15-2-6.10(B)(4)) of the Park City Land Management Code, as amended. 
4-8A-4. DEFINITIONS. 
For the purpose of this Chapter, the following words shall have the following meanings: 
(A) AMPLIFIED EVENT OR MUSIC. An event or music utilizing an amplifier or other 
input of power so as to obtain an output of greater magnitude or volume through speakers or 
other electronic devices. 
(B) PUBLIC OUTDOOR MUSIC PLAZA. The following plazas used for public 
performances and outdoor music; 
(1) Town Lift Plaza as shown on Exhibit A; and 
(2) Summit Watch Marriot Plaza as shown on Exhibit B. 
(C) STAGES. The raised and semi-enclosed platforms that are designed to attenuate sound, 
in a form substantially similar to as depicted in Exhibit C or as otherwise approved by 
Special Events staff. 
4- 8A- 5. MASTER FESTIVAL LICENSE; REVIEW PROCEDURE. 
The City Council hereby grants Master Festival Licenses for each of the plazas in Section 4. The 
Licenses shall be subject to all regulations and conditions of this Chapter. The Licenses shall be 
valid as of June 1, 2000 and shall expire October 1, 2000, unless renewed by the City Council. 
The City Council may not renew said licenses until after a public hearing and receipt of a staff 
evaluation of the prior year's compliance with this Chapter. Renewal shall be granted in the sole 
judgment of the City Council based upon compliance with the regulations herein, community 
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impacts, and so long as such decision is not arbitrary and capricious. No licensee nor performer 
shall accrue any vested rights under this revocable license. 
4- 8A- 6. PROGRAM LIMITS AND CATEGORIES. 
Each Stage may be programed for not more than four days per week, and of those four days, only 
one program day may be a weekend day (Saturday or Sunday). The categories of programming 
allowed at Public Outdoor Music Plazas are: 
(A) Amplified Event or Music: This type of event shall be programmed for no more than 2 
days a week at each plaza, only one of which may be a weekend day (Saturday or Sunday). 
Amplified Music shall be limited to no more than 5 hours of total performance time on each of 
those two days (breaks are not included in total time but warm-up and rehearsals are). 
(B) Non-amplified music and events: Programming for music and events such as poetry 
readings, dance, or other events that require no amplification. 
4-8A-7. GENERAL REGULATIONS. 
(A) The program manager, or his/her designee, shall provide on-site management for each 
event. 
(B) A sound technician shall provide on-site noise monitoring for each event with music, 
Amplified or otherwise, and any Amplified Event. 
(C) For Amplified Events or Music, a sound limiter will be placed on the sound system that 
maintains the sound at an A-weighted sound level adjustment and maximum decibel level of 90, 
as measured twenty five (25) feet from the stage. Non-amplified music and events shall not 
exceed a maximum decibel level of 90, as measured twenty five (25) feet from the stage. The 
data currently available to the City indicates that a maximum decibel level of 90 satisfies the 
purpose of this ordinance. The City may amend this ordinance consistent with newly acquired 
data. 
(D) All events shall be open to the public and free of charge. 
(E) Power controls. A timer device will be installed that shuts the power of the stage and 
sound system off at 8:00 p.m. 
(F) Time: All performances, regardless of type, are permitted only between noon (12:00 
p.m.) and 8 p.m. 
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(G) No event shall exceed 250 people unless a separate Master Festival License is granted for 
that event. 
(H) The Police Department or other proper City official shall have access at all times to all 
plazas under this Chapter, and may make periodic inspection of said premises whether the officer 
or official is in uniform or plain clothes. 
(I) All events shall take place only on authorized Stages and shall have clean-up services 
directly following each event so as to leave the plazas in a clean and litter free manner. 
4-8A-8. ALCOHOL. 
It is unlawful for the licensee or any person or business to allow the sale, storage, supply, or 
consumption of alcoholic beverages on the Public Outdoor Music Plazas, unless licensed 
pursuant to Chapters 4-6 of Title 4, as applicable. 
4- 8A-9. LICENSE HOLDER; PROGRAM BOARD 
(A) The Park City Arts Council will be the licencee of the events and will own the Stages. 
The Arts Council will hire a program manager, approved by the City, said approval not to be 
unreasonably withheld. The program manager will be responsible for general management of 
each plaza and on-sight oversight for each event. Agreements with the individual property 
owners will be provided to the City Special Events Department by the program manager. 
(B) The Arts Council will appoint an independent Programming Board, consisting of five 
residents of Park City (community and arts). The Programming Board will schedule the 
selection and times of events. Nothing herein shall allow the City to regulate the content or 
otherwise censor plaza productions or speech. The Arts Council shall at all times hold the City 
harmless and indemnify the City for all claims, actions and liability arising from the Arts 
Council's use of the Public Outdoor Music Plazas. The Arts Council shall maintain its own 
liability insurance, with the City listed as an additional insured in a form approved by the City 
Attorney. 
(C) Nothing in this Chapter shall be interpreted to create a contract or implied-contract 
between the City and any performer, or plaza owner. 
4- 8A-10. ON-GOING COMPLIANCE EVALUATION. 
(A) The City Special Events Department will appoint an independent neighborhood review 
group of at least three area residents which will be contacted weekly by the City Special Events 
staff and the program manager to receive comments and concerns. A phone number will also be 
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available at each venue so that individuals may phone in comments. Based upon such 
comments, the Special Events staff may issue additional conditions consistent with the intent of 
this Chapter to the program manager. A summary of, and recommended response to comments 
will be forwarded to the City Council within seven days of the end of each month of operation, or 
sooner if requested by«the program manager to resolve any issue. At the end of the season, the 
Special Events staff will forward a final recommendation to the City Council, with proposed 
changes, if any, prior to renewal of the licenses granted herein. 
(B) The Police Chief, or his/her designee, may suspend the Licenses granted herein and 
schedule a revocation hearing before the City Council at the next regularly scheduled City 
Council meeting for any of the following causes: 
(1) Any violation of this Chapter as evidenced by a citation issued by the Police 
Department. 
(2) Any violation of law or City ordinance. 
(3) Upon any other evidence that the Program Manager or entertainer constitutes a 
hazard or nuisance to the health, safety, or welfare of the community. 
4-8A-11. TRANSFER LIMITATIONS. 
The Master Festival Licenses granted under this Chapter are not transferable without the written 
consent of the Mayor, It is unlawful for an individual to transfer a Public Outdoor Music Plaza 
master festival license without City approval as provided herein. If any transfer of the 
controlling interest in a Public Outdoor Music Plaza license occurs without City approval, the 
license is immediately null and void and the Public Outdoor Music Plaza shall not operate until a 
separate new license has been properly issued by the City as herein provided. The City will not 
unreasonably withhold consent of transfer provided the proposed Licensee is a non-profit 
organization within Park City, meets all the criteria of this Chapter, and demonstrates experience 
managing special events. 
4-8A-12. PLAZAS LICENSES IN LIEU OF ADMINISTRATIVE PERMITS FOR 
OUTDOOR MUSIC AND OUTDOOR SPEAKERS. 
The Master Festival Licenses granted under this Chapter are in lieu of any Administrative 
Conditional Use Permit for outdoor music (including outdoor speakers) pursuant to the existing 
Land Management Code and pending ordinance MCPC § 15-2-6.10(B)(4) . The Community 
Development Department shall not issue any outdoor music permits in the Historic Commercial 
Business (UHCB") zoning district north of Heber Avenue. The City may still issue outdoor 
music permits in conjunction with an approved Master Festival License. 
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SECTION 3. AMENDMENT. Section 6-3-10, of Title 6, Health, Nuisance Abatement, Noise, 
is hereby amended to add the following to as an exemption to Chapter 3, Noise: 
(J) Noise resulting from a duly licensed and operated Public Outdoor Music Plaza pursuant to 
Title 4, Chapter 8a of the Municipal Code of Park City. 
SECTION 4. SEVERABILITY. If any phrase, clause, sentence, paragraph, or section of this 
Ordinance is declared unlawful by a Court of competent jurisdiction, such decision shall not 
affect any of the remaining phrases, clauses, sentences, paragraphs, or sections of this Ordinance. 
SECTION 5. EFFECTIVE DATE. This ordinance shall become effective upon publication. 
PASSED AND ADOPTED this 1st day of June, 2000. 
PARK CITY MUNICIPAL CORPORATION 
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ORDINANCE 01-16 
AN ORDINANCE AMENDING TITLE 4, CHAPTER 8A 
REGULATING PUBLIC OUTDOOR MUSIC PLAZAS 
WHEREAS, Utah Code Annotated ("UCA") Sections 10-8-73 and 10-8-76 give 
the City the power to regulate and prohibit public demonstrations, processions and other street or 
otherwise public performances which may interfere with public order or otherwise create a noise 
nuisance; and 
WHEREAS, UCA Section 10-8-84 allows the City to pass all ordinances and 
rules, and make all regulations, not repugnant to law, necessary for carrying into effect or 
discharging all powers and duties conferred by Chapter 8 of UCA Title 10 which are necessary 
and proper to provide for the safety and preserve the health, and promote the prosperity, improve 
the morals, peace and good order, comfort and convenience of the City and its inhabitants, and 
for the protection of property in the City; and 
WHEREAS, UCA Section 10-8-60 gives the City the right to declare what 
constitutes a public nuisance, and provide for the abatement of the same, and impose fines upon 
persons who may create, continue or suffer nuisances to exist; and 
WHEREAS, the City Council received a petition supporting outdoor music, but 
also heard from several area residents who objected to amplified music; and 
WHEREAS, the City Council received recommendations based upon the findings 
and experiences of a volunteer citizen committee, and a University of Utah class concerning the 
effects and regulation of noise and the construction of sound mitigating stages, to properly set 
forth reasonable regulations and time limits to substantially mitigate the effects of such music 
upon neighboring residents and businesses; and 
WHEREAS, the Community Development Department recommended the 
restrictions herein based upon the Department's noise measurements around the neighborhood 
and other parts of the City; and 
WHEREAS, on June 1, 2000, the City Council of Park City adopted Ordinance 
00-36, regulating Outdoor Music Plazas at the Town Lift Plaza and Summit Watch Marriot 
Plaza; and 
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WHEREAS, amplified events and music operated at the Town Lift Plaza and 
Summit Watch Marriot Plaza in accordance with Ordinance 00-36; and 
WHEREAS, the Neighborhood Review Group, an independent review committee 
appointed to monitor ongoing compliance with Ordinance 00-36, delivered a positive 
recommendation and review of performance under the ordinance; and 
WHEREAS, the Public Outdoor Music locations authorized herein are within the 
City limits, in areas where noisy commercial operations, businesses and public master 
festivals/parades are common; and 
WHEREAS, licensing and zoning are legitimate and reasonable means of time, 
place and manner regulations to ensure that outdoor music performers comply with reasonable 
regulations and to ensure that performers do not knowingly allow their music to become a 
nuisance to nearby residences and businesses, nor create public disorder; and 
WHEREAS, the City Council received convincing testimony that outdoor music 
performances, because of their very nature, have a positive effect on both the existing businesses 
around them and the community at large, causing enhanced resort atmosphere and business 
patronage; and 
WHEREAS, as a result of these findings and testimony, the City Council finds 
that public outdoor music in the specified location is not a nuisance per se, but if performed 
consistently with the regulations contained herein, is reasonably within the standard of comfort 
prevailing in the areas of and adjacent to the locations defined herein, promotes the arts and 
cultural enhancement in the community, and is consistent with pending Master Festival 
Licensing section 4-8-5; and 
WHEREAS, the City Council finds that outdoor music, if unregulated, may have 
serious objectionable operational characteristics particularly when located in close proximity to 
residential neighborhoods, thereby contributing to increased noise, pedestrian traffic and 
downgrading the quality of life in such adjacent residential areas; and 
WHEREAS, the City Council desires to minimize and control these adverse 
effects and thereby preserve the property and character of surrounding neighborhoods, deter 
unreasonably large pedestrian crowds, protect the citizens from increased noise, preserve the 
quality of life, and protect the health, safety and welfare of the citizenry; and 
WHEREAS, the time, place and manner restrictions of this ordinance are required 
to protect legitimate and important governmental interests and are reasonably related to achieve 
the protection of those interests with the minimum interference necessary to rights protected by 
state and federal constitutional provisions; and 
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WHEREAS, the City Council finds that barring all amplified events and music 
would be over broad and arbitrary; and 
WHEREAS, the City Council held work sessions with public input on this matter 
as regularly scheduled meetings on March 19, 2001, and May 3, 2001. 
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED BY THE CITY COUNCIL OF PARK CITY, UTAH, 
AS FOLLOWS: 
SECTION 1. FINDINGS. The recitals above are incorporated herein as findings by the City 
Council, the legislative body of Park City. 
SECTION 2. AMENDMENT. Title 4, Chapter 8 A of the Municipal Code of Park City is 
hereby amended as follows: 
CHAPTER 8A - PUBLIC OUTDOOR MUSIC PLAZAS 
4-8A-1. TITLE FOR CITATION. 
This section shall be known and may be referred to as the Public Outdoor Music Plaza 
Ordinance. 
4- 8A- 2. PURPOSE: REASONABLE LICENSING PROCEDURES. 
It is the purpose and object of this Chapter section that the City establish reasonable and uniform 
regulations governing the licensing and manner of operations of Public Outdoor Music Plazas in 
Park City. This Chapter section shall be construed to protect the legitimate and important 
governmental interests recognized by this Chapter in a manner consistent with constitutional 
protections provided by the United States and Utah Constitutions. The purpose of these 
regulations is to provide for the regulation and licensing of Public Outdoor Music Plazas within 
the City in a manner which will protect the property values of surrounding businesses and 
neighborhoods, and residents from the potential adverse secondary effects, while providing to 
those who desire to perform in and patronize Public Outdoor Music Plazas the opportunity to do 
so. The purpose of this Chapter is to prevent and control the adverse effects of Public Outdoor 
Music Plazas and thereby to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the citizens and guests of 
Park City, protect the citizens from increased noise, preserve the quality of life, preserve the 
property values and character of the surrounding neighborhoods. 
4- 8A- 3. APPLICATION OF PROVISIONS. 
This Chapter section imposes regulatory standards and license requirements on certain activities, 
which are characterized as "Public Outdoor Music Plazas." It is not the intent of this Chapter to 
suppress any speech activities protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
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States Constitution and the Constitution of the State of Utah, but to impose content-neutral 
regulations which address the adverse secondary effects of Public Outdoor Music Plazas. This 
Chapter is intended to supersede any other related ordinances including, but not limited to, Title 
6 Chapter 3, Noise, of the Municipal Code; and Chapter 7 (including pending Municipal Code 
^Section 15-2-6.10(B)(4)) of the Park City Land Management Code, as amended. 
4-8A-4. DEFINITIONS. 
For the purpose of this Chapter, the following words shall have the following meanings: 
(A) AMPLIFIED EVENT OR MUSIC. An event or music utilizing an amplifier or other 
input of power so as to obtain an output of greater magnitude or volume through speakers or 
other electronic devices. 
fB) PUBLIC OUTDOOR MUSIC PLAZA. The following plazas used for public 
performances and outdoor music: 
(!•) Town Lift Plaza as shown on Exhibit A; and 
(2) Summit Watch Harriot Plaza as shown on Exhibit D. 
f€)(B) STAGES. The raised and semi-enclosed platforms that are designed to attenuate sound, 
in a form substantially similar to as depicted in Exhibit C or as otherwise approved by 
Special Events staff. 
4- 8A- 5. MASTER FESTIVAL LICENSE; REVIEW PROCEDURE. 
The City Council hereby grants Master Festival Licenses for each of the Public Outdoor Music 
Plazas in Section 46. The Licenses shall be subject to all regulations and conditions of this 
Chapter. The Licenses shall be valid as of June 1, 2000 2001 and shall expire October 1, 
29002001, unless renewed by the City Council. The City Council may not renew said licenses 
until after a public hearing and receipt of a staff evaluation of the prior year's compliance with 
this Chapter. Renewal shall be granted in the sole judgment of the City Council based upon 
compliance with the regulations herein, community impacts, and so long as such decision is not 
arbitrary and capricious. No licensee nor performer shall accrue any vested rights under this 
revocable license. 
4- 8A- 6. PROGRAM LIMITS AND CATEGORIES. 
Each Stage may be programed for not more than four days per week, and of those four days, only 
one program day may be a weekend day (Saturday or Sunday). The categories of programming 
allowed at Public Outdoor Music Plazas arc: 
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(A) Amplified Event or Music This type of event shall be programmed for no more than 2 
days a week at each plaza, only one of which may be a weekend day (Saturday or Sunday) 
Amplified Music shall be limited to no more than 5 hours of total performance time on each uf 
those two days (breaks are not included in total time but warm-up and rehearsals are) 
(B) Non-^amplified music and events: Programming for music and events such as poetiy 
readings, dance, or other events that require no amplification 
4- 8A- 6. PUBLIC OUTDOOR MUSIC PLAZAS 
The following locations, dates, and times may be piogrammed by Mountain Town Stages foi 
public performances and outdoor music 
(A) PARTY ON THE PLAZA 
(1) LOCATION On Summit Watch Plaza between Dynamite Dom's and Picasso's 
Appioved plans are on file with the Special Events Department 
(2) OPERATION D AYS/HOURS/MONTHS This Stage may be progi ammed 
Tuesdays, Fridays, and Saturdays from 5 00 PM to 8 00 PM fiom June 12th through 
Septembei 30th A timer device will be installed that shuts the power of the stage and 
sound system off at 8 00 PM 
(3) TYPE OF MUSIC Amplified and Acoustic For Amplified Events or Music on 
Summit Watch Plaza, the program manager shall be responsible to ensure that the sound 
system maintains the sound at an A-weighted sound level adjustment and maximum 
decibel level of 90, as measured twenty fi\e (25) feet in front of the stage 
(4) SPECIAL EVENTS This Public Outdoor Music Plaza may also be 
programmed for a maximum of four (4) additional week-nights during the summer for 
special events from 5 00 PM to 8 00 PM, provided these special events do not conflict 
with any City-sponsored or duly licensed Master Festival as appioved by the Special 
Events Department 
(B) DEER VALLEY NEAR MCHENRY^ GRILL 
(1) LOCATION Deer Valley near McHenry's Grill Approved plans aie on file 
with the Special Events Department 
(2) OPERATION D AYS/HOURS/MONTHS This Stage may be programmed 
Wednesdays, Thuisdays, Saturdays, and Sundays from 11 30 AM to 2 30 PM, from June 
27th through September 9th A timer device will be installed that shuts the power of the 
stage and sound system off at 2 30 PM 
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(3) TYPE OF MUSIC. Amplified and Acoustic. 
(4) SPECIAL EVENTS. This Public Outdoor Music Plaza may also be 
programmed for a maximum of four (4) additional weekdays during the summer for 
special events from Noon to 6:00 PM, provided these special events do not conflict with 
any City-sponsored or duly licensed Master Festival as approved by the Special Events 
Department. 
(C) PARK CITY MOUNTAIN RESORT AT MOOSE'S PUB & GRILL 
(1) LOCATION. Park City Mountain Resort at Moose's Pub & Grill. Approved 
plans are on file with the Special Events Department. 
(2) OPERATION DAYS/HOURS/MONTHS. This Stage may be programmed 
Saturdays and Sundays from Noon to 6:00 PM, from June 30th through September 9th. 
A timer device will be installed that shuts the power of the stage and sound system off at 
6.00 PM . 
(3) TYPE OF MUSIC. Amplified and Acoustic. 
(4) SPECIAL EVENTS. This Public Outdoor Music Plaza may also be 
programmed for a maximum of four (4) additional weekdays during the summer for 
special e\ents from Noon to 6:00 PM, pro\ided these special e\ents do not conflict with 
any City-sponsored or duly licensed Master Festival as approved by the Special Events 
Department. 
(D) ADDITIONAL LOCATIONS; ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW. Additional Public 
Outdoor Music Plaza locations may be administratively approved by the Special Events 
Department for programming by Mountain Town Stages of public perfonnances and outdoor 
music pursuant to the criteria set forth herein. No additional Public Outdoor Music Plaza 
location shall be administratively approved unless the proposal fully complies with all of the 
following criteria: 
(1) No more than mo (2) additional Public Outdoor Music Plaza locations maybe 
administratively approved; 
(2) No proposed location may occupy or othen\ise compromise any public parking 
space(s), whether for use by performers, attendees, or other amenities directly 
connected to programming pursuant to this Chapter; 
(3) The proposed location must include sufficient area to accommodate performers, 
MTS staff, and anticipated attendees without interfering with pedestrian or 
vehicular traffic or otherwise impairing any public right of way; 
(4) No proposed location shall be approved unless located within the HRC, HCB, RC, 
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RCO, GC, or LI Districts, and in no case shall a proposed location be approved 
within one hundred feet (100') of a residential neighborhood; 
(5) No additional Public Outdoor Music Plaza location shall be programmed prior to 
June 1, nor after September 30, 2001; 
(6) Additional Public Outdoor Music Plaza locations may be programmed no more 
than three (3) days or evenings per week; and 
(7) No additional Public Outdoor Music Plaza location may be programmed for more 
than five (5) hours in any day, and m no event shall programming commence prior 
to 11:30 AM nor end later than 8:00 PM. 
4- 8A-7. GENERAL REGULATIONS. 
(A) The program manager, or his/her designee, shall provide on-site management for each 
event. 
(B) A sound technician shall provide on-site noise monitoring for each event with music, 
Amplified or otherwise, and any Amplified Event. 
(C) Except as otherwise provided at Subsection 6(A) herein, for Ftrr Amplified Events or 
Music, a sound limitcr will be placed on the program manager shall be responsible to ensure that 
the sound system maintains the sound at an A-weighted sound level adjustment and maximum 
decibel level of 95 90, as measured thirty five feet (35') twenty five (25) feet fromin front of the 
stage. Non-amplified music and events shall not exceed a maximum decibel level of 90, as 
measured twenty five (25) feet from the stage. The data currently available to the City indicates 
that a maximum decibel level of 95 90 satisfies the purpose of this ordinance. The City may 
amend this ordinance consistent with newly acquired data. 
(D) All events shall be open to the public and free of charge. 
fE) rower Controls: A timer device will be installed that shuts the power of the stage and 
sound system off at 8:00 PM . 
(F) TIME. All performances, regardless of type, arc permitted only between noon (12:00 
PM) And 8 PM 
fG)(E) No event shall exceed 250 people unless a separate Master Festival License is granted for 
that event. 
(H}(F) The Police Department or other proper City official shall have access at all times to all 
Public Outdoor Music Plazas plazas under this Chapter, and may make periodic inspection of 
said premises whether the officer or official is in uniform or plain clothes. 
f£)(G) All events shall take place only on authorized Stages and shall have clean-up services 
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directly following each event so as to leave the plazas in a clean and litter free manner. 
4- 8A-8. ALCOHOL. 
It is unlawful for the licensee or any person or business to allow the sale, storage, supply, or 
consumption of alcoholic beverages at on the Public Outdoor Music Plazas, unless licensed 
pursuant to Chapters 4-6 of Title 4, as applicable. 
4- 8A-9. LICENSE HOLDER; PROGRAM BOARD 
(A) Mountain Town Stages (MTS) The Park City Arts Council will be the licencee of the 
events and will own the Stages. MTS The Arts Council will hire a program manager, approved 
by the City, said approval not to be unreasonably withheld. The program manager will be 
responsible for general management of each Public Outdoor Music Plaza and on-sight oversight 
for each event. Agreements with the individual property owners will be provided to the City 
Special Events Department by the program manager. 
(B) Mountain Town Stages shall schedule events in accordance with the regulations set forth 
in this Chapter. The Ails Council will appoint an independent Programming Doard, consisting of 
five residents of Park City (community and arts). The Programming Doard will schedule the 
selection and times of events. Nothing herein shall allow the City to regulate the content or 
otherwise censor Public Outdoor Music Plaza productions or speech. Mountain Town Stages 
The Arts Council shall at all times hold the City harmless and indemnify the City for all claims, 
actions and liability arising from Mountain Town Stage's the Arts Council's use of the Public 
Outdoor Music Plazas. Mountain Town Stages The Arts Council shall maintain its own liability 
insurance, with the City listed as an additional insured in a form approved by the City Attorney. 
(C) Nothing in this Chapter shall be interpreted to create a contract or implied-contract 
between the City and any performer, or Public Outdoor Music Plaza owner. 
4- 8A-10. SUSPENSION .AND REVOCATION-ON-GOING COMPLIANCE 
EVALUATION. 
(A) The City Special Events Department will appoint an independent neighborhood review 
group of at least three area residents which will be contacted weekly by the City Special Events 
staff and the program manager to receive comments and concerns. A phone number will also be 
available at each venue so that individuals may phone in comments.—Dascd upon such 
comments, the Special Events staff may issue additional conditions consistent with the intent of 
this Chapter to the program manager. A summary of, and recommended response to comments 
will be forwarded to the City Council within seven days of the end of each month of operation, or 
sooner if requested by the program manager to resolve any issue. At the end of the season, the 
Special Events staff will forward a final recommendation to the City Council, with proposed 
changes, if any, prior to renewal of the licenses granted herein. 
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fBfThe Police Chief, or his/her designee, may suspend the Licenses granted herein and schedule 
a revocation hearing before the City Council at the next regularly scheduled City Council 
meeting for any of the following causes: 
(A) Any violation of this Chapter as evidenced by a citation issued by the Police Department. 
(B) Any violation of law or City ordinance, 
(C) Upon any other evidence that the Program Manager or entertainer constitutes a hazard or 
nuisance to the health, safety, or welfare of the community. 
4- 8A-11. TRANSFER LIMITATIONS. 
The Master Festival Licenses granted under this Chapter are not transferable without the written 
consent of the Mayor. It is unlawful for an individual to transfer a Public Outdoor Music Plaza 
Master Festival License without City approval as provided herein. If any transfer of the 
controlling interest in a Public Outdoor Music Plaza license occurs without City approval, the 
license is immediately null and void and the Public Outdoor Music Plaza shall not operate until a 
separate new license has been properly issued by the City as herein provided. The City will not 
unreasonably withhold consent of transfer provided the proposed Licensee is a non-profit 
organization within Park City, meets all the criteria of this Chapter, and demonstrates experience 
managing special events. 
4-8A-12. PLAZAS LICENSES IN LIEU OF ADMINISTRATIVE PERMITS FOR 
OUTDOOR MUSIC AND OUTDOOR SPEAKERS. 
The Master Festival Licenses granted under this Chapter are in lieu of any Administrative 
Conditional Use Permit for outdoor music, including outdoor speakers, pursuant to the existing 
Land Management Code and pending ordinance MCPC ^Section 15-2-6.10(B)(4). The City may 
still issue outdoor music permits in conjunction with an approved Master Festival License. 
SECTION 3. SEVERABILITY. If any phrase, clause, sentence, paragraph, or section of this 
Ordinance is declared unlawful by a Court of competent jurisdiction, such decision shall not 
affect any of the remaining phrases, clauses, sentences, paragraphs, or sections of this Ordinance. 
SECTION 4. EFFECTIVE DATE. This ordinance shall become effective upon publication. 
PASSED AND ADOPTED this 10th day of May, 2001. 
PARK CITY MUNICIPAL CORPORATION 
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Attest: 
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M. Scott, City Recorder 
Approved as to Form: 
Mark D. HamngtorCCity Attorney 
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Exhibit I 
Russell A. Cline (4298) 
CRIPPEN & CLINE, L.C. 
10 West 100 South, Suite 425 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801)539-1900 
Telefax: (801)322-1054 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
Ronald R. Whaley and Melanie A. Reif 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
Park City Municipal Corporation, 
Randy Barton, d/b/a The Wooden Dog and 
Mountain Town Stages, and 
Park City Arts Council, a nonprofit 
corporation 
Defendants, 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
RONALD R. WHALEY 
Civil No.: 
Judge Robert K. Hilder 
STATE OF UTAH | 
:ss 
County of Summit | 
The undersigned, being duly sworn, hereby states the following: 
1. My name is Ronald R. Whaley. 
2. I am a plaintiff in the above named case; I have personal knowledge of the facts 
contained in this affidavit; and I am competent to testify to the statements made 
00084 
herein. 
3. I am a licensed real estate broker in the State of Utah; I have worked as a Park 
City real estate agent for the past 25 years; I list and sell real estate throughout 
Summit County; and I am very familiar with Old Town1 properties, market values, 
and the circumstances and/or conditions that influence those values. 
4. From approximately 1983 to 1993,1 served on the Park City Planning 
Commission. During that time, I became very familiar with Park City's policies 
on planning and zoning issues. Before, during, and after my tenure, I witnessed 
Park City ("City") defend quality of life issues through its economic and policy 
decisions, e.g., the City invested monies and efforts to preserve the neighborhood 
characteristics of the entire community, especially Old Town. 
With respect to noise problems, I witnessed the City Council vehemently defend 
residents who lived close to Main Street against noise intrusions by Main Street 
businesses. Specifically, during my tenure on the Planning Commission, we dealt 
with at least four major noise problems created by bars and restaurants on Main 
Street.2 In resolving each problem, the City firmly supported eliminating the 
noise that emanated from Main Street businesses and degraded the peace and 
quiet of nearby residents. 
I The term "Old Town" is used by local realtors to refer to properties in the Historic 
District of Park City. 
2
 These included: (1) noise from the Club-Alamo; (2) noise from the Memorial Building; 
(3) noise from Cisero's; and (4) noise from El Cheapo. 
OOySj 
With these experiences in mind, I cannot explain the City's decisions, over the 
past three summers, to allow continued and projected noise from lower Main 
Street activities to impact nearby residents such as Melanie A. Reif and myself. 
Especially given the fact that during the approval process of lower Main Street, 
the City repeatedly considered the preclusion of activities resulting in continued 
and projected noise. The City then agreed that NO restaurant/bar would be 
allowed on the west side of lower Main Street. Yet, over the past several years, 
restaurants and/or bars have occupied nearly all of the west side of lower Main 
Street. This departure from eliminating noise intrusions on private residents has 
resulted in problematic land use issues, which were routinely addressed during the 
approval process. Unfortunately, the City's failure to protect private residents 
from noise has resulted in a degradation of the quality of life for residents living 
close to bars and restaurants on lower Main Street. 
Approximately six years ago, longtime Park Avenue residents, Bernice and Betty 
Watts, complained to the City about excessive noise emanating from the Broken 
Thumb sports bar, which was located across the street from the Watts' home. The 
intensity of the bar-related activities so close to the Watts' residence ultimately 
drove them out of Old Town, where they had lived for over twenty years, despite 
the fact that the City's policies purported to preclude the Broken Thumb and 
businesses like it, from degrading the peace and quiet of nearby residents. The 
Wattes received no meaningful noise mitigation from the City, and, later, the City 
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bought the Watts' home for approximately $1,000,000 to settle the dispute. 
Today, the City's assistant attorney resides in the home previously owned by the 
Wattes, and the Broken Thumb is no longer located in Old Town. Yet, as set 
forth in this affidavit and accompanying Complaint, the City continues to provide 
no meaningful noise mitigation to Old Town residents who live near the lower 
Main Street area, namely Ms. Reif and myself. 
At all times relevant to this action, I have resided at 819 Park Avenue, Park City, 
Summit County, Utah, and since 1991, Ms. Reif has resided at the same address. 
I purchased our home in 1974. 
Our home is a duplex located on the west side of Park Avenue and facing east. 
Ms. Reif and I live in the rear of our home. 
Our property is zoned Historical Residential Commercial (HRC) in the front and 
Historical Residential (HR1) in the rear. 
Our home is adjacent to the lower section of Main Street in the historic district of 
Park City. 
Both Main Street and our property are located at the bottom of a steep mountain 
canyon. 
A steep hillside abuts the rear of our property. Woodside Avenue is situated atop 
that hillside and runs parallel to the rear of our property. 
Park Avenue runs parallel along the front of our property. 
The lower section of Main Street did not exist in any way when I purchased our 
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home in 1974. 
15. Many years after I purchased our home, the lower section of Main Street was 
approved and developed. 
16. The Town Lift plaza and Summit Watch plaza (collectively referred to herein as 
the "plazas") are now located in the lower section of Main Street. 
17. The plazas are higher in elevation than our property. 
18. The plazas are surrounded on all four sides by residential activity: Park Station 
Condominiums exist to the north, Caledonian Condominiums exist to the south, 
Marriott Summit Watch timeshares exist to the east, and our home exists to the 
west. 
19. Ms. Reif and I are the closest, permanent, year-round residents to the plazas. 
20. Our home is located less than 150 feet from the Town Lift plaza and less than 380 
feet from the Summit Watch plaza. 
21. In the summer of 1998, the City began allowing live, amplified, outdoor music in 
the lower section of Main Street. 
22. The music was so loud that Ms. Reif and I could hear it on our property and inside 
our home. 
23. During the summer of 1998,1 complained to the Park City Planning Commission 
that I could hear the noise from the outdoor concerts inside our home. 
24. I complained to the Park City Planning Commission because it is the chief 
advisory board to the Park City Council regarding land use issues and because I 
was well-aware oft!." 'Jity's desire to preserve the residential quality of the 
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historic district. 
25. The City did nothing to resolve my concerns. 
26. In the summer of 1999, the City continued to allow live, outdoor, amplified music 
in the lower Main Street area through permits and master festival licenses. 
27. Ms. Reif and I continued to complain to the City about the excessive volume 
level, but the City still did nothing. 
28. The music from the 1999 summer concerts was so loud that Ms. Reif and I were 
unable to enjoy any activities inside or outside of our home. 
29. Basic life activities, such as sleeping, resting, relaxing, working, studying, 
reading, or doing anything that required concentration, were impossible due to the 
loud noise created by the outdoor music concerts. 
30. Intrusions from the loud music occurred every day as well as every night, except 
some Mondays, Wednesdays, and Thursdays. 
31. On Sundays, which are commonly reserved for rest, Ms. Reif and I were subjected 
to ten (10) hours of disruptive, amplified music from 11:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m. 
32. On Tuesdays, while Ms. Reif and I prepared to relax and enjoy our evening meal 
together, we were subjected to three (3) hours of disruptive, amplified music from 
5:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. 
33. On Fridays, while Ms. Reif and I prepared to relax and enjoy our evening meal 
together and to begin a restful and relaxing weekend, we were subjected to four 
(4) hours of disruptive, amplified music from 5:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m. 
34. On Saturdays, from 2:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. and from 6:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m., hours 
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that otherwise would have been productive or restful, Ms. Reif and I were 
subjected to six (6) hours of disruptive, amplified music. 
35. During the summer of 1999, Ms. Reif and I made numerous calls to the Park City 
Brewing Company & Smokehouse, and Dynamite Dom's, both of which held 
permits from the City to play outdoor music. We politely requested that the 
businesses lower the volume level; we explained that we could hear the music on 
our property and within our home; and we informed the businesses that the noise 
was disturbing and excessively loud. The businesses, however, refused to adjust 
the volume level. As a result of the businesses' uncooperative and disrespectful 
postures, Ms. Reif and I were forced to complain incessantly to the City police 
department. 
36. During the summer of 1999, when Ms. Reif was preparing for the Utah Bar Exam, 
she used earplugs and earmuffs (the kind that used for deafening sound), which 
did not alleviate the noise created by outdoor music concerts. As a result, Ms. 
Reif was forced to leave our home and to study elsewhere. 
37. While Ms. Reif was trying to prepare for the Utah Bar Exam, I walked over to the 
Town Lift plaza upon her request and politely asked Steve Shluker, the business 
manager of the Park City Brewing Company & Smokehouse, to lower the volume 
level of the music. Mr. Shluker, however, refused to adjust the volume level. I 
explained to him that Ms. Reif and I could hear the music on our property and 
within our home, and I further informed him that Ms. Reif was trying to study for 
the Bar Exam. He insisted he had a "business to run"; he maintained he had a 
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permit from the City to play the music; and he referred to me in profane terms and 
suggested that I should move if I did not like the noise. 
38. As a result of the loud, noxious noise created by the live, amplified, outdoor 
music concerts during the summer of 1999, Ms. Reif and I had to leave our home 
on several occasions. 
39. The music was so loud that Ms. Reif and I could not hear our television over the 
noise. 
40. Meals and conversations were impossible or very unpleasant while the music was 
playing, and we frequently left our home to escape the incessant noise and 
returned after the music ceased. 
41. To be forced from our home by the noise was exhausting and very stressful for 
both Ms. Reif and myself. 
42. We again asked the business owners to lower the volume of the noise, but they 
again refused. 
43. We complained continuously about the volume level to the Park City Police. 
44. Occasionally, the police claimed they had asked business owners to lower the 
volume level, but no relief resulted. 
45. Because we received no relief from the Park City Police, we called again and 
again to report the loud, noxious noise, but still no relief resulted. 
46. We also complained to the City about the level of noise, the lack of cooperation 
from the business owners, the number of hours of intrusion, and the business 
owners' practices of playing before and/or after their permits allowed. 
47. On several occasions the Park City Police responded to our complaints, came to 
our house, knocked on our door, and spoke to us in our backyard about the noise 
issue. 
48. On at least one occasion, the police agreed that the music was too loud but said 
that they could do nothing about it because the business had a "permit" to play the 
music. When Ms. Reif asked the officer what he thought we should do to resolve 
the problem, he suggested that legal action was our only remedy. 
49. Ms. Reif and I called the police repeatedly to voice our objections to the noise 
level. Our voices became so familiar to police dispatchers that they began calling 
us by our first names before we identified ourselves. 
50. No relief resulted despite our incessant complaints to the City. 
51. On numerous occasions during the summer of 1999, Ms. Reif and I voiced our 
objections concerning the noise level to City Community Development Director, 
Richard E. Lewis. We voiced our objections to Mr. Lewis in person, over the 
telephone, and in writing. We notified Mr. Lewis of several violations regarding 
the noise level and hours of operation. Mr. Lewis told us that he had spoken with 
the business owners and they had agreed to lower the volume level of the music. 
Mr. Lewis described Steve Shluker, the manager of the Park City Brewing 
Company & Smokehouse, as "arrogant," and emphasized that the City Police 
Chief, Lloyd D. Evans, Sr., was "real pissed" about the noise issue and the lack of 
cooperation from the business owners. Mr. Lewis also told us that City 
Councilman Hugh Daniels had gone on the record, saying "This noise is damn 
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outrageous!" He also stated that City Councilman Roger Harlan had expressed 
concern about the noise. Nevertheless, no noticeable volume adjustment or relief 
resulted after our communications with Mr. Lewis. 
52. Mr. Lewis asked us to record the times of the performances that violated the 
conditions of the permits. Ms. Reif recorded the times of the performances, and 
Ms. Reif and I notified Mr. Lewis in writing of the dates and times of the 
violations. Mr. Lewis told us that he and Chief Evans would recommend that the 
City allow no more music in the lower Main Street area. Mr. Lewis promised us 
that the City would revoke the permits if the complaints continued and told us that 
he had sent letters to all three businesses (Brew Pub, Dynamite Dom's, and 
Jambalaya) notifying them that their permits would be revoked effective August 
20, 1999. Ms. Reif and I continued to complain, however, the City never revoked 
the permits or licences as promised. Instead, Mr. Lewis informed us that the City 
had entered into a private agreement with the business owners, whereby the City 
allowed the business owners to continue playing music. With the City's blessing, 
the business owners continued to play music at the same loud, noxious volume 
level. When we continued to complain to Mr. Lewis and the City, the City did 
nothing to resolve our concerns. 
53. On August 30, 1999, Ms. Reif and I expressed our concerns about outdoor music 
in a letter to Mayor Bradley A. Olch. 
54. Sometime in the fall or winter of 1999, the City began considering whether to 
allow another summer of outdoor music concerts in the lower Main Street area. 
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55. Upon learning of the possibility of the City allowing another summer of outdoor 
music concerts, Ms. Reif and I voiced our objections to another summer of 
intolerable intrusion. 
56. On March 2, 2000, Ms. Reif and I delivered a letter of intent to sue to Mayor Olch 
and the City Council. 
57. On April 13, 2000, Ms. Reif and I delivered a notice of claim to Jan Scott, Park 
City Recorder. 
58. Ms. Reif spent many hours reviewing drafts of the City's proposed ordinance 
governing outdoor music (the "Outdoor Music Ordinance"), drafting changes, and 
advising the City's legal staff about many issues. 
59. On May 18, 2000, Ms. Reif and I delivered an extensive letter to City Attorney 
Mark Harrington, in which we explained our opposition to nearly every part of the 
proposed Outdoor Music Ordinance. 
60. On May 18, 2000, Ms. Reif and I attended a public hearing held to discuss the 
outdoor music issue. At that hearing, Councilwoman Candy Erickson made it 
very clear that her primary focus was whether the decibel level would ruin the 
quality of the performances. Councilwoman Erickson made no effort to 
determine whether the decibel level would unreasonably interfere with our ability 
to use and enjoy our property. 
61. At the public hearing on May 18, 2000, City Attorney Mark Harrington accused 
Ms. Reif and me of being disingenuous and raising our concerns and objections 
too late. Attorney Harrington made this accusation both verbally and in writing, a 
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copy of which he presented to the City Council, others present at the hearing, Ms. 
Reif, and me. 
62. On May 30, 2000, Ms. Reif and I delivered another extensive letter to City 
Attorney Mark Harrington, in which we again explained our opposition to the 
proposed Outdoor Music Ordinance. 
63. On more than one occasion, Ms. Reif and I explained to the City that the noise 
was most problematic in the rear of our property, where we reside. We explained 
to the City that the problem seemed to be exacerbated by the elevation of the 
plazas and the noise bouncing off the hillside behind our home before invading 
our home. 
64. On June 1, 2000, Ms. Reif and I attended another public hearing on the subject of 
outdoor music and again raised our concerns and objections to the proposed 90 
decibel level. 
65. At the public hearing on June 1, 2000, and in response to our adamant objections 
to the proposed 90 decibel level, City Councilwoman Shauna Kerr assured us that 
the City Council would amend the ordinance if problems arose. 
66. Despite our numerous and continued objections to outdoor music in the lower 
Main Street area, the City Council voted to adopt the Outdoor Music Ordinance 
on June 1,2000. 
67. Defendant Randy Barton ("Barton") has, on a number of occasions, made 
unsolicited calls to our home and left messages on our voice mail. Barton, who 
works at Park City Television and books bands under assumed business names, 
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The Wooden Dog and Mountain Town Stages, called to invite Ms. Reif and me 
on Park City Television to "debate" the issue of outdoor music. 
68. Ms. Reif and I did not respond to Barton's harassing, uninvited, insincere, and 
entirely self-interested calls. 
69. Barton instructed his female co-worker, who was working as a television reporter 
at Park Television, to make unsolicited calls to our home, requesting to enter our 
property to conduct an "on-site interview" on the "outdoor music issue." 
70. Ms. Reif and I did not respond to Barton's co-worker's calls and did not grant 
permission to Barton or his co-worker to enter our property. 
71. During the summer of 2000, as a result of the Outdoor Music Ordinance, Ms. Reif 
and I again experienced loud, live, amplified music on our property and within our 
home on several days and/or nights during nearly every week throughout summer 
and fall. Such intrusions occurred nearly every day and every night, except some 
Mondays, Wednesdays, and Thursdays. 
72. On Sundays, which are commonly reserved for rest, Ms. Reif and I were subjected 
to approximately six (6) hours of disruptive, amplified music from approximately 
1:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. and approximately 5:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. 
73. On Tuesdays, while Ms. Reif and I prepared to relax and enjoy our dinner 
together, we were subjected to approximately three (3) hours of disruptive, 
amplified music from approximately 5:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. 
74. On Fridays, as Ms. Reif and I settled in for the evening, prepared to relax and 
enjoy our dinner together and to begin a restful and relaxing weekend, we were 
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subjected to approximately three (3) hours of disruptive, amplified music from 
approximately 5:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. 
75. On Saturdays, from 1:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. and from 5:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m., hours 
that otherwise would have been productive or restful, Ms. Reif and I were 
subjected to approximately six (6) hours of disruptive, amplified music. 
76. Our ability to sleep, rest, relax, read or do anything that required concentration 
was severely disrupted as a result of the loud, intrusive noise. 
77. Ms. Reif and I tried to watch the evening news, but were unable to do so because 
the music was so loud. 
78. Ms. Reif and I could not enjoy our meals or conversation together as a result of 
the loud, intrusive noise. 
79. Ms. Reif and I could not enjoy working or relaxing in our yard because the loud 
music made such activities intolerable and unenjoyable. 
80. No appreciable relief resulted when Ms. Reif and I closed our windows and doors. 
81. The music was so loud that Ms. Reif could not concentrate and was thereby 
prevented from working while the music was playing. 
82. The music was so loud that Ms. Reif could not practice her flute. 
83. Ms. Reif and I could not enjoy playing our own selection of music because the 
bellowing noise created by the neighboring music was so loud. 
84. Ms. Reif and I were also disturbed by the clapping, yelling, and whistling of 
concert attendees. 
85. Ms. Reif and I were disturbed by every aspect of the music, especially vocals, 
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instruments, and drums. 
86. Ms. Reif and I were disturbed by every aspect of the music throughout the entire 
concerts while we were at our home. 
87. Ms. Reif and I were unable to escape the noise except by leaving our home. 
88. Ms. Reif and I were able to seek relief only by leaving our home and then 
returning after the music ceased. This form of self-help was enormously 
inconvenient and stressful for both Ms. Reif and myself. Similarly, the loud, 
noxious noise created by outdoor music in the lower Main Street area and the 
uncooperativeness of Defendants was exasperating for both Ms. Reif and myself. 
As a result of this undesirable and exhausting experience, we often felt irritable 
and restless. 
89. Ms. Reif and I logged numerous general noise complaints with the City. When 
doing so, we stated that the music is too loud and asked the City to request that 
Barton lower the volume level. When our general complaints did not result in any 
resolution, we repeatedly called with very specific noise complaints. Ms. Reif, for 
example, complained to the City police dispatchers that we could hear the music 
like it was being played right next door, that we could hear the music with our 
television on and our windows and doors closed, that Ms. Reif was prevented 
from working because the music was so loud, that we could hear every aspect of 
the music in our home, including the vocals, instrumentals, and drums, and that 
Ms. Reif could not enjoy basic pleasures such as taking a bath because the music 
was so loud that she had to get out of the tub to call the police. 
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90. No matter how detailed Ms. Reif and I were when we made our complaints, 
neither the City, Barton, nor the Arts Council did anything to resolve our 
concerns. 
91. During the summer of 2000, the police did not come to our home as they had done 
previously when responding to our complaints. 
92. On June 30, 2000, a single musician who resembled Berl Ives was playing at the 
Town Lift plaza venue. The loud noise emanated clearly on our property and 
inside our home. Ms. Reif and I walked our entire property line and noted that the 
noise was most problematic in our backyard. We also walked the block of 
Woodside Avenue, from our property line to Gary Kimball's house, which is 
located at 662 Tramway Alley (the 600 block of Woodside Avenue). The music 
was clearly audible the entire way; however, it was loudest in our backyard. Upon 
returning home and while the concert was still ongoing, I called the City police 
dispatcher and reported the following: (1) the music was too loud; (2) the 
cumulative effect throughout the summer would be excessive; and (3) the complaint 
was based on a lone musician, and the disturbance and excessiveness would likely 
increase with a larger group of musicians. Thereafter, Ms. Reif and I left our home 
and returned after the music ceased. 
93. Ms. Reif and I received so little attention and cooperation from the City that we 
have, on numerous occasions, walked over to the venues and directly complained 
to Barton and/or his assistant. Barton and/or his assistant, however, have refused 
to adjust the noise level. 
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94. On July 1, 2000, at approximately 5:30 p.m., I called the police to register a noise 
complaint about excessive noise coming from the outdoor music concert. 
95. Ms. Reif and I never received any documents from the City that were purportedly 
delivered to us for our input in connection with a neighborhood monitoring 
mechanism referred to in the City's report dated July 6, 2000. 
96. On July 2, 2000, Ms. Reif delivered a notice of intent to sue to the City, the Arts 
Council, and Barton. 
97. The noise level did not improve after July 2, 2000, and Ms. Reif and I continued 
to complain to the police. 
98. On August 8, 2000, after Ms. Reif reported that she received no cooperation from 
Barton's assistant after asking him to lower the volume level of the music at the 
Summit Watch plaza (in front of Dynamite Dom's), I called the police and 
reported a noise complaint. No noise abatement resulted, however. 
99. The stages do not direct the noise away from our home. The stage located in front 
of Dynamite Dom's, in particular, is situated in such a way that sound travels by a 
direct line from the stage to and through our home. 
100. Our property value has significantly diminished due to the excessive and 
disturbing noise created by live, amplified, outdoor music in the lower Main 
Street area. 
101. The City did not amend the ordinance as promised. 
102. City Attorney Mark Harrington informed Ms. Reif that the City may allow the 
same activity to continue next summer. 
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103. The City has not responded to our notice of claim dated April 13, 2000. 
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned affiant executeatftfe affidavit 
( 
onald R. Whaley 
Affiant 
Sworn and subscribed before me on this J>7 day of April, 2001. 
UUx!& wv ^iltu X / Notary Public T7^ 
"NOTASITF . 
SUSAN A8BRUZZESE 
16S0 Pork Atf9.. PO Sox 1230 
Paris C*ly, Utah 84®g0 
My Commission Expires 
December SO, £004 
STATE OF UTAH 
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Exhibit J 
Russell A. Cline (4298) 
CRIPPEN & CLINE, L.C. 
10 West 100 South, Suite 425 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801)539-1900 
Telefax: (801)322-1054 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
Ronald R. Whaley and Melanie A. Reif 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
Park City Municipal Corporation, 
Randy Barton, d/b/a The Wooden Dog and 
Mountain Town Stages, and 
Park City Arts Council, a nonprofit 
corporation 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
MELANIE A. REIF 
Civil No.: _ _ „ _ „ _ 
Judge Robert K. Hilder 
STATE OF UTAH | 
:ss 
County of Summit | 
The undersigned, being duly sworn, hereby states the following: 
1. My name is Melanie A. Reif 
2. I am a plaintiff in the above named case; 1 have personal knowledge of the facts 
contained in this affidavit; and I am competent to testify to the statements made 
herein. 
3. I have a strong interest in the ails; I am an accomplished musician; 1 play the flute; 
I am a member of the Utah Flute Association; I attended Interlochen Arts 
Academy; I played in many prestigious groups, including the University of 
Michigan Honors Band; I received a first1 in all competitions in which I have 
participated; and I teach flute lessons. 
4. During college, I assisted the Utah Symphony with its fund-raising efforts; and I 
contribute annually to my alma mater's public radio station. 
5. From 1996 until 1999,1 was a law school student. 
6. I am a licensed attorney in the State of Utah. My bar number is 8489. 
7. Until recently, 1 worked from home. 
8. Since 1991,1 have lived at 819 Park Avenue, Park City, Summit County, Utah, 
together with Ronald R. Whaley. 
9. Our home is a duplex located on the west side of Park Avenue and facing east. 
10. Mr. Whaley and I live in the rear of our home. 
11. Our home is adjacent to the lower section of Main Street in the historic district of 
Park City. 
12. Both Main Street and our property are located at the bottom of a steep mountain 
canyon. 
13. A steep hillside abuts the rear of our property. Woodside Avenue is situated atop 
1
 The term "first" refers to the best rating possible and is denoted by an "I" on a scale of 
I-V ("I being the best and V being the worst."), http://www.mit.edu/people/rlang/soloens.html 
(explaining scoring system for solo and ensemble participants). 
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that hillside and runs parallel to the rear of our property. 
14. Park Avenue runs parallel along the front of our property. 
15. The Town Lift plaza and Summit Watch plaza (collectively referred to herein as 
the "plazas") are rather new developments that are located in the lower section of 
Main Street. 
16. The plazas are higher in elevation than our property. 
17. The plazas are surrounded on all four sides by residential activity: Park Station 
Condominiums exist to the north, Caledonian Condominiums exist to the south, 
Marriott Summit Watch timeshares exist to the east, and our home exists to the 
west. 
18. Mr. Whaley and I are the closest, permanent, year-round residents to the plazas. 
19. Our home is located less than 150 feet from the Town Lift plaza and less than 380 
feet from the Summit Watch plaza. 
20. In the summer of 1998, Park City Municipal Corporation (wtCity") began allowing 
live, amplified, outdoor music in the lower section of Main Street. 
21. The music was so loud that Mr. Whaley and I could hear it on our property and 
inside our home. 
22. During the summer of 1998, Mr. Whaley complained to the City about the noise 
level, but no abatement resulted. 
23. In the summer of 1999. the City continued to allow live, amplified, outdoor music 
in the lower Main Street area through permits and master festival licenses. 
24. The permits were issued to three restaurants in the lower Main Street area, 
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including Park City Brewing Company & Smokehouse (located at the Town Lift 
plaza), Jambalaya (located at the Summit Watch plaza), and Dynamite Dom's 
(located at the Summit Watch plaza). 
25. The master festival licenses were issued to two organizations known as the 
Historic Main Street Business Alliance and The People Make the City Organizers. 
26. Throughout the summer of 1999, Mr. Whaley and I continued to complain to the 
City about the excessive volume level and the number of days of interference, but 
no abatement resulted. 
27. The music was so loud that we were unable to enjoy any activities inside or 
outside our home. 
28. Basic life activities, such as sleeping, resting, relaxing, working, studying, 
reading, or doing anything that required concentration, were impossible due to the 
loud noise that was created by the outdoor music concerts. 
29. Intrusions from the loud music occurred every day as well as every night, except 
some, Mondays, Wednesdays, and Thursdays. 
30. On Sundays, which are commonly reserved for rest, Mr. Whaley and 1 were 
subjected to ten (10) hours of disruptive, amplified music from 11:00 a.m. to 9:00 
p.m. 
31. On Tuesdays, while Mr. Whaley and I prepared to relax and enjoy our evening 
meal together, we were subjected to three (3) hours of disruptive, amplified music 
from 5:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. 
32. On Fridays, as Mr. Whaley and I prepared to relax and enjoy our evening meal 
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together and to begin a restful and relaxing weekend, we were subjected to four 
(4) hours of disruptive, amplified music from 5:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m. 
33. On Saturdays, from 2:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. and from 6:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m., hours 
that otherwise would have been productive or restful, Mr. Whaley and I were 
subjected to six (6) hours of disruptive, amplified music. 
34. During the summer of 1999, Mr. Whaley and 1 made numerous calls to the Park 
City Brewing Company & Smokehouse and Dynamite Dom's, both of which held 
permits from the City to play outdoor music. We politely requested that the 
businesses lower the volume level; we explained that we could hear the music on 
our property and within our home; and we informed the businesses that the noise 
was disturbing and excessively loud. The businesses, however, refused to adjust 
the volume level. As a result of the businesses' uncooperative and disrespectful 
postures, Mr. Whaley and I were forced to complain incessantly to the City police 
department. 
35. During the summer of 1999, when 1 was preparing for the Utah Bar Exam, I used 
earplugs and earmuffs (the type designed to deafen sound). When those devices 
did not alleviate the excessive noise that was created by the outdoor music 
concerts, 1 was forced to leave our home and to study elsewhere. 
36. During the time that I was trying to prepare for the Utah Bar Exam, I asked Mr. 
Whaley to walk over to the Town Lift plaza and politely ask the business manager 
of the Park City Brewing Company & Smokehouse to lower the volume level of 
the music. Mr. Whaley did so; however, no relief resulted. 
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37. Mr. Whaley reported to me that Steve Shluker, the manager of Park City Brewing 
Company & Smokehouse, refused to lower the volume level; insisted he had a 
"business to run'"; maintained he had a permit to play the music; and referred to 
Mr. Whaley in profane terms and suggested that he move if he did not like the 
noise. 
38. As a result of the loud, noxious noise created by the live, amplified, outdoor 
music concerts during the summer of 1999, Mr. Whaley and I had to leave our 
home on several occasions. 
39. The music was so loud that Mr. Whaley and I could not hear our television over 
the noise. 
40. Meals and conversations were impossible or very unpleasant while the music was 
playing, and we frequently left our home to escape the incessant noise and 
returned after the music ceased. 
41. To be forced from our home by the noise was exhausting and very stressful for 
both Mr. Whaley and myself. 
42. We again asked the business owners to lower the volume level of the noise, but 
they again refused to do so. 
43. We complained continuously about the volume level to the Park City Police. 
44. Occasionally, the police claimed they had asked business owners to lower the 
volume level, but no relief resulted. 
45. Because we received no relief from the Park City Police, we called again and 
again to report the loud, noxious noise level, but still no abatement resulted. 
46. We also complained to the City about the level of noise, the lack of cooperation 
from the business owners, the number of hours of intrusion, and the business 
owners' practices of playing before and/or after their permits allowed. 
47. On several occasions, the Park City Police responded to our complaints, came to 
our house, knocked on our door, and spoke to us in our backyard about the noise 
issue. 
48. On at least one occasion, the police agreed that the music was too loud but said 
that they could do nothing about it because the business had a "permit" to play the 
music. When I asked the officer what he thought we should do to resolve the 
problem, he suggested that legal action was our only remedy. 
49. Mr. Whaley and I called the police repeatedly to voice our objections to the noise 
level. Our voices became so familiar to police dispatchers that they began calling 
us by our first names before we identified ourselves. 
50. No relief resulted despite our incessant complaints to the City. 
51. On numerous occasions during the summer of 1999, Mr. Whaley and I voiced our 
objections concerning the noise level to City Community Development Director 
Richard E. Lewis. We voiced our objections to Mr. Lewis in person, over the 
telephone, and in writing. We notified Mr. Lewis of several violations regarding 
the noise level and hours of operation. Mr. Lewis told us that he had spoken with 
the business owners and they had agreed to lower the volume level of the music. 
Mr. Lewis described Steve Shluker, the manager of the Park City Brewing 
Company & Smokehouse, as "arrogant." and emphasized that City Police Chief, 
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Lloyd D. Evans, Sr. was ureal pissed'1 about the noise issue and the lack of 
cooperation from the business owners. Mr. Lewis also told us that City 
Councilman Hugh Daniels had gone on the record, saying "This noise is damn 
outrageous!" He also stated that City Councilman Roger Harlan had expressed 
concern about the noise. Nevertheless, no noticeable volume adjustment or relief 
resulted after our communications with Mr. Lewis. 
52. Mr. Lewis asked us to record the times of the performances that violated the 
conditions of the permits. I recorded the times of the performances, and Mr. 
Whaley and I notified Mr. Lewis in writing of the dates and times of the 
violations. Mr. Lewis told us that he and Chief Evans would recommend that the 
City allow no more music in the lower Main Street area. Mr. Lewis promised us 
that the City would revoke the permits if the complaints continued, and told us 
that he had sent letters to all three businesses (Brew Pub, Dynamite Dom's, and 
Jambalaya) notifying them that their permits would be revoked effective August 
20, 1999. Mr. Whaley and I continued to complain, however, the City never 
revoked the permits or licences as promised. Instead, Mr. Lewis informed us that 
the City had entered into a private agreement with the business owners, whereby 
the City allowed the business owners to continue playing music. With the City's 
blessing, the business owners continued to play music at the same loud, noxious 
volume level. When we continued to complain to Mr. Lewis and the City, the 
City did nothing to resolve our concerns. 
53. On August 30, 1999, Mr. Whaley and 1 expressed our concerns about outdoor 
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music in a letter to Mayor Bradley A. Olch. 
54. Sometime in the fall or winter of 1999, the City began considering whether to 
allow another summer of outdoor music concerts in the lower Main Street area. 
55. Upon learning of the possibility of the City allowing another summer of outdoor 
music concerts, Mr. Whaley and 1 voiced our objections to another summer of 
intolerable intrusion. 
56. On February 10, 2000,1 attended a City Council work session on the issue of 
outdoor music. At that meeting, but before public comment was taken or 
completed on the subject of outdoor music in the lower Main Street area, 
Defendant Randy Barton ("Barton") polled each City Council member who was 
present, asking whether they supported outdoor music in the lower Main Street 
area. Council women Shauna Kerr, Peg Bodell, and Candy Erickson all voiced 
their support. 
57. On March 2, 2000, Mr. Whaley and I delivered a letter of intent to sue to Mayor 
Olch and the City Council. 
58. On April 13, 2000, Mr. Whaley and I delivered a notice of claim to Jan Scott, 
Park City Recorder. 
59. I spent many hours reviewing drafts of the City's proposed ordinance governing 
outdoor music (the "Outdoor Music Ordinance"), drafting changes, and advising 
the City's legal staff about many issues. 
60. On May 18, 2000. Mr. Whaley and 1 delivered an extensive letter to City Attorney 
Mark Harrington, in which we explained our opposition to nearly every part of the 
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proposed Outdoor Music Ordinance. 
61. On May 18, 2000, Mr. Whaley and I attended a public hearing held to discuss the 
outdoor music issue. At that hearing. City Councilwoman Candy Erickson made 
it very clear that her primary focus was whether the decibel level would ruin the 
quality of the performances. Councilwoman Erickson made no effort to 
determine whether the decibel level would unreasonably interfere with our ability 
to use and enjoy our property. 
62. At the public hearing on May 18, 2000, City Attorney Mark Harrington accused 
Mr. Whaley and me of being disingenuous and raising our concerns and 
objections too late. Attorney Harrington made this accusation both verbally and 
in writing, a copy of which he presented to the City Council, others present at the 
hearing, Mr. Whaley. and me. 
63. On May 30, 2000, Mr. Whaley and 1 delivered another extensive letter to City 
Attorney Mark Harrington, in which we again explained our opposition to the 
proposed Outdoor Music Ordinance, 
64. On more than one occasion. Mr. Whaley and I explained to the City that the noise 
was most problematic in the rear of our property, where we live. We explained to 
the City that the problem seemed to be exacerbated by the elevation of the plazas 
and the noise bouncing off the hillside behind our home before invading our 
home. 
65. On June 1, 2000, Mr. Whaley and 1 attended another public hearing on the subject 
of outdoor music and again raised our concerns and objections to the proposed 90 
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decibel level. 
66. At the public hearing on June 1, 2000, and in response to our adamant objections 
to the proposed 90 decibel level. City Councilwoman Shauna Kerr, assured us that 
the City Council would amend the ordinance if problems arose. 
67. Despite our numerous and continued objections to outdoor music in the lower 
Main Street area, the City Council voted to adopt the Outdoor Music Ordinance 
on June 1.2000. 
68. Barton has, on a number of occasions, made unsolicited calls to our home and left 
messages on our voice mail. Barton, who works at Park City Television and 
books bands under assumed business names, The Wooden Dog and Mountain 
Town Stages, called to invite Mr. Whaley and me on Park City Television to 
t%debate" the issue of outdoor music. 
69. Mr. Whaley and I did not respond to Barton's harassing, uninvited, insincere, and 
entirely self-interested calls. 
70. Barton instructed his female co-worker, who was working as a television reporter 
at Park Television, to make unsolicited calls to our home, requesting to enter our 
property to conduct an "on-site interview" on the "outdoor music issue." 
71. Mr. Whaley and I did not respond to Barton's co-worker's calls and we did not 
grant permission to Barton or his co-worker to enter our property. 
72. During the summer of 2000. as a result of the Outdoor Music Ordinance, Mr. 
Whaley and I again experienced loud, live, amplified music on our property and 
within our home on several days and/or nights during nearly every week 
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throughout summer and fall. Such intrusions occurred nearly every day and every 
night, except some Mondays, Wednesdays, and Thursdays. 
73. On Sundays, which are commonly reserved for rest, Mr. Whaley and I were 
subjected to approximately six (6) hours of disruptive, amplified music from 
approximately 1:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. and from 5:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. 
74. On Tuesdays, while Mr. Whaley and 1 prepared to relax and enjoy our dinner 
together, we were subjected to approximately three (3) hours of disruptive, 
amplilled music from approximately 5:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. 
75. On Fridays, as Mr. Whaley and I prepared to relax and enjoy our dinner together 
and to begin a restful and relaxing weekend, we were subjected to approximately 
three (3) hours of disruptive, amplified music from approximately 5:00 p.m. to 
8:00 p.m. 
76. On Saturdays, from approximately 1:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. and from 5:00 p.m. to 
8:00 p.m., hours that otherwise would have been productive or restful, Mr. 
Whaley and I were subjected to approximately six (6) hours of disruptive, 
amplified music. 
77. Our ability to sleep, rest, relax, read or do anything that required concentration 
was severely disrupted by the loud, intrusive noise. 
78. Mr. Whaley and I tried to watch the evening news, but were unable to do so 
because the music was so loud. 
79. Mr. Whaley and I could not enjoy our meals or conversation together as a result of 
the loi J, intrusive noise. 
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80. Mr. Whaley and I could not enjoy working or relaxing in our yard because the 
loud music made such activities intolerable and unenjoyable. 
81. No appreciable relief resulted when Mr. Whaley and 1 closed our windows and 
doors. 
82. The music was so loud that I could not concentrate and was thereby prevented 
from working while the music was playing.2 
83. The music was so loud that 1 could not practice my flute. 
84. Mr. Whaley and I could not enjoy playing our own selection of music because the 
bellowing noise created by the neighboring music was so loud. 
85. Mr. Whaley and 1 were also disturbed by the clapping, yelling, and whistling of 
concert attendees. 
86. Mr. Whaley and I were disturbed by every aspect of the music, especially vocals, 
instruments, and drums. 
87. Mr. Whaley and 1 were disturbed by every aspect of the music throughout the 
entire concerts while we were at our home. 
88. Mr. Whaley and 1 were unable to escape the noise except by leaving our home. 
89. Mr. Whaley and I were able to seek relief only by leaving our home and then 
returning after the music ceased. This form of self-help was enormously 
inconvenient and stressful for both Mr. Whaley and myself. Similarly, the loud, 
noxious noise created by outdoor music in the lower Main Street area and the 
uncooperativeness of Defendants was exasperating for both Mr. Whaley and 
2
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myself. As a result of this undesirable and exhausting experience, we have often 
felt irritable and restless. 
90. Mr. Whaley and I logged numerous general noise complaints with the City. When 
doing so, we stated that the music is too loud and we have asked the City to 
request that Barton lower the volume level. When our general complaints did not 
result in any resolution, we called repeatedly with very specific noise complaints. 
I, for example, complained to the City police dispatchers that we could hear the 
music like it was being played right next door, that we could hear the music with 
our television on and our windows and doors closed, that I was prevented from 
working because the music was so loud, that we could hear every aspect of the 
music in our home, including the vocals, instrumentals, and drums, and that I 
could not enjoy basic pleasures such as taking a bath because the music was so 
loud that I had to get out of the tub to call the police. 
91. No matter how detailed Mr. Whaley and I were when we made our complaints, 
neither the City, Barton, nor the Arts Council did anything to resolve our 
concerns. 
92. During the summer of 2000, the police did not come to our home as they had done 
previously when responding to our complaints. 
93. On June 30, 2000, a single musician who resembled Berl Ives was playing at the 
Town Lift plaza venue. The loud noise emanated clearly on our property and 
inside our home. Mr. Whaley and I walked our entire property line and noted that 
the noise was most problematic in our backyard. We also walked the block of 
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Woodside Avenue, from our property line to Gary Kimball's house, which is 
located at 662 Tramway Alley (the 600 block of Woodside Avenue). The music 
was clearly audible the entire way; however, it was loudest in our backyard. Upon 
returning home and while the concert was still ongoing, Mr. Whaley called the 
City police dispatcher and reported the following: (1) the music was too loud; (2) 
the cumulative effect throughout the summer would be excessive; and (3) the 
complaint was based on a lone musician, and the disturbance and excessiveness 
would likely increase with a larger group of musicians. Thereafter, Mr. Whaley 
and I left our home and returned after the music ceased. 
94. On June 30, 2000, during an outdoor concert, I saw a City Special Events 
Department employee, Melissa Caffey, peering over the ledge of the Town Lift 
plaza into our backyard where Mr. Whaley and I were talking with one another. I 
also saw City Councilwoman Peg Bodell in the plaza area. 
95. Mr. Whaley and I received so little attention and cooperation from the City that 
we have, on numerous occasions, walked over to the venues and directly 
complained to Barton and/or his assistant. Barton and/or his assistant, however, 
have refused to adjust the noise level. 
96. On July 1, 2000, at approximately 6:30 p.m., I called the Park City Police to check 
the status of a complaint that Mr. Whaley had made approximately one hour 
earlier. The police dispatcher laughed and said that an officer was just at our 
home but that no one was home. I informed the dispatcher that I had been home 
all evening and that there had been no officer at our home. The dispatcher then 
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informed me that she had received a "directive from the Chamber of Commerce" 
stating that someone would visit our home to mediate the issue. I asked the 
dispatcher whom the City intended to send over to mediate the issue, and she 
informed me that the City intended to send Barton. I indicated that Barton was 
not an appropriate person to mediate this issue. I asked the dispatcher to inform 
Barton that Mr. Whaley and I did not want him on our property. I also stated that 
if Barton did not lower the volume of the music, we would seek a legal remedy. 
97. Despite my discussions with the police dispatcher, Barton trespassed on our 
property on July 1, 2000, and thereafter called and left another harassing message 
on our voice mail. 
98. On July 1, 2000, at approximately 6:31 p.m., after speaking with the Park City 
Police, I retrieved a message from Barton. Barton stated that he had just been 
over to our house. He said that he would really like Mr. Whaley and I to come 
and "talk about" the issue on Park City Television where he works. He left his 
cell phone number and said he would be at the Town Lift Plaza the following day. 
99. Neither Mr. Whaley nor I returned Barton's voice mail message of July 1, 2000. 
100. Sometime later, I requested a copy of the City's report dated July 6, 2000, and in it 
discovered that the City's Special Events Department had accused Mr. Whaley 
and me of bringing false complaints on July 1, 2000. The City's accusation is 
false, slanderous, and libelous. Furthermore, with respect to the neighborhood 
monitoring mechanism that is referred to in the report, I never received any 
documents from the City that were purportedly delivered to me for my input. The 
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City's report of July 6, 2000, at the very least, is evidence of the Cit> "s lack of 
investigation into, and minimization of, our complaints. 
101. On July 2, 2000,1 delivered a notice of intent to sue to the City, the Arts Council, 
and Barton. When I hand delivered the notice to Barton, he asserted that the City 
would provide his legal counsel. I explained to Barton that I was an attorney and 
that I was unable to provide him with legal advice. I did, however, suggest both 
that it was highly improbable that the City would represent him and that he seek 
his own counsel. 
102. Shortly after delivering the notice of intent to sue, I heard Joanna Charnes, a 
layperson and spokesperson for the Arts Council, contend in a KPC W radio 
interview that the Arts Council has a "right" to play music, thereby implying that 
the Outdoor Music Ordinance protects the Arts Council from suit. 
103. The noise level did not improve after July 2, 2000, and Mr. Whaley and I 
continued to complain to the police. 
104. On August 8, 2000, at approximately 5:00 p.m., I walked over to the band shell in 
front of Dynamite Dom's at the Summit Watch plaza to ask Barton to lower the 
volume level. The noise was so deafening that, as I approached the band shell and 
looked for Barton, I had to cover my ears with my hands to alleviate the pain in 
my ears. Barton was not there, but I found his assistant who told me that Barton 
was at a "show." The music was so loud that I had to yell as loud as 1 could so 
that Barton's assistant could hear me. I asked him to lower the volume but he 
refused by stating that the music was playing at 89 decibels, which he alleged was 
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in compliance with the Outdoor Music Ordinance. I told Barton's assistant that 
Mr. Whaley and I could hear the music inside our home and that it was too loud. I 
told him that if he did not turn the volume down, we would file suit. I later 
returned with a camera to document the event. After I received no cooperation 
from Barton's assistant, Mr. Whaley called the police and reported a noise 
complaint. No volume adjustment ever resulted, however. 
105. The stages do not direct the noise away from our home. The stage located in front 
of Dynamite Dom's, in particular, is situated in such a way that sound travels by a 
direct line from the stage to and through our home. 
106. The City did not amend the ordinance as promised. 
107. City Attorney Mark Harrington informed me that the City may allow the same 
activity to continue next summer. 
108. The City has not responded to our notice of claim dated April 13, 2000. 
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned affiant executed this affidavit. 
_ U-« UcL 
Mefeaie A. Reif 
Affiant 
Sworn and subscribed before me on this ^ -7 day of April, 2001. 
'UMA I X Lk-'i yj^oMJ-w Notary Public 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
SUSAfJ ABOTUIZESE 
1650 Park Ave., PO Bos 1238 f>m* City, Utah 84060 
My Commission Expir#i 
December 20, 2004 
STATE OF UTAH 
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Exhibit K 
Russell A. Cline (4298) 
CRIPPEN & CLINE, L.C. 
10 West 100 South, Suite 425 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801)539-1900 
Telefax: (801)322-1054 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
Ronald R. Whaley and Melanie A. Reif 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
Park City Municipal Corporation, 
Randy Barton, d/b/a The Wooden Dog and 
Mountain Town Stages, and 
Park City Arts Council, a nonprofit 
corporation 
Defendants, 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
ANTHONY R. SOLA 
Civil No.: 
Judge Robert K. Hilder 
STATE OF ARIZONA | 
:ss 
County of Maricopa | 
The undersigned, being duly sworn, hereby states the following: 
1. My name is Anthony R. (Tony) Sola. I reside in Mesa, Arizona. 
2. I have personal knowledge of the facts contained in this affidavit, and I am 
competent to testify to the statements made herein. 
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3. I am a professional acoustical consultant. I have worked in the field of acoustics 
and noise assessment for eleven years. The Institute of Noise Control Engineering 
("INCE") is the national organization that certifies acoustical consultants. To 
become a full member of the INCE, one must meet certain educational and 
experience requirements, accept and abide by a code of professional ethics, and 
pass a professional exam. I am a full member of both INCE and the Acoustical 
Society of America. 
4. I have taught Acoustics at Arizona State University for the past seven years. 
5. I have worked as a noise expert for the City of Phoenix's Neighborhood Services 
Department for the past three years. As the City of Phoenix's consultant, I have 
investigated, measured, and assessed numerous noise complaints and zoning 
violations for a variety of noise sources. Also, a variety of municipalities have 
hired me to assess other acoustical consultants' reports. 
6. I have reviewed the noise study dated May 4, 2000, which was conducted by 
Richard K. Fullmer of Spectrum Acoustical Engineers in Salt Lake City, Utah 
("Noise Study"); I have reviewed the Outdoor Music Ordinance ("Ordinance"); I 
have reviewed Title 6 of the Park City Municipal Code; and I am familiar with the 
Town Lift and Summit Watch plazas and their locations in relationship to Mr. 
Whaley and Ms. Reif s home. 
7. According to my research, neither Richard K. Fullmer nor Jim Fullmer is a 
member of the INCE. 
8. Based on my review of the Noise Study, it appears that Spectrum Acoustical 
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Engineers ("Spectrum") measured the sound level in the lower Main Street area of 
Park City from 12:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m. on April 26, 2000 through May 2, 2000. 
9. Spectrum reported that the average hourly decibel level during that period was 
66.7 dBA (referred to in the Noise Study and herein as the "Leq"). 
10. Spectrum also reported that the average decibel reading for the loudest 1% of each 
hour was 75.3 dBA (referred to in the Noise Study and herein as the "IV). 
11. Spectrum also concluded that the sound of outdoor music played at or below the 
90 decibel level as proposed by Park City would result in noise to nearby residents 
in the 72-74 decibel range. 
12. Spectrum then concluded that music played at or below a 90 decibel level, as 
contemplated by Park City, would not create an "unusually loud noise or sound," 
would not annoy or disturb a reasonable person with normal sensitivities, and 
would not interfere with "comfort, repose, health, hearing, [or] peace" of nearby 
residents. 
13. In reaching its conclusion, Spectrum found that the "expected sound levels from 
the music plazas' activities are comparable to the loudness to the present traffic 
noise." Spectrum compared the projected 72-76 decibel level of music to nearby 
residents with the Lx level (75.3 dBA) and concluded that, since they were 
approximately the same, nearby residents would have no cause to complain about 
the noise from the music since it would be no louder than the loudest normal 
noises measured in its study. 
14. In my opinion, Spectrum's conclusions are flawed for at least one major reason, 
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and several other issues are in need of clarification. 
First, even if the noise levels recorded by Spectrum were accurate, Spectrum 
incorrectly focused on the highest L, measurement rather than the lowest 
measurement. The L, reading measures the maximum noise. Comparing a noise 
source to the ambient noise level is an appropriate method of helping to determine 
the annoyance potential. Ambient has been defined differently by various 
municipalities. It has been defined as "the lowest level," the level exceeded 
ninety percent of the time (the lowest 10%), or the average noise level without 
inclusion of the noise from isolated sources. I am not aware of any standard or 
code that uses a measurement above the average noise level to define the ambient 
noise level. The Noise Study relied on the L, measurement (the highest 1%) to 
determine ambient noise levels. In so doing, the Noise Study relied on a 
measurement far exceeding the average noise level. The Noise Study is 
extraordinary in this respect. Furthermore, by focusing on the upper limit rather 
than the lower limit, Park City has taken a complete opposite approach compared 
to other municipalities. 
Second, the conclusion that music played at 90 dBA is not excessive is entirely 
inconsistent with accepted standards for noise throughout the country. Typical 
municipal ordinances set not-to-exceed limits and consider instantaneous noise 
levels below 50 to 55 dBA at night and 60 to 65 dBA during the day to be 
acceptable. Some suburban and rural municipalities have set nighttime limits as 
low as 45 dBA. Park City's general noise ordinance sets a not-to-exceed limit of 
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65 dBA. The Noise Study indicates the expected impact on nearby properties will 
be approximately 72 dBA and 74 dBA, and if both plaza venues have concerts at 
the same time, the noise impact could be over 76 dBA. Under the most 
conservative estimate, i.e., simultaneous concerts are not taking place, the impact 
will be approximately 10-15 decibels higher than a typical ordinance allows. A 
difference of 10-15 decibels is significant, e.g., 10 decibels sounds twice as loud 
to the human ear and 15 decibels sounds three times as loud. 
Third, the Noise Study does not adequately explain, nor does the Ordinance 
adequately consider, the significant difference between 65 decibels (which is 
allowed by Park City's general noise ordinance) and 90 decibels (which is 
permitted by Park City's Outdoor Music Ordinance). When heard from 0-25 feet 
from its source, 90 decibels sounds six times louder than 65 decibels. 
Fourth, the Noise Study compares the noise impact from music to the existing 
traffic noise, and fails to distinguish the two. The annoyance potential is 
dependent not only on the level of noise but also the noise characteristics. Noises 
that are impulsive, periodic, tonal, or shrill in nature are potentially far more 
annoying than typical "brbad-band" traffic noise at the same noise level Music 
contains all of these potentially annoying characteristics. Additionally, music or 
speech that is identifiable is very difficult to ignore. I have investigated a number 
of complaints resulting from music (live and recorded) measured at levels that did 
not exceed 55 dBA during my tenure with the City of Phoenix. Even at this level 
(50-55 dBA), songs are identifiable and every word is intelligible. Park City's 
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Noise Study projects that nearby residents can be impacted by 74 dBA. This level 
of impact is 20 dBA (four times louder) than levels that have prompted numerous 
complaints to the City of Phoenix. 
19. Finally, Spectrum concluded that a "shell" in the back of the music stage would 
reduce the noise by 10 decibels or more. Based on my review of the structure of 
the shell, its position relative to residential areas and the geographical position of 
the stage relevant to residential areas (including the canyon-like setting and/or 
steep hillside behind some of the residential homes), I believe that Spectrum's 
generalized conclusion is incorrect. Although the shell may reduce the sound of 
the music to certain limited areas, the shells will not uniformly reduce the music 
by 10 decibels to all residential areas. As to some residential locations the shell 
will have no effect at all on the level of the sound and will actually funnel sound 
directly into certain residential areas. 
20. In my opinion, the amplified music performed under the Ordinance has been and 
will continue to be excessive and unusually loud. 
21. Even assuming that the amplified music reaches nearby residents at 72-76 decibel 
level, that level of music will, in my opinion, based on a person with normal 
sensitivities, deprive nearby residents of the reasonable and comfortable 
enjoyment of their homes. 
22. Furthermore, in my opinion, the level of amplified music would likely interfere 
with "the comfort, repose, peace, health, and enjoyment" of persons residing in 
nearby residential areas, such as Mr. Whaley and Ms. Reif 
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23. The amplified music will emanate beyond the boundaries of the immediate 
business establishment from which the music originates to nearby residents, 
including Mr. Whaley and Ms. Reif, and the level of noise reaching such 
individuals will likely interfere with residents' ability to sleep, study, read, 
converse, concentrate or otherwise carry on normal activities around one's 
property. 
24. Based on my review of this matter, it is neither surprising nor unreasonable that 
Mr. Whaley and Ms. Reif have complained numerous times of experiencing 
excessive noise on their property and inside their home. 
25. Furthermore, Mr. Whaley and Ms. Reif s complaints that the problem is most 
severe in the rear of their property is perfectly normal. I have encountered 
complaints similar to Mr. Whaley and Ms. Reif s. Many factors explain these 
type of complaints: reflection (caused from canyon-like setting or a steep hillside 
behind the home), atmospheric conditions, changes in ambient noise, elevation 
differences, etc. 
OUilO 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned affiant executed this affidavit. 
Anthony R^&ola 
Affiant 
Sworn and subscribed before me on this / / day of April, 2001. 
^ P^gy M.Jones 
Notary Public* Arizona 
Maricopa County 
My Commission Expires 
December 31,2003 
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Exhibit L 
Russell A. Cline (4298) 
CRIPPEN & CLINE, L.C. 
10 West 100 South, Suite 425 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801)539-1900 
Telefax: (801)322-1054 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
Ronald R. Whaley and Melanie A. Reif 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
Park City Municipal Corporation, 
Randy Barton, d/b/a The Wooden Dog and 
Mountain Town Stages, Mountain Town 
Stages, a nonprofit corporation, and 
Park City Arts Council, a nonprofit 
corporation 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF RUSSELL A. CLINE 
Civil No.: 010600122-PR 
Judge Robert K. Hilder 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Russell A. Cline, being duly sworn, does say and depose as follows: 
1. I am attorney of record for plaintiffs in the above-captioned matter. 
2. On Thursday, July 18, 2003,1 had a telephone conversation with Kevyn Dem. 
3. Mr. Dem said that he was a musician that played at the Town Lift Plaza in Park 
0Ui lb4 
City, Utah in the summer of 1999. 
4. Mr. Dem said that he was booked that summer by Randy Barton, dba The 
Wooden Dog. 
5. Mr. Dern said that during the performances he recalled that complaints were made 
by some neighbors as to the volume of the music. 
6. Mr. Dem said that Randy Barton provided the sound system for the concerts at 
which he performed. 
7. Mr. Dem said that Randy Barton was the person that adjusted the volume of the 
music prior to and during the performances. 
8. Mr. Dem said that Randy Barton was present during the concerts and handled the 
complaints relating to the volume of the music. 
9. Mr. Dem said that Randy Barton adjusted the volume of the music during the 
concerts at which complaints were made in an effort to resolve complaints about the volume of 
the music. 
10. Mr. Dem said that Randy Barton, d/b/a Mountain Town Stages, had also booked 
him to perform at Town Lift Plaza during the Summer of 2000. 
11. I have requested that Mr. Dem voluntarily provide an affidavit as to the 
foregoing. However, to date he has not done so. 
12. Rule 26(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure prevents any discovery prior to 
an Attorney Planning Conference being held. 
13. Because of the various dispositive motions (and motions for reconsideration) that 
have been before the court since the Complaint in this case was filed, no Attorney Planning 
2 
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Conference has been held. 
14. I request that the Court vacate its prior ruling so that an Attorney Planning 
Conference Report can be filed and Mr. Dern's deposition can be taken. 
15. Attached hereto as Exhibits B, C, D and E are true and correct copies of the 
following newspaper articles: Happening Today, Salt Lake Tribune, Aug. 7, 1999, at C6; Utah 
Marquee: Music, Salt Lake Tribune, Aug. 6, 1999, at E6; Weekend Entertainment Calendar, 
Deseret News, July 2, 1999, at C2; and Park City Divas (Wooden Dog Annual Benefit Concert), 
Park Record, May 1, 1999, at B-6. 
DATED this I/O day of September, 2003. // 
iCussell A. Cline 
Sworn and subscribed before me this ' ^ day of September, 2003. 
,,<6rf«>^ N OTARY PUBLIC 
$%0lm\ SHAUNA L ROGERS 
^ ^ l | e \ 1 0 E a s t S o u t h Temple, 5th Floor i*lm»¥ft )c£ Salt Lake C i t y > U T 84133 
x
^^tHm^ My Commission Expires 
vCtJJJS^y June 11, 2006 
^ . i "» ,V ' " STATE OF UTAH 
S^&-^ £ 
Notary Public 
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EXHIBIT "B" 
{Happening Today, Salt Lake Tribune, Aug. 7, 1999, at C6) 
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Happening Today ... 08/07/1999 
The Salt Lake Tribune 
Date: 08/07/1999 Edition: Final Section: Religion Page: C6 
Keywords: Events Schedul 
Happening Today 
The Wooden Dog Plaza Concert Series 
Town Lift Plaza; Between Main Street and Park Ave at 8th Street; David Hahn, 2 p.m.; Shane Jackman, 6 
p.m.; free. 
Utah Symphony with 
Michael Martin Murphey 
classical/country; Deer Valley Resort, Park City; 7:30 p.m.; 355-ARTS. 
Utah Festival Opera 
Opera; Ellen Eccles Theatre; "The Tales Of Hoffmann," "The Student Prince," and Carousel"; Logan; $15 
to $45 
Barbara and Gerhardt Suhrstedt 
keyboardists; Assembly Hall, Temple Square; 7:30 p.m.; free. 
"The Reluctant Dragon," 
City Rep Theater; 638 S. State St.; 7:30 p.m.; tickets, $7, 532-6000. 
"I Do! I Do!" 
Provo Theatre Company; 105 E. 100 North, Provo; 8 p.m., tickets, $12.50 to $15 with discounts available; 
call (801) 379-0600 between 6 and 9 on performance evenings. 
"The Masque of Beauty 
and the Beast" 
Lighthouse Theatre; 4991 S. Highland Drive, behind Cottonwood Mall; 7 p.m.; adults $7, seniors $6 and 
children $5; call 274-9404, presented by Academy Theatre Company. 
Tributary Theatre 
Star Hall; Moab; "Gulliver's Travels," 7 p.m.; tickets, $4 to $8; (800) 413-8164. 
"George Washington Slept Here" 
Hale Center Theater Orem, 225 W. 400 North; 7:30 p.m.; through Aug. 16; tickets, $7-$ 10; 226-8600. 
"Showdown at Sugar Cane Saloon" 
Heritage Theatre; 2505 S. Highway 89, Perry; 8 p.m.; through Aug. 14; tickets, $5 and $6; (435) 723-
8392. 
"The Farley Family Reunion" 
with James Arrington, Villa Playhouse; 254 S. Main, Springville; 7:30 p.m.; tickets, 489-3088. 
"Tons of Money" 
Springville Civic Center, 50 S. Main St., Springville (below Springville Public Library); 7:30 p.m.; $5, $4 
for students and seniors. 
"Quick Wits" 
Off Broadway Theatre; 272 S. Main, Salt Lake City; 10 p.m.; tickets, $8 adults, $6 students and seniors; 
355-4628. 
"Mission Improbable" 
Terrace Plaza Playhouse; 99 E. 4700 South, Ogden; 10:30 p.m.; tickets, $5 adults, $3 students with ID; 
393-0070. 
"Waiting for Godot" 
Margetts Theatre; Brigham Young University, Provo; 7:30 p.m.; tickets, $9, $7 for students or faculty, 
(801)378-4322. 
"Comedy of Errors" 
Alder Amphitheater, Salt Lake Community College Redwood Campus; 4600 S. Redwood Road; 7 p.m.; 
Oullb.8 
EXHIBIT "C" 
{Utah Marquee: Music, Salt Lake Tribune, Aug. 6, 1999, at E6) 
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Utah Marquee MUSIC 08/06/1999 
The Salt Lake Tribune 
Date 08/06/1999 Edition Final Section Calendar Page E6 
Keywords Events Schedule 
Subject Arts Culture and Entertainment 
Utah Marquee: MUSIC 
The Wooden Dog Plaza Concert Senes 
Town Lift Plaza, Between Mam Street and Paik Ave at 8th Sheet, James Scott, tonight 6 p m , David 
Hahn, Saturday, 2 p m , Shane Jackman, Satin day, 6 p m , Pat Carnahan Trio, Sunday, 2 p m , Mi 
Whoopee, Sunday, 6 p m , free 
The Park City 
International Music Festival 
St Mary of the Assumption Catholic Church, Paik City, tonight, 8 p m , $15 legulai admission, $10 
students/seniors 
Utah Symphony 
with Michael Martin Murphey 
classical/country, Abiavanel Hall, 123 W South Temple, tonight, 7 30 p m , also Deei Valley Resort, Park 
City, Satuiday, 7 30 p m , 355 ARTS 
Utah Festival Opera 
Opera, Ellen Eccles Theatre, "The Tales Of Hoffmann,' "The Student Prince," and Caiousel", Logan, 
tonight thiough Aug 7, $15 to $45 
Ammaha Concert 
Homeless animal fund-raiser concert, featuimg the Munay Concert Band, Cliff Millwaid, conductor, 
arrive early for a camel ride at 6 30 p m , Munay Park Amphitheater 5100 S State Street, 8 p m , Concert 
$5, Children $3, Camel nde $3 
Barbara and Gerhardt Suhistedt 
keyboaidists, Assembly Hall, Temple Square, Satuiday, 7 30 p m , free 
Kathy Kalhck Band 
contemporary, Randall L Jones Theatie, Southern Utah University, Cedar City, Sunday, 7 p m 
Park City International Music 
Festival and Young Artist Institute 
classical, Paik City Community Church, Sunday, 8 p m , $15 legulai admission, $10 students/seniois 
On the Mark 
bluegiass, Sundance Village Sundance Resoit, Piovo Canyon, Sunday, 2 to 5 p m , free 
Alumni Band 
Kent Concert Hall, Chase Fine Arts Center, Utah State University Logan, Sunday, 7 p m , fiee 
Biown Bag Concert Senes 
City Cieek Park, North Temple and State Street, Monday Cieighkey, Celtic, Tuesday, Juliet Convention, 
folk, Wednesday, Julie Hill, Smger/songwntei, Thuisday, Eddy Zenn, rock, 12 15 pm free 
Elbo Finn 
lock, Trolley Square, 500 S 700 East, 6 3 0 p m 
Spirit of Unity World Tom 
reggae, Hellenic Center, 279 S 300 West, Salt Lake City, Tuesday, doois open at 3 30 p m , music from 5 
to 10 p m 
Chamber Strings 
rock, ABG's, 190 W Center, Provo 9 p m 
Twilight Concert Series 
concert and outdoor maiket, featuring Petei Rowan and dobio mastei Jeiry Douglas bluegrass Galhvan 
Utah Centei, 36 E 200 South, Thuisday, 7 30 p m , fiee 
O u i l id 
EXHIBIT "D" 
(WeekendEntertainment Calendar, Deseret News, July 2, 1999, at C2) 
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Deseret News Archives, 
Friday, July 2, 1999 
Edition: All 
Section: Leisure 
Page: C02 
Length: 244 lines 
Weekend entertainment calendar 
MUSIC/DANCE 
Music of the Night a Broadway Medley, July 1-August 14, 6:30 p.m., the Little London Dinner Theater, Pleasant Grove, 
tickets at the door. 
The Utah National Guard 23rd Army Band, July2-3, 7:30 p.m., Assembly Hall, Temple Square, free. 
Tlie Utah Music Festival, July 2, 8 p.m., St. Luke's Episcopal Church, Park City; 7 p.m., New St. Mary's Catholic Church, 
Park City ; 5 p.m., Sai-Sommet Restaurant Terrace, Deer Valley Club. Tickets for all shows are at the door. 
Folk Concert, July 3, 7 p.m., DUP Building in downtown Torrey, Ut. Free. 
Tir na n'og, July 3, 8 p.m., Westminster College Malmsten Amphitheater, tickets at the door. 
"Yesturday-A Salute to the Beatles," July 3, 8 p.m., Murray Softball Field, free. 
Fireworks Concert, July 4, 9 p.m., Layton Heritage Park, free. 
Kirkmount, July 4, 2 p.m., Sundance Village, Sundance resort, free. 
Shanahy, July 4, 7 p.m., Southern Utah Umversity Randall L. Jones Theater, Cedar City, tickets at the door. 
Utah State Umveisity Alumni Band, July 4, 7 p.m., Utah State University Main Hill Amphitheater, fiee 
United States Air Force Band, July 5, 7 p.m., Bngham City Chamber of Commerce Historic Building, free. 
Celtic Dance Theater "Fire and Grace", July 6, 8 p.m., Kingsbury Flail, tickets at the door. 
Tlie Duttons, July 6, 7:30 p.m., Kenley Centennial Amplntheater, tickets available at all First National Bank offices, Olde 
Samt Rose Gift Shop, Layton. 
Howard Jones, July 6, 7 p.m., Snow Park Lodge Outdoor Amphitheater at Deer Valley, tickets at the gate 
Am DiFranco, July 7, 7 p.m., Snow Park Lodge Outdoor Amphitheater. Deer Valley, tickets at the gate. 
Avenues Jazz Trio, July 7, 7:30 p.m., Anderson-Foothill Branch Library Amphitheater, free. 
Ruth Ellis, July 7, 7"30 p.m., Assembly Hall Temple Square, free. 
G U J . 1 7 2 
Utah Symphony, July 7, noon, Gallivan Center Plaza, free. 
Dynatones and the Tempo Timers, July 7, 7 p.m., Gallivan Center Plaza, free. 
Amy Jackson and Paul Noyce, July 8 , 7 p.m., Riverton Music Recital Hall, donations accepted at the door. 
Cat Van Natter & Friends, July 8, 6:30 p.m., MTC Park, Ogden, free. 
Charlie Musselwhite Band, July 8, 7:30 p.m., Gallivan Center Plaza, free. 
Judith Stillman, Maria Lambros, and Guest, July 8, 8 p.m., St. Mary's Catholic Church, Park City, tickets at the door. 
Members of the Muir Quartet, July 8, 8 p.m., St. Mary's Church, Park City, tickets available at the door. 
Paul Whelan, July 9, 7:30 p.m., Assembly Hall, Temple Square, free. 
Murray Ballet Theaterb, July 9-10, 8:30 p.m., Murray Park Outdoor Amphitheater, tickets at the door. 
Rock U2 the Top, Carousel Theatre, Lagoon, daily except Thursdays through Labor Day weekend. 
BROWN BAG CONCERT SERIES 
Underpaid Professors, July 2 
Phil Taylor, July 6 
Shanahy, July 7 
Kairo by Night, July 8 
Anke Summerhill, July 9 
All concerts begin at 12:15 p.m., Eagle Gate Plaza at South Temple and State Street. 
CONCERTS IN THE PARK 
Castleview Cloggers, July 2 
Salt Lake Symphony, July 6 
Intimate Opera, July 9 
All concerts will begin at 8 p.m., Brigham Young Historic Park, free. 
THE WOODEN DOG CONCERT SERIES 
James Scott, July 2, 6 p.m. 
David Halm and Leraine Hortsmanshoff, July 3, 2:30 and 6 p.m. 
Mr. Whoopee, Megan Peters, Leraine Hortsmanshoff, July 4, lp.m.-6 p.m. 
All concerts will be at Park City's Town Lift Plaza. They are free. 
0ui l73 
EXHIBIT "E" 
{Park City Divas (Wooden Dog Annual Benefit Concert), Park Record, May 1, 1999, at B-6) 
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O r a m Shea Price Lvndsa \ 
Schmunk Rachel N o e l ^ess i 
D o m e n i c k A m a n d a D e a d e n c k 
A h De lan t } Lau ra Khngensle4n 
Jennie St i th Mackenz ie St i th 
N o r a Laslev Jasmine Faber 
N ico le Schoenherr A n n i e Serra 
B n t l Sacks Nanc \ K ie fhabe r 
C a m i Orcu t t Sa"mm\ D e l a n n 
and Rene Cohen 
Dance Tech is ho ld ing open 
aud i t ions for nev. compa-m 
dancers ages six to 10 A u d i t i o n ^ 
w i l l be held at Dance Tech 12*^ 
I r o n Horse D r Sa iu rda \ June 
12 
Dance Tech S tud io of fers a 
\ e a r roand dance p rog ram lo r 
gir ls and b o \ s ages three t o IN 
Classes o f fered inc lude p r t bal 
let classical bal let po inte jazz 
K n c a l tap h ip hop breakdanc 
ing and L i t t l e M a n Jamm For 
fu r the r i n f o r m a t i o n cal l n ^ 
9 2 H 
Dancer Jasmine Faber performs the soto dance to • " • « * * - — • * • 
which won her a high first place 
Spotlight" statewide dance competition. 
at last weekend^ 
'Divas' highlights local female talent 
• Continued from B-1 
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to tht static at the EccLv ( c n t u 
wi th hi.r blucs\ \o ie t a<> p i n ol l l u 
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rendit ion of the theme Irom 1 he 
Litt le M e r m n d 
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ac $2$ MIMX St Admission is $7 
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IONAL SERVICES 
i l auto 
[ion 
?nter 
d B y 
h D 
D 
S W 
lan M S 
APRN 
xjy Family 
Scale 649 
)octors 
MD, PhD 
Specialist 
ir & Joints Pain 
Pain Pain 
Services 
it injection 
therapy and 
Sidewinder Dr 
urgery 
MD 
AD 
irgery 
y Contounng * 
on • Hanri 
Medicine and Spine specialist 
Charles L Beck, MD 
Vernon J Cooley, M D 
Lesl ie J Harris, M D 
Thomas D Rosenburg , M D 
2200 Park Ave Suite D-100 
Universi ty of Utah Park City 
Family heal th Center 
649-7640 
Adult and Pediatric Medical Care 
Family Planning Medical 
Emergencies and Trauma 
Dtp}ornate, American Board 
of Family Practice 
Robert W Barnett , MD 
Cress R Bohnn , MD 
Robert J Evers, MD 
Pam Farmer, MD 
Dave Greenberg, MD 
Joseph Feniter, MD 
J o h n Hanrahan, MD 
Chr is Hays M D 
Elizabeth Wetzel, MD 
Diplomate American Board of 
Pediatrics 
Robert T Winn, MD 
Family Nurse-Practitioner 
R Herbert Lepley, FNP 
Kathleen Wl tham FNP 
Certified in Sports Medicine 
Dr Robert J Evers 
Dr Cress Bohnn 
Dr Chr is Hays 
Uniyejsift ^-Ulah3iimmlt 
Hejdth £e_Diex 
1750 W Sun Peak Drive 
Terry P Sm i t h MD Ptodfafcy 
Renato Sattz, M D Piaster Suwgpey 
Kathy DeTemple, Hanoi Ttaajpjp 
Todd Reich PT Ph\>stcail Jfo&mpy 
Chr is topher Jones . USD, Steejp) 
Disorcfe s 
Laurence P d o f L M B . 
Reproductive Endocrinology 
Robin Ross APRM, Meitta* Heetfffe 
64^ 80-1? 
Patricia L indsay, PHd . 
Lesl ie Webster MD. P&dimmns 
65 <> 092b 
Lena Terry MD Pedisttmcs, 
IHC Phys ic ian G r o u p 
Family P r a c t i c e 658-©179 
Joseph H B e n n a a . M D 
George A J o s e p h , MO 
Boa d Cei r f ied 
Shon Wartmg Times 
Urqeni Care 
' Radiology and Laboratoiry 
Servit e<< 
Physical Therapy 
Most insurance plans flpflegrte<tf 
1612 Wesl Ule Blvd Suite 112 aft 
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Music 
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•fjnee Quality work Gomnartteeil 
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77i«? Park Record Saturday. May 1, 19 
Btihd & Shutter Sale 
Free Installation!!! 
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2 5 % OFF Shut ters 
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Li ffFREE [stimates • ^ • "
 D
^ 649-9665 
544 Park Ave. 
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vein round dance prop ram lor 
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I \r ieal. u p . hip-hnp. hreakdanc-
inp and Little Man Jamm. For 
furl net information, cull 655-
• O l * . 
Dancer J 
which t 
"SpotDahr statewide d 
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a dance to "Witness,! 
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Continued from B-1 
FiUperald. Sclipman recently look 
to the siape at the Ecclcs Center 
with her hlucsv voice I U pan of the 
Jazz. < iospcl. Blue* performance 
featuring B. Murphy of The . • 
Platters - . » • • v 
. uicst Park Cttv Diva. 
Iltcodosia " I l ica" Blaine Hcnncy 
is vtmetfunp of a sinpinp sensation. 
at the 11 year-old pave her first 
punk performance at the age of 
four in SaniB Fc, N.M.. with her 
rendition of the theme from "The 
Little Mermaid." 
Locallv. Thea has performed at 
McPolm filcmenlan productions. 
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Accounting Business Service* 
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Sn.it* 350 S I C by appoKitmenl 
tingtneenng 
Peterson Engineering 
_jL:vyisuHi"g Engineers and Land 
Sl.VfVC«S 
fc'5 vea<s experience 
Phone 801 255 3503 
t*\ e0*. 255-4502 
Construction Slaking tot surveys 
lopoqiaphtc surveys 
I IIKIDC TTTI; II1MII1U 
CiHjt iM" hits: 
V»H«y Mental Health 
M9-&JJ7 
Umtn Hunh Subttanct 
4f)uif *«d Pr»venfK»n S*rv<ej 
• •• I lXO»W> . 
H«cor Olatrlet/Phoenli 
^.o.inc.ai Planning Inc . Financial 
Jiirrv^os Rolnomcnl Vehicles 
y. Ni.tir PlannmQ and Investments 
Sl.ii' S^iiv BO I 'OS 4381 
farmers Inturanct Croup 
Judy Kimball Hanley. Agenl 
W9-86S6 
The Counwtinfl cenfar 
Medwthon Conducted By 
Lynn C. Maynas. Ph.D. 
Executive Director ^ 
Linda Bakttbur.1*ri.O. « •' 
Suzanne Back LC.S.W. 
Jonathan D. Sherman. M.S. 
Pat DrvwTy-Sanger. APRN 
Divorce Ch*d Custody Family 
Contkct SWiog Fee Scale 649-
" Medical Doctors 
AJdMP-ltoCJIPJc 
€55-MOO 
Srmort A. VtaJtarWk, MO. PhD. 
Pain Rehabilitation Specialist 
Neck. Back Muscular & Jomls Pain 
Abdominal & Chest Pain Pain 
Related Depression Services 
include: Trigger point injection 
spinal manipulation therapy and 
acupunctura. 1912 Sidewinder Dr. 
Suite 108 
Park CUy^HifltSucBtr/ 
A*»ocM«a 
Larry G. Leonard. M.O. 
Daniel S. Seders, M O . 
Cosmetic Plaskc Surgery *n 
Breast • Face • Body (^nfourihg • 
Bieast Reconstrudion • Hand 
Surgery 
Reconslaictive Plastic Surgery 
1795 Sidawmder Dnve 
649-0074 
Mor«n.Ey» C«lexJlnbm»»ty of 
Ulah 
Summit Hf ¥W.C*ntar 
658-1390 
Ophthalmology 
Bart P. Ketover. M.D. 
John B. Pau lo . M.O. 
Th« OrthoofvHc SpecfaHy Cllnlc-
PerK City 
65S-S322 
Orttioperhc Surgeons Sports 
Macfecine and Spina tpeciatrst. 
Charles U Back. MO 
Vemon J. Cooiey, M.D. 
Lealte J . Harrta, M.D. 
Thomas D. Rosenborg. M.D. 
2200 Park Ave, Suite D-100 
UnlvaraHv of Utah P.rV K H Y 
M»-7»40 * 
Adult and Peraatric Medical Care. 
Family Planning. Medcaf 
Emergencies, and Trauma 
Diplomats, American Board 
of Fam«y Pnctfc* 
Robert W. Bamatt, MD 
Crass R. Bohnn. M 0 
Robert J . Ever*. MD 
m Pam Farmer, MD 
Dave Graenbery^VD 
Joaaph Ferriter. MD 
John Hanrahan, MD 
Chris Hays. M.D. 
Elizabeth Wetzaf. MD 
Ofpfomafa. Amarican Board of 
Terry P SmWi, MO, Ftahaty 
Ranato Sattz, MO, Pttoai: Skagan/ 
Kathy DeTampte. Hand Ttmopy 
Todd Belch. PT/ fyscat f Thmapr 
Owtanphar Jonas, MD, Sleap 
Orsoroiers 
U u r w w e J k k ^ L V a . ^ . . . — 
BeirjroQt<dfag1&idbowotaar 
Room Ross, APRN, a 
64S-B013 
N E W LOCATION: 
a Open 
Robert T. Winn. MO 
Family Nuna-PmcWonar 
R. Herbert Leptey, FNP 
Karhtean WWham. FNP 
Carmad In Sport* Madiclna 
Dr. Robert J. Evars 
Or. Cress Bohnn 
Dr. Chris Hays 
LmfYarslty of Utah SrorpJI 
Ps)cnol0C«S7 647-S7IS 
Ln l te Webstar, aRQ. Pmfaortx 
655-0926 
Lena Terry. MD. Fttftajncs. 
655-0926. 
(HC Ph^siojaj^Qrojia 
Family Practtoe CStKM79 
Joseph H. Barman, U D 
George A. Joseph. MD 
• Board Gerirtifed 
" Shori Waamg Times 
" Uioem Care 
* Racioiogy aryj Laboafiory 
Services 
* Physical Therapy 
' Mosi insurance plans *»•»<,a«*i 
1612 Wea u » BUd. Sute 112 • 
Kimball Juncnoo. Park Oey 
Back and Wee* Therapy 
Pacsonat Trajrang 
Cteettonino MBrnbersbips 
Open MoB.-Frt 6 am. to 7 pi 
Sattjnaqr 8 am lo 7 pm 
1255 focitiorse Dnva 
RealEstate 
TT 
w 801-687-4511 
randan ftaatty & C j ^ v « n o a , l L C 
Ifcusav, tect. condus. farms and 
larches. Dear VWley Park CKy. 
Swaps* County Utah, Idaho. 
IU«C 
1750 W Sun Peak DrWa 
Parte City. UT 8 4 0 M 
M7-5740 
Monday - Frkfay l:30em-B:30pm 
MuHi-Spedarry Facikty. stalled by 
Board Certified University o< Utah 
Faculty 
Jutte Dolan, MD, Fam»y Practice 
Brian Rush.MO, FarrWy Practice 
Mary Parsons, MO. Internal 
Kim Scott, MD. Internal M e d o r * 
JennhV VanHom, MD. OB&YH 
BHtki Rowtes. M0 . OB-GYN 
T\na Fought, CNM. Nurse Mowtie 
Jeffrey B SnMm. MD. Dermaiotop) 
Piano lunei ov»r 1 
enoe Qualify * , 
Relerances avaflatte. Fton Janseh 
435-783-5334 p, 80t-S7S-l9BS 
•TC ivsvcai Therapy 
TOSH PanX-Ctly 
The Ormopedk: SpactaBy 
Hosprtal (tormedy r " 
Physical Therapy) 
M7-5955 
Jan Watta.fl.P.T. 
Laurie Savage * wing P.T. 
Marten* Hatch. P X 
SpecuiK/ing n per»onatead'cap» ft 
win' «n»u^ ' OnYionedc rehabllfta-
IOT iMIunng Daci knee & ffVt* 
Uaaas. Woteott & Oornbush 
84» -18M or 8O0-MVl f t84 
i s» Park Cm/and 
Seaow FVanca 4 Asaooatas 
Paer>laeu| ReatCatata 
P a r t Cay S77-Z73-288S 
Video ct'lruin Pfoductioa" 
WBIWW TWC PredvctKpav 
Sheam EaaeiynXrector 
* 4 3 - 7 m 
CV>ree»JtB >"deo and 6frn producboo 
corporate, ectcaoonal, commerciajs 
IHI.I 
